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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL MACROECONOMICS
AND MONETARY POLICY
by
Renzo Manuel Alvarez Oyola
Florida International University, 2019
Miami, Florida
Professor Hakan Yilmazkuday, Major Professor
A sound monetary policy depends on a solid understanding of how external shocks
reverberate throughout the economy. This is particularly true in emerging market
economies under the inflation targeting (IT) framework since these economies tend
to be subject to large external shocks, and don’t have a long IT track record. My
dissertation studies the macroeconomic consequences of external shocks under IT in
emerging market economies, and the policy response to such shocks.
The first chapter studies whether foreign exchange interventions (FXI) are effec-
tive under IT in the context of commodity prices shocks. It also explores the extent
to which lack of public confidence in the central bank’s ability to meet its infla-
tion objectives may frustrate the success of FXI. Using an interacted panel vector
autoregression framework, I find that, when the central bank fights simultaneous
appreciation and inflationary pressures driven by positive commodity price shocks,
FXI indeed leads to less exchange rate appreciation. However, lack of credibility —
reflected by the (de-)anchoring of inflation expectations — can undermine a central
bank’s FXI effort since less credible central banks increase interest rates more ag-
gressively to stabilize inflation. The simultaneous effort to depreciate the currency
is thus weakened in the presence of higher rates.
vi
The second chapter investigates the implications of international trade costs
shocks for exchange rate determination under different inflation targets. Using a
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model I show that, given a shock to in-
ternational trade costs, the nominal exchange rate exhibits higher volatility under
higher inflation targets. The results suggest that monetary policy authorities should
choose inflation targets with caution, especially in a context of uncertainty regarding
international trade costs.
The third chapter empirically estimates the extent to which changes in the ex-
change rate induce changes in the prices of imported agricultural goods in Turkey.
I show that agricultural commodities have a low and incomplete exchange rate
pass-through. The results suggest that Turkish monetary policymakers may allow
nominal exchange rate fluctuations to stabilize real activity without having to worry
about a spike in CPI inflation induced by higher import prices.
vii
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INTRODUCTION
The sound formulation and implementation of monetary policy rests on an appropri-
ate understanding of how external shocks reverberate throughout the economy. This
is particularly the case in emerging market economies under the inflation targeting
monetary policy framework. Under inflation targeting the Central Bank announces
a target for the inflation rate and conducts policy in order to achieve it. This implies
that other policy objectives — like exchange rate stability — come second to the pri-
mary objective of price stability. This in turn means that central banks constantly
face policy trade offs when external shocks occur, and policymakers need to fully
understand the consequences of these shocks before devising the policy response.
These considerations are especially true in emerging market economies for var-
ious reasons. First, these economies tend to be subject to large external shocks.
Second, policymakers in these countries don’t have a long track record under in-
flation targeting. Third, even though the exchange rate is supposed to float freely
under inflation targeting, the fact remains that most emerging markets pay close
attention to exchange rate developments for reason that range from financial stabil-
ity to external competitiveness. With this in mind, understanding the interactions
between the economic shocks and both inflation and the exchange rate, and between
the shock and the monetary policy response is crucial. With this in mind, my dis-
sertation studies the macroeconomic consequences of external shocks under inflation
targeting in emerging market economies and the monetary policy response to such
shocks.
In the first chapter, I begin by noting that in recent years, significant exchange
rate pressures, driven by large external shocks, have induced inflation targeting cen-
tral banks in emerging market economies to intervene in foreign exchange markets,
while trying to stabilize inflation. The viability of foreign exchange interventions
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under inflation targeting has generated an intense debate given their theoretical
incompatibility. This chapter analyzes whether foreign exchange interventions are
effective under inflation targeting, and the extent to which lack of public confidence
in the central bank’s ability to meet its inflation objectives may frustrate the success
of foreign exchange interventions.
Using an interacted panel vector autoregression framework and a set of seven
inflation targeting emerging markets, I find that, when the central bank fights si-
multaneous appreciation and inflationary pressures driven by positive commodity
price shocks, foreign exchange intervention indeed leads to less exchange rate appre-
ciation. However, lack of credibility — reflected by the (de-)anchoring of inflation
expectations — can undermine a central bank’s foreign exchange intervention ef-
fort. The reason is that less credible central banks need to increase interest rates
more aggressively to stabilize inflation. This undermines the simultaneous effort to
depreciate the currency by inducing a new source of appreciation pressure on the
exchange rate.
The results suggest that the appreciation effect of the interest rate response
to a loss of credibility reflected by a 1 percentage point increase in the inflation
expectations gap can cancel out the depreciation effect of a purchase of foreign
currency equivalent to 0.75 percent of GDP. This is a large effect, considering that,
on average, countries in the sample hold international reserves in the amount of 10
percent of GDP.
This paper contributes not only to the literature on foreign exchange intervention
and the literature on central bank credibility mentioned above, but also to a recent
debate on how inflation targeting emerging markets should conduct monetary policy
when they are hit by large external shocks. Over time, the literature has noticed
that inflation targeting central banks in emerging market economies (EMEs) have
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generally succeeded at keeping inflation in check (see IMF, 2018a). However, the
desirability to meet other policy objectives, especially after the Global Crisis, has
prompted a debate on how the framework should be complemented. In this debate,
there is no consensus on the merits and viability of exchange rate management within
the inflation targeting framework. However, in recent years, the literature has found
evidence that there may be room for some degree of exchange rate management
within inflation targeting, especially in emerging markets.
Within this reality, the findings of this chapter suggest that foreign exchange
intervention in inflation targeting EMEs may indeed serve as a buffer to contain
appreciation pressures in the context of large external shocks. However, they also
suggest that policymakers should proceed with caution. In general, it’s clear that
central banks should avoid engaging in foreign exchange interventions that are in-
consistent with the monetary policy stance — such as trying to curb appreciation
pressures while raising interest rates. But the results of this paper emphasize that
this should be particularly the case in situations in which inflation expectations are
not well-anchored and policy credibility is lacking. To the extent that the public
does not view the central bank as being credible, policymakers could find that they
need to conduct more aggressive foreign exchange interventions in order to overcome
their own more aggressive monetary policy stance. For policymakers, the results pre-
sented in that chapter offer a further incentive to increase the quality of the inflation
targeting framework by increasing transparency and devising better communication
strategies with the aim of increasing the credibility of monetary policy. The eco-
nomic benefits of well-anchored inflation expectations and high credibility are well
documented in the literature. This first chapter offers another reason to strive for
further improvements in policy credibility.
3
In the second chapter, I investigate the implications of shocks to international
trade costs (e.g. transportation costs) for exchange rate determination under the
inflation targeting regime. Understanding these shocks is important since they affect
the prices of imported goods, which in turn can affect inflation. These shocks
can trigger monetary policy responses by inducing inflation deviations from the
target. Further, these consequences may vary with the magnitude of the inflation
rate targeted by the central bank. Indeed, there is heterogeneity regarding what
inflation rate is targeted in different countries, and in fact, some countries may even
be considering raising their targets. For instance, since the crisis, some economists
have argued that Central Banks could raise their inflation targets (say, from 2% to
4% in the case of the Federal Reserve) so that monetary policy can have more room
for action in the context of deflationary shocks (see Blanchard et al. (2010) and Ball
(2013)). Controlling for the prevailing inflation target is important since, as Ascari
and Sbordone (2014) have shown in a closed economy model, higher inflation targets
are associated with a more volatile and unstable economy, and they can induce
a more aggressive monetary policy response to inflation deviations from target.
However, the interaction between trade costs shocks and IT has not been taken into
account in the literature and a number of questions remain unanswered.
To fill this gap in the literature, I develop a two-country dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model (DSGE) of the New Keynesian type. I then simulate this
micro-founded New-Keynesian model to test its implications. When the monetary
policy authority uses a CPI-based Taylor Rule, I find that a trade costs shock
received by the Home economy leads to a permanent depreciation of the nominal
exchange rate, and this permanent depreciation is more pronounced under higher
inflation targets. Further, I find that the nominal exchange rate exhibits changes of
larger magnitude in each period following the shock under higher inflation targets,
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suggesting a higher volatility. Lastly, I find that this type of shock induces the real
exchange rate to exhibit a slow pace of adjustment towards its equilibrium value.
The implied persistence of the real exchange rate is higher under trade costs shocks
than under monetary policy shocks.
In short, under this calibration exercise, the model predicts that given a shock
to international trade costs, the nominal exchange rate exhibits higher volatility
under higher inflation targets. The results suggest that monetary policy authorities
should choose inflation targets with caution, especially in a context of uncertainty
regarding international trade costs.
In the last chapter, chapter I empirically estimate the extent to which changes in
the exchange rate induce changes in the prices of imported agricultural goods — the
exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) — in Turkey. Since increases in import prices
can increase consumer price inflation the measure obtained is of great importance to
policymakers. To do this, I introduce a novel good-level data set of daily wholesale
prices of imported agricultural products into Turkey.
The data set has two main advantages over others used in the literature. First,
it consists of daily prices. To my knowledge, this is one of a few databases available
in which the frequency of the observations is daily. One of the most important con-
tributions of this chapter is to establish a relationship between the level of exchange
rate pass-through (ERPT) and the storage potential of an agricultural product (a
concept related to the literature on the economic effects of depreciation of invento-
ries). Since some agricultural commodities have a storage potential of only a few
days, having a daily investigation is crucial for establishing this relationship. Second,
the data source contains the corresponding daily prices for domestically produced
agricultural products. This allows me to construct a relevant measure that controls
for all other macroeconomic developments in Turkey which may affect the prices of
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agricultural commodities, thereby allowing me to properly identify the pure effect
of nominal exchange rate changes on prices.
In general, the chapter presents evidence that agricultural commodities have
a low and incomplete exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) measure. The results
of standard empirical analysis are in line with the findings in the literature. In
particular, this chapter provides evidence for incomplete daily ERPT of about 5%.
The key contribution of the chapter arises once nonlinearities are taken into account.
Using a threshold regression model, the chapter provides evidence of an ERPT
measure that doubles to about 10% when daily nominal exchange rate changes
exceed 0.55%, when the prices of the imported commodities change more than 3.12%
of the time, and when the storage potential of a product is above 10 weeks. This
last results is in line with an economic channel in which the seller of a perishable
commodity wishes to sell the good as soon as possible, due to its high depreciation
rate. This implies that sellers of products with lower storage potential will be less
inclined to try to pass-through their higher costs to consumers in the event of an
exchange rate shock. On the contrary, importers of commodities with longer shelf
lives may pass-through their higher costs simply because they can afford to wait for
an optimal price. This channel is in line with the studies of Kryvtsov and Midrigan
(2012), and Alessandria et al. (2013), who show that the optimal price of a seller
decreases as the depreciation rate of its inventories increase.
The results suggest that Turkish monetary policymakers may allow nominal
exchange rate fluctuations to stabilize real activity in the face of external shocks
without having to worry about a spike in CPI inflation induced by higher prices of
imported agricultural commodities.
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CHAPTER 1
FOREIGN EXCHANGE INTERVENTION, INFLATION
TARGETING, AND CENTRAL BANK CREDIBILITY
1.1 Introduction
In recent years, emerging markets have faced significant exchange rate pressures
driven by large terms-of-trade movements and sizable international capital flows.1
These pressures have posed serious challenges for the central banks in these coun-
tries, particularly for those with formal inflation targeting (IT) frameworks. The
reason is that IT requires exchange rate flexibility (Mishkin, 2000; Mishkin and
Savastano, 2001), yet excessive exchange rate volatility can induce well-known ad-
verse effects in emerging markets (Nordstrom et al., 2009).2 This yields the familiar
“fear of floating” (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002) or, more recently, the “fear of ap-
preciation” (Levy-Yeyati et al., 2013) typically associated with these economies.
Consequently, IT central banks tend to respond to exchange rate pressures driven
by large external shocks by intervening in foreign exchange markets, while using
interest rate policy to stabilize inflation. Managing the exchange rate under IT,
however, is a hotly debated topic in the literature. Not only is there no consensus
on whether there is room for foreign exchange interventions within the IT frame-
work, it is also not clear what determines the effectiveness of these interventions
under this regime.
In this paper, I show that IT central banks in emerging market economies
(EMEs) are indeed able to curb exchange pressures by intervening in foreign ex-
1The terms-of-trade movements in emerging markets have been largely driven by sharp
commodity price fluctuations, while the large international capital flows are largely the
result of monetary policy normalization in advanced economies.
2This is due to the critical role the exchange rate plays in these economies
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change markets, but that the effectiveness of these interventions may depend on
whether the public has confidence in the central bank’s ability to meet its infla-
tion objectives. This effect takes place specially in situations in which the central
bank fights simultaneous appreciation and inflationary pressures driven by external
shocks. Certainly, the literature has demonstrated that the effective formulation
and transmission of monetary policy can be determined by whether the public’s
inflation expectations are anchored to the central bank’s target (Ha et al., 2018).
This paper shows that the credibility of the central bank — reflected by the degree
of anchoring of inflation expectations — can also determine the success of foreign
exchange interventions. In particular, I quantify the extent to which lack of cred-
ibility can undermine a central bank’s foreign exchange intervention effort when it
fights simultaneous appreciation and inflationary pressures driven by commodity
price shocks.
Any attempt at identifying the determinants of foreign exchange intervention
(FXI) effectiveness, however, must first address the methodological challenge posed
by the endogenous nature of the FXI choice. Indeed, interventions attempt to push
against market pressures: central banks accumulate (sell) international reserves to
curb appreciations (depreciations). That is, the decision to intervene in foreign
exchange markets is driven by contemporaneous exchange rate movements, which
makes the decision endogenous. As Adler et al. (2015) point out, unaddressed, the
endogeneity bias tends to conceal the effectiveness of FXI.
To overcome the endogeneity challenge, I use the Interacted Panel Vector Au-
toregression (IPVAR) framework introduced in Towbin and Weber (2013). In this
setup, the dynamics of the endogenous variables can vary with country characteris-
tics; here the FXI intensity and degree of central bank credibility (CBC). Inducing
an external shock that triggers appreciation and inflationary pressures, the model
8
exploits the exogenous nature of the shock and the cross-sectional variation of FXI
and CBC. This allows me to observe the dynamics of the exchange rate for varying
combinations of FXI intensities and degrees of CBC. The external shock used in this
paper is a commodity export price shock. This is meant to reflect the fact that, as
mentioned above, in recent years EMEs have faced significant exchange rate pres-
sures (Figure 1.1a) driven by sharp commodity price movements and sizable capital
flows. The literature, however, has mostly focused on the FXI response to interna-
tional capital flows, devoting little attention to FXI in the context of commodity
price shocks. One of the contributions of this paper is to fill this void.
With this empirical strategy I first analyze the independent effects of FXI and
CBC on the exchange rate, and then their joint effects. Accordingly, I find the
following: First, following a commodity export price shock, IT central banks in
emerging markets conducting FXI are indeed able to curb appreciation pressures on
the exchange rate. In particular, the exchange rate appreciates less (between 0.4
to 1.2 percentage points less) when the central bank intervenes heavily in foreign
exchange markets than when it intervenes lightly. Equivalently, a purchase of foreign
currency in the amount equivalent to 0.75 percent of GDP induces a 1 percent
depreciation of the domestic currency. This result is highly significant, statistically
and economically. In general, this result is consistent with the findings in Aizenman
et al. (2012), who use an error correction approach to find that the accumulation
of reserves in Latin America helps buffer the direct effect of transitory commodity
terms-of-trade shocks on the real effective exchange rate. More broadly, the findings
in this paper are consistent with the findings in Adler and Tovar (2011), Adler et al.
(2015), Blanchard et al. (2015), and Daude et al. (2016), among others, who find
empirical evidence for the effectiveness of FXI.
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Second, following the external shock, relatively lower CBC is found to exacer-
bate the appreciation pressure on the exchange rate. The accompanying dynamics
of inflation and of the policy rate response paint a picture of the underlying mech-
anism. In particular, the appreciation pressure on the exchange rate is intensified
by the policy rate response given the shock’s simultaneous inflationary pressure.
Following the shock, inflation increases more in economies with less credible central
banks than in economies with more credible central banks. Accordingly, central
banks with lower degrees of credibility raise policy rates more aggressively, which
provides a further source of appreciation pressure on the exchange rate. The results
suggest that a loss of credibility in the form of a 1 percent increase in the inflation
expectations gap, ultimately leads to a 1.13 percent appreciation of the exchange
rate.
This agrees with the underlying mechanism identified in theoretical models. For
instance, Neuenkirch and Tillmann (2014) present a model in which agents’ inflation
expectations are sensitive to deviations from the inflation target. To regain credi-
bility, monetary policy under discretion sets higher interest rates today if average
inflation exceeded the target in the past. That is, the model predicts that lower
credibility forces the central bank to increase interest rates more aggressively. This
prediction is confirmed in this paper. The result also confirms the empirical findings
in IMF (2018b) who, in the context of general terms-of-trade shocks, find that the
interest rate response to inflation deviations from target is more aggressive when
inflation expectations are not well-anchored.3
Third, the estimation of the joint effects of FXI and CBC show that less credi-
ble central banks that engage in FXI to fight an appreciation see their intervention
3The analysis in IMF (2018b), however, stops short of discussing the implications for
the exchange rate, and does not touch on foreign exchange interventions.
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efforts undermined by the need to have a more aggressive policy rate response to
fight the inflationary pressures of the underlying shock. In particular, the results
suggest that the appreciation effect (through higher interest rates) of a loss of cred-
ibility reflected by a 1 percentage point increase in the inflation expectations gap
can cancel out the depreciation effect of a purchase of foreign currency equivalent
to 0.75 percent of GDP. Equivalently, an IT EME central bank needs to accumulate
international reserves in the amount of 0.75 percent of GDP to overcome the ap-
preciation pressure to which a 1 percent increase in the inflation expectations gap
ultimately leads. This is a large effect, considering that, on average, countries in the
sample hold international reserves in the amount of 10 percent of GDP, and that
engaging in FXI and holding reserves is costly.4
As suggested above, the importance of credibility arises since FXI does not occur
in isolation, but in a response to shocks that have consequences not only for the
exchange rate, but also for inflation and output. When an external shock puts
appreciation pressures on the exchange rate, the degree of credibility of an IT central
bank may hinder the effectiveness of FXI through its effect on the aggressiveness with
which policy interest rates need to be increased to fight simultaneous inflationary
pressures.5
The potential for lack of coherence between exchange rate policy and inflation
objectives in IT central banks is always there when the external shock places appre-
ciation pressures on the exchange rate while simultaneously inducing inflationary
pressures. For instance, Kamil (2008) provides evidence that in trying to slow
4For a discussion of the costs of foreign exchange interventions see Adler and Mano
(2018)
5This channel is different from what the literature usually refers to as the signaling
channel — the idea that interventions can be viewed by agents as a signal about the
future stance of monetary and exchange rate policy (Sarno and Taylor, 2001)
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down appreciation pressures in 2007, the Central Bank of Colombia’s large-scale
intervention became incompatible with its inflation objectives. The results in this
paper show that this potential tension between exchange rate and monetary policy
is heightened with lower policy credibility. Beyond finding evidence that FXI in
EMEs is effective, this paper suggests that not only policy coherence remains an
important determinant of the effectiveness of FXI, but that central bank credibility
plays a crucial role in determining the success of interventions. In this sense, this
result is related to the finding in Daude et al. (2016), who look at the correlation
between country-specific measures of intervention effectiveness and various macroe-
conomic indicators. They find that the effectiveness of intervention declines with
inflation. The authors interpret this as evidence that lower credibility can reduce
the effectiveness of FXI. That conclusion relies on an interpretation of realized infla-
tion as a valid proxy for credibility. The results above, however, rely on credibility
measures based on inflation expectations — the most commonly used measures of
credibility in the literature (see Demertzis et al., 2012).
The final contribution of the paper is to show that observed inflation-based mea-
sures of credibility measures are informative and yield qualitatively similar results
to those found using expectations-based measures. This result lends credence to the
interpretation in Daude et al. (2016) discussed above. This may seem trivial given
the high correlation between inflation expectations and realized inflation. However,
credibility has a forward-looking interpretation, which implies that current inflation,
or inflation from the recent past, a priori does not contain all the information found
in the information set of agents forming expectations about the future. Indeed, the
fact that the results are quantitatively more nuanced when using credibility mea-
sures based on observed inflation reflects this fact. Nevertheless, it’s important to
know that measures of credibility based on observed inflation can be informative,
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especially since data on inflation expectations is not publicly available for many
emerging markets.
This paper contributes not only to the foreign exchange intervention and central
bank credibility literatures mentioned above, but also to a recent debate on how
IT emerging markets should conduct monetary policy in the face of large external
shocks. Certainly, IT central banks in EMEs have generally succeeded at keeping
inflation in check (see IMF, 2018a).6 However, the desirability to meet other policy
objectives, especially after the Global Crisis, has prompted a debate on how the
framework should be complemented.7 In this debate, there is no consensus on
the merits and viability of exchange rate management within IT. In recent years,
however, the literature has found evidence that there may be room for some degree
of exchange rate management in IT EMEs.8 This seems reasonable given the crucial
6Some argue that this is due to EMEs graduating from pursuing procyclical policies
(Vegh and Vuletin, 2014). Others say there are reasons to believe that low inflation in
EMEs is the result of the “globalization of inflation” (see Ihrig et al., 2010). Nevertheless,
Ha et al. (2018) show that domestic shocks rather than global shocks explain the lion’s
share of the variation in domestic inflation. Similarly, Bems et al. (2018) find evidence
that domestic rather than global factors have been the drivers of the improved inflation
performance in EMEs since the mid-2000s, implying that policymakers can have significant
influence over domestic inflation.
7See Baldwin and Reichlin (2013); Smets et al. (2014); Gillitzer et al. (2015); Debortoli
et al. (2018); and Ghosh et al. (2016), among others.
8For instance, Ghosh et al. (2016) present a model in which judicious foreign exchange
intervention can supplement inflation targeting especially in the face of volatile capital
flows. They find that FXI is fully consistent with the central bank meeting its inflation
target under IT, and that this is welfare enhancing insofar as the central bank cares about
exchange rate volatility. Similarly, Airaudo (2016) presents a model in which management
of the exchange rate greatly enhances the efficacy of inflation targeting. Further, study-
ing inflation targeting Guatemala, Catala´n-Herrera (2016) finds that intervention had a
dampening effect on the daily exchange rate return’s volatility, although level effects are
not found. Lastly, analyzing 37 countries, Berganza and Broto (2012) find that FXI in
some IT countries has been more effective to lower exchange rate volatility than in non-IT
countries.
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role that the exchange rate plays in these economies.9 Normative questions aside,
the reality is that sharp exchange rate fluctuations have triggered the response of IT
EME central banks in recent years. Figure 1.1b plots a simple measure of exchange
rate management for a group of IT and non-IT EMEs. The computed statistic ranges
from 0 (representing a purely floating exchange rate) to 1 (representing a peg). The
figure shows that many IT EMEs manage their exchange rates as actively as, and
sometimes more actively than, non-IT EMEs.1011 There is no reason to believe these
central banks will stop conducting these interventions. This implies that it’s crucial
to understand the determinants of FXI effectiveness and how policy credibility could
facilitate or complicate the task of the policymaker.
Within this reality, the findings of this paper suggest that FXI in IT EMEs may
indeed serve as a buffer to contain appreciation pressures in the context of large
external shocks, but they suggest that policymakers should proceed with caution.
In general, it’s clear that central banks should avoid engaging in foreign exchange
interventions that are inconsistent with the monetary policy stance. But the results
of this paper emphasize that this should be particularly the case in situations in
which inflation expectations are not well-anchored and policy credibility is lacking.
Insofar as the central bank is not credible, policymakers could find that they need
to engage is more aggressive FXI to overcome their own more aggressive monetary
9From the pass-through of exchange rate changes to inflation, to currency mismatches,
the exchange rate has a crucial role in EMEs. The importance is such that Aghion et al.
(2009) even find that in less financially developed countries higher exchange rate volatility
is associated with lower productivity growth.
10Adler et al. (2015) report a figure similar to Figure 1.1b for these and other countries
over the 1996-2013. Ghosh et al. (2016) also use this statistic as a simple measure of FXI.
11Not only does the empirical evidence show that IT central banks in EMEs conduct
foreign exchange interventions (Ghosh et al., 2016), but surveys find that central banks
acknowledge using interventions to curb excessive exchange rate volatility and calm dis-
orderly markets (e.g. Neely, 2001 and Mihalkej, 2005). Curbing “disorderly conditions”
in FX markets is in fact recommended by the IMF. See IMF (2017)
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policy stance. For policymakers, the results presented here offer a further incentive
to increase the quality of the IT framework by increasing transparency and devising
better communication strategies with the aim of increasing the credibility of mone-
tary policy. The benefits of well-anchored inflation expectations and high credibility
are well documented in the literature. This paper offers another reason to strive for
further improvements in policy credibility.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.3 defines and describes
the measurement of the key variables for the empirical model, and describes the
methodology; Section 3.4 presents the results; and Section 3.5 concludes.
1.2 Methodological Approach
As mentioned in the introduction, any attempt at studying the determinants of the
effectiveness of foreign exchange interventions needs to overcome the endogenous
nature of FXI.12 In its attempt to overcome the endogeneity issue, the literature
has resorted to the use of instrumental variables or the use of high frequency data.
However, proper instruments are not readily available, and high-frequency estimates
are not informative about the macroeconomic relevance (e.g. the persistent and
cumulative effects) of FXI at horizons larger than a few days (Adler et al., 2015
and Blanchard et al., 2015). A further limitation is that high frequency data on a
central bank’s foreign exchange position is often unavailable, which leads us to rely
12An example of the endogeneity of FXI is useful: Suppose that a given shock induces an
8 percent exchange rate appreciation in the absence of intervention. Suppose further that
by conducting FXI the central bank is able to partially offset the appreciation pressure
by 3 percent. The FXI would be deemed successful. However, simple correlations would
pick up that a given amount of FXI was associated with a 5 percent appreciation of the
exchange rate.
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on proxies based on publicly available data like changes in international reserves
(Adler and Tovar, 2011).
The approach to revealing the effectiveness of FXI in this paper is different from
those previously used in the literature, and it rests on two observations. First, in
combating the appreciation (depreciation) pressure of an external shock, an inter-
vention — in the form of a purchase (sale) of foreign currency — need not fully
overcome the appreciation (depreciation) to be deemed successful. The effective
intervention need only show up in the form of an exchange rate that appreciated
(depreciated) by a lower amount than it otherwise would have in the absence of
intervention. Second, an empirical strategy that allows for observing the potential
effect of FXI (described in the first point) and its determinants, needs to exploit the
exogenous nature of an external shock that puts appreciation or depreciation pres-
sures on the exchange rate, and then allow us to observe the exchange rate response
under varying amounts of FXI and varying institutional characteristics.
With this in mind, to unveil the effects of FXI, I make use of the Interacted
Panel Vector Autoregression (IPVAR) framework introduced in Towbin and Weber
(2013). In this framework, the response of the endogenous variables to a given shock
is allowed to vary with country characteristics. This strategy allows me to induce
an external shock that triggers an exchange rate appreciation, and then observe the
dynamics of the exchange rate at different intervention intensities. In particular,
using a set of seven IT EMEs (and then thirteen in the robustness checks), I estimate
an IPVAR model in which the coefficients are allowed to vary with the amount of
FXI conducted by the central bank, and with the degree of CBC. Inducing a positive
commodity exports price shock to the system, which tends to put inflationary and
appreciation pressures on the economy, the framework exploits the exogenous nature
of the shock and the cross-sectional variation of FXI intensities and degrees of CBC.
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This allows me to analyze how the exchange rate response varies with the amount
of FXI conducted and with the degree of CBC.
The plan for this section is as follows: Subsection 1.2.1 defines key variables
and provides their measurement; Subsection 1.2.2 introduces the Interacted Panel
Vector Autoregression framework; and Subsection 3.2 discuses the data used in this
paper.
1.2.1 Definitions and Measurement
This subsection defines and provides a measure for three key variables used in the
empirical model: central bank credibility, foreign exchange intervention, and com-
modity price shocks.
Measuring Central Bank Credibility
Central bank credibility is an institutional characteristic that, as Blinder (2000)
points out, matters in theory, is believed to matter in practice, and is difficult to
measure. Although it might be difficult to define, the overall intuition of what
credibility means has not changed much over the years: credibility involves the
ability of the central bank to meet its objectives.13 However, while the intuition
may be clear, quantifying credibility is not straightforward, and will always involve
using a proxy.14
13Blinder (2000) says that his favorite definition “involves matching deeds with words”
and that “a central bank is credible if people believe it will do what it says”; while recently,
James Bullard, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, linked the credibility
of a central bank to its ability to meet its commitments (Appelbaum, 2016).
14This is, of course, the case of many other economic concepts: think of any concept
that has the word “natural” in front of it, e.g. the natural rate of unemployment, or the
natural interest rate. Measuring institutional characteristics is no less challenging.
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In the context of IT, however, having an explicit objective — the inflation target
— somewhat facilitates the proxy choice. Central banks in IT EMEs have generally
succeeded in keeping runaway inflation in check since adopting IT. However, as seen
in Figure 1.2a CPI inflation in these countries tends to, at the very least, linger near
the inflation target bands.15 Missing the target or not provides a clear cut way of
assessing whether a central bank is doing what it says it will do. Accordingly, the
standard measure of credibility used in the literature has typically been a function of
the inflation gap. In particular, the most commonly used measures are a function of
either the difference between observed inflation and the central bank target (Bordo
and Siklos, 2014; Bordo and Siklos, 2015; Ogrokhina and Rodriguez, 2018), or be-
tween inflation expectations and the central bank target (Bordo and Siklos, 2017;
Levieuge et al., 2018). The first is a direct observation of whether or not the central
bank actually meets its objectives, while the second is a measure of the anchoring of
inflation expectations. In principle, a smaller inflation gap from the target implies
a more credible policy.
I begin the investigation defining credibility measures based on the inflation ex-
pectations gap from the central bank target. In recent years, the literature has
favored these expectations-based credibility measures given that credibility has a
natural forward-looking interpretation — i.e. do market participants believe the
central bank will do what it says? Accordingly, the main results of this paper use
expectations-based credibility measures. However, publicly available data on in-
flation expectations is limited to seven IT EMEs. Therefore, after conducting the
investigation with the expectations-based credibility measures — using the sample
of seven countries for which the data is available — I go on to use credibility mea-
sures based on the observed inflation gap from the central bank’s target. Using
15Refer to Figure A.1 for a figure like 1.2a for all countries in EM13.
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the latter I find results, for the thirteen EMEs in the sample, that are qualitatively
equivalent to the findings using inflation expectations-based credibility measures.
This should not be surprising given that past observed inflation is contained in the
information set used to form expectations. For future reference, the sample of seven
countries for which inflation expectations data is publicly available are Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and Turkey. I will refer to this set of countries
as EM7. The set of thirteen countries that will be used to conduct the analysis using
CBC measures based on observed inflation include all those in EM7, plus Hungary,
Indonesia, Philippines, Poland, Romania, and Thailand. I will refer to this set of
countries as EM13.
Expectations-Based Credibility Measures
The first expectations-based measure is defined as the difference between the
1-year-ahead inflation expectation and the central bank inflation target. Defining
the expectations-based gap in this manner reflects the fact that central banks set
inflation targets over the medium term. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that
agents judge the central bank’s ability to meet its commitment at annual instead
of at business cycle frequencies.16 Formally, during quarter t, the first credibility
measure is defined as
CREDEGapi,t = pi
e
i,t|t+4 − p¯ii,t ∀ t , (1.2.1)
where piei,t|t+4 is the expected inflation for the year ahead, and p¯ii,t is the central
bank’s inflation target prevailing at time t. Although the objective p¯ii,t is time-
16Aside from the fact that targets are not meant to be met on a short-term, quarterly
basis, using quarterly deviations from the implied quarterly target for the purposes of
assessing policy credibility would contain noise in the form of temporary spikes in headline
inflation. These temporary spikes don’t necessarily affect the credibility of the central,
especially if the spike is short lived and understood to be temporary. This can be, for
instance, due to temporary spikes in the prices of imports.
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varying in principle, except for a few gradual target reductions in the early years
after adopting the IT regime, IT countries do not change the target often. Given
that inflation targets are medium term objectives, I treat them as prevailing for the
entire year for which they are announced. With this in mind, a consideration arises
on what target to use in eq. (1.2.1) when the inflation target does change. Given
that expectations are formed 1 year ahead, a target change implies that the year
over which expectation are formed may include more than one inflation target. This
implies that one must be careful with what inflation target should be used in eq.
(1.2.1) to assess the anchoring of inflation expectations. Given that targets prevail
for the entire calendar year — that is, a new target typically takes effect in January
— then whether the expected inflation piei,t|t+4 is formed with information that more
than one target will bind during the horizon over which the expectation is formed is
a function of the timing of the target change announcement. Insofar as the central
bank announces changes in the target at the beginning of the year in which the new
target will take effect no issues arise. However, if the central bank was to announce
a new target for the following year several quarters before the new target takes effect
agents would update their expectations, and the prevailing target would not be an
up-to-date frame of reference to gauge credibility. Indeed, a more up-to-date frame
of reference would involve a weighted average of the prevailing target and the target
for the following year. I argue, however, that this is not a major concern given that
some central banks in fact announce the target changes at the beginning of the year.
For instance, Peru’s Central Bank announced its target change from 2.5 to 2 percent
in January 2006, i.e. the beginning of the year in which the new target started
binding (see Central Reserve Bank of Peru, 2007). More importantly, however, this
is not a major concern given that during the sample period, central banks in the
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countries studied maintained their inflation targets constant, on average, more than
93 percent of the time.
It should also be noted that the computation of CREDEGapi,t involves taking the
simple difference between inflation expectations and the inflation target, as opposed
to the absolute or squared difference used in other studies (see Bordo and Siklos,
2017). Using the absolute difference tacitly implies that missing the target from
below or from above has the same repercussions for a central bank’s credibility. A
priori there is no reason to believe in symmetric effects, especially given the aversion
for runaway inflation that characterizes IT regimes. In fact, countries don’t tend
to miss the target symmetrically as one can observe in Figure 1.2b which plots
the CREDEGap measure for a subset of EM7.17 Further, the empirical evidence
provided in Neuenkirch and Tillmann (2014) and Paloviita et al. (2017) suggest
that central banks react more aggressively — i.e. asymmetrically and non-linearly
— when past inflation exceeded the target than when inflation fell below the central
bank’s target. This suggests that policymakers consider positive deviations to be
more serious than negative deviations from target.
The second expectations-based measure of central bank credibility is taken from
Levieuge et al. (2018). In that study, the authors point out the shortcomings of
existing credibility indexes. First, they note that existing indexes tend to rely on
ad hoc threshold levels that imply a full loss of credibility. For instance, Cecchetti
and Krause (2002) construct an index that takes the value of 1 — implying full
credibility — if expected annual inflation is less than or equal to the inflation target.
The index then decreases linearly as expected inflation increases, and takes a value
of 0 — implying a total loss of credibility — when the expected inflation is greater
than 20 percent. Second, Levieuge et al. (2018) argue that a credibility indicator
17Refer to Figure A.2 for a figure like 1.2b for all countries in EM13.
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should be asymmetric in the sense that negative deviations of expected inflation
from the target should be taken to be less serious than positive deviations from
the target. This is in line with the discussion on asymmetric responses to inflation
deviations from target above. With this in mind, Levieuge et al. (2018) suggest the
following credibility measure:
CREDLLRi,t =
1
exp(p˜iei,t)− p˜iei,t
(1.2.2)
where p˜iei,t is the deviation of expected inflation from the central bank’s target. That
is, using 1-year-ahead inflation expectations as above, p˜iei,t = pi
e
i,t|t+4 − p¯ii,t. This
indicator falls between 0 (implying total loss of credibility) and 1 (implying full
credibility). The functional form of the denominator determines the profile of the
indicator. In particular, for p˜iei,t < 0, the linear term in the denominator tends to
dominate, which implies that the value of the index decreases, indicating a loss of
credibility. However, for p˜iei,t > 0, the exponential term tends to dominate making the
denominator increase exponentially with p˜iei,t. This implies that the index declines
relatively rapidly with positive deviations from target than with negative deviations
from target. Figure 1.2c plots the measure CREDLLR for a subset of EM7.18 For
instance, the measure captures well the fact that inflation in Chile tends to stay very
close to the target, and therefore its profile paints the picture of a highly credible
central bank.
It should be noted that Levieuge et al. (2018) suggest the index in eq. (1.2.2)
particularly for the case when the central bank’s target is a point target instead of
a target range. They provide a similar index for the case when the central bank
targets a range. In this case, the central bank attains full credibility as long as
the expected inflation falls within the target range. A potential issue in using this
18Refer to Figure A.3 for a figure like 1.2c for all EM7 countries.
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measure of credibility, however, is that there is no way to discern between a central
bank that constantly hits the midpoint target or stays close to the midpoint target,
and a central bank that constantly misses the midpoint of the target range and
tends to linger close to the upper target band. Discerning between these two types
of central bank’s is important especially since central banks tend to emphasize what
can be understood as a preference to stay close to the midpoint target. Indeed, the
language used by many central banks in specifying their targets provides evidence
for this preference. For instance, Chile’s Central Bank policy is to “use the necessary
instruments to keep annual CPI inflation around 3 percent most of the time, within
a tolerance range of plus or minus one percentage point” (see Banco Central de
Chile, 2007). Certainly, the tolerance range is explicitly stated, but the focus —
i.e. the target — tends to be the midpoint. With this in mind, I prefer to use the
credibility measure specified in eq. (1.2.2).
Robustness: Observed-Inflation-Based Credibility Measures
The second set of measures of central bank credibility in this paper will be defined
as a function of the gap between realized annual CPI inflation and the central bank’s
target. In particular, the first measure of credibility of this kind is defined as the
observed year-on-year inflation gap. Formally,
CREDY oYi,t = pi
yoy
i,t − p¯ii,t (1.2.3)
where piyoyi,t is the inflation rate with respect to the same quarter in the previous
year. This measure can thought of as an alternative, albeit incomplete, measure
of credibility, given that inflation expectations are typically highly correlated with
observed inflation. Indeed, the correlation between CREDY oY and CREDEGap for
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EM7 countries is about 0.8 and highly significant. This high correlation can be
observed in Figure 1.2b.19
The high correlation between inflation expectations and observed inflation sug-
gests yet another set of credibility measures based on realized inflation. Consider
an agent that, early in the year does not have enough information to form accurate
end-of-year inflation expectations. One thing the agent can do is use the previous
year’s realized inflation gap to gauge the central bank’s credibility early in the new
year. In subsequent quarters, however, as economic information becomes public,
it’s possible that the agent will form end-of-year inflation expectations that closely
correspond to the actual end-of-year inflation. Insofar as we are dealing with coun-
tries in which the inflation expectations tend to be close to realized inflation — as
it is the case in this paper — we can proxy the later-in-the-year expectations of
end-of-year inflation by the observed annual inflation rate. Formally,
CRED1Qi,t =
 pii,τ−1 − p¯ii,τ−1 if t = 1;pii,τ − p¯ii,τ if t = 2, 3, 4. (1.2.4)
CRED1Qi,t is defined so that during the first quarter, the credibility of the central
bank is assessed as a function of last year’s inflation gap, while during the remaining
quarters of the year, the credibility of the central bank is a function of the current
year’s inflation gap. CRED1Qi,t is a measure that reflect an assessment of the central
bank that is a function of current and past performance when information lags are
present.
Measuring Foreign Exchange Intervention
Foreign exchange intervention involves a financial operation in which the central
bank buys or sells foreign exchange in order to affect the exchange rate (Sarno
19Refer to Figure A.2 for a figure like 1.2b for all countries in EM13.
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and Taylor, 2001). Accordingly, to measure intervention one would like to observe
the actual purchases and sales of foreign assets by the central bank. However, as
Adler et al. (2015) point out, this data is generally not available. Therefore, as it’s
usually done in the literature, I proxy FXI by the change in the net foreign asset
position of the central bank as reported in its balance sheet. Changes in international
reserves, however, may reflect more than just intervention. Accordingly, following
Levy-Yeyati et al. (2013), to approximate the changes in reserves that most closely
reflect intervention in the FX market, I subtract government deposits at the central
bank from the central bank’s net foreign assets.2021 That is, define net international
reserves in U.S. dollars as
Ri,t =
NFAi,t −Gov. Depositsi,t
NERi,t
(1.2.5)
where NFAi,t is the central bank’s net foreign assets, and NERi,t is the exchange
rate defined as the price of a U.S. dollar in terms of the domestic currency. Central
banks report their balance sheet items in domestic currency, including the value of
their foreign assets and liabilities. To account for this fact, and for comparability
purposes, net reserves are converted to US dollars in eq. (1.2.5). It should be
noted that the measure in eq. (1.2.5) implicitly assumes that the US dollars is the
single currency of denomination of the net FX position of the central bank. This
is common practice in the literature since specific data on the composition of the
central bank’s foreign assets is rarely available. As Adler and Mano (2018) point
out, the exact composition of the central bank holdings of foreign currencies is of
20As Levy-Yeyati et al. (2013) note, this correction matters especially in oil producing
countries and countries with important privatization programs.
21Although the literature relies mostly on changes in reserves to proxy FXI out of
necessity, there are well-known reasons why the changes in reserves don’t correspond one-
to-one with intervention. As Calvo and Reinhart (2002) point out, changes in reserves
may reflect fluctuations in valuation, the accrual of interest earnings, and hidden foreign
exchange reserve transactions.
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secondary importance from an ex ante perspective as long as the reserve currencies
held by the central bank are close substitutes of each other.
The first measure of intervention is defined as the ratio of the change in net
international reserves to the HP filtered trend GDP in US dollars. This normaliza-
tion follows Adler et al. (2015) and is meant to prevent endogeneity arising from
movements in the US dollar value of GDP. In particular
FXIRAi,t =
Ri,t −Ri,t−1
GDPHP Trendi,t−1
(1.2.6)
Beyond comparability, there aren’t obvious reasons why one would normalize
FXI by GDP. Therefore, for robustness, I define a second measure of intervention in
which, as suggested in Levy-Yeyati et al. (2013), the net international reserves are
normalized by the monetary base in the previous quarter (measured in US dollars):
FXILY Si,t =
Ri,t −Ri,t−1
MoneyBasei,t−1
NERi,t−1
(1.2.7)
Commodity Price Shocks
Since the early 2000s, EMEs have faced large terms-of-trade movements, in large
part driven by rapid changes in commodity prices. By the end of 2011, for instance,
average energy and base metals prices in real terms were three times as high as just
a decade before (IMF, 2015). After 2011, on the other hand, commodity prices fell
dramatically, posing fiscal and monetary policy challenges for commodity exporters
(IMF, 2012; IMF, 2018b). Within this reality, EMEs saw their exchange rates
change swiftly along with the rapid commodity price swings. The co-movement
between commodity prices and the exchange rate observed in the data and studied
in the literature (IMF, 2015; Ferraro et al., 2015) invites the question of whether
FXI efforts are successful in the context of commodity price shocks.
26
With this in mind, the benchmark external variable in this paper will be a
country-specific index of commodity export prices. Focusing on these prices seems
appropriate given that the EMEs included in this paper are small open economies
which take export prices as given in world commodity markets. This implies that
— to the extent that world price movements induce changes in the exchange rate
— shocks to these prices are exogenous for these countries. Further, with the sole
exception of Turkey, the other six countries in EM7 are commodity exporters, and
nine of the countries in EM13 are also considered to be commodity exporters. Lastly,
even for those EMEs that are not considered to be commodity exporters, their
exchange rates display a very high co-movement with a country-specific index of
commodity prices (see discussion below).
Certainly, an alternative to these prices is to use terms-of-trade measures that are
typically based on export-to-import price ratios. However, I prefer to use commodity
export prices over more general terms-of-trade measures for two reasons previously
identified in the literature. First, as pointed out in Chen and Rogoff (2003), nominal
rigidities and incomplete pass-through prevent standard terms-of-trade measures
from capturing contemporaneous shocks that tend to induces immediate changes in
the exchange rate, which makes proper identification close to impossible. Second,
terms-of-trade measures are typically constructed using unit value indices which are
known to bias the representation of export and import price indexes. Silver (2009)
documents the various sources of this bias. Among the most important ones are the
compositional changes in the quantity and quality mix of the heterogenous products
recorded in customs documents (on which the calculation of export and import unit
value indexes is based).
On the other hand, since commodity price indexes are based on observed com-
modity prices determined in world markets, identification issues and the bias as-
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sociated with unit value indexes become less of a concern. With this in mind, I
use the index constructed in Gruss (2014). This index is constructed as a weighted
average of 45 commodities from the IMF’s Primary Commodity Prices database. In
particular, the country-specific indexes are constructed as follows:
∆ log(CMXi,t)i,t =
J∑
j=1
∆Pj,t · ωi,j,τ (1.2.8)
where Pj,t is the logarithm of the relative price of commodity j in month t within
year τ (in U.S. dollars and divided by the IMF’s unit value index of manufactured
exports), and ωi,t,τ is the weight of commodity j in country i for all monthly ob-
servations t within year τ . Even though Deaton and Miller (1996) argued for the
use of fixed weights in constructing indexes like CMXi,t, Gruss (2014) notes that
allowing the weights to vary over time is a way of taking into account the fact that
the commodity mix traded by many countries has changed significantly over time.
Accounting for this is particularly important when the study spans a few decades.
As such, the weights used to construct the index are based on three-year rolling
averages of export values and lagged on year. The former smooths fluctuations and
the latter ensures that the changes in the price index actually reflect changes in
the underlying commodity prices instead of endogenous changes in trade volumes
(Gruss, 2014).22
A reason to use country-specific indexes of commodity prices, as opposed to the
price of an individual commodity for each country — for instance, the commodity
with the highest export share — is that EMEs, even commodity exporters, tend
22Formally, country i’s weights for each commodity price are given by
ωi,t,τ =
1
3
3∑
s=1
xi,j,τ−s∑J
j=1 xi,j,τ−s
where xi,j,τ−s denotes the average export value of commodity j by country i between years
τ − 1 and τ − 3. See (Gruss, 2014) for more details.
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to export not one commodity by baskets of them. This implies that focusing on
a single commodity would not accurately represent the overall price movements to
which the country is subject (Gruss, 2014). Indeed, Figure 1.3a plots the commodity
price index CMXi,t as well as the price index for all commodities, for metals, and
for agricultural raw materials taken from the IMF’s Primary Commodity Prices
database for four emerging markets in EM13. The figure clearly shows that some
indexes (for instance, the agricultural index) underestimates the price changes for
most countries most of the time, while other indexes (for example, the metals price
index), overestimate the relevant commodity price movements for most countries
most of the time.23
Finally, Figure 1.3b reports commodity price index CMXi,t along with the nom-
inal exchange rate for the same group of countries. The co-movement between these
two prices is evident. As mentioned above, with the exception of only four countries
(Hungary, Romania, Poland, and Turkey) all other countries in the sample are con-
sidered to be commodity exporters. And even in the case of countries like Poland,
the co-movement between commodity prices and the exchange rate is evident to the
eye. This demonstrates both the strengths of the CMXi,t index and the need to use
country-specific indexes.24
Naturally, the correlation observed in Figure 1.3b has received attention in the
literature. For instance, Chen et al. (2010) find robust evidence that commodity
currencies have predictive power over the exchange rates of commodity exporters.
This is a result of the fact that exchange rates are forward looking and commodity
price fluctuations represent major terms-of-trade movements for these countries.
This implies, as Chen et al. (2010) point out, that when market participants come
23Refer to Figure A.4 for a figure like 1.3a including all countries in EM13.
24Refer to Figure A.5 for a figure like 1.3b including all countries in EM13.
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to expect future commodity price shocks, the expectations is priced into the current
exchange rate given the anticipated impact on future export income and exchange
rate values. This evidence is corroborated in Ferraro et al. (2015) who report that
copper prices have predictive power over the Chilean peso-U.S. dollar exchange rate
at daily frequencies.2526
Finally, a different mechanism — and one that is particularly appropriate for IT
countries — is studied in Devereux and Smith (2018). In that paper, the authors
suggest that increases in commodity prices lead FX market participants to anticipate
a tightening of domestic monetary policy in commodity exporting countries. The
correlation arises due to the immediate reaction of the exchange rate to the expected
change in future policy.
The strong relationship between commodity prices and the exchange rate demon-
strates that shocks to commodity prices provide an economically relevant context
in which to study the role of credibility in the presence of FXI.
1.2.2 An Interacted Panel Vector Autoregression
The empirical strategy to measure the effects of credibility on the effectiveness of FXI
is to use the Interacted Panel Vector Autoregression (IPVAR) framework introduced
in Towbin and Weber (2013). Effectively, the model is a panel VAR augmented with
interaction terms that allow the VAR coefficients to vary with country character-
25Ferraro et al. (2015) mainly study Canada, but also present results for Norway, South
Africa, Australia, and Chile; a set of advanced and emerging market economies typically
identified as commodity exporters.
26At monthly and quarterly frequencies, however, Ferraro et al. (2015) report little
systematic relation between commodity prices and exchange rates for the set of countries
they study. Using lower frequency data, Cashin et al. (2004) have looked at the relationship
between commodity currencies and the real exchange rate for a sample of 58 commodity-
exporting countries and find evidence of a long-run relationship between the real exchange
rate and real commodity prices for about a third of the countries in their sample.
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istics. In this paper, it allows the coefficients of the VAR to vary with different
degrees of FXI and CBC, thereby allowing me to examine the dynamic response of
the endogeneous variables to external shocks conditional on a given level of FXI and
degree of CBC.
The General Framework
Formally, a general representation of the IPVAR framework takes the following form:
B0,itYi,t = C˜i,t +
L∑
l=1
Bl,itYi,t−l + u˜i,t (1.2.9)
where C˜i,t are controls defined as C˜i,t = C˜i +
∑M
m=1 C˜mXm,i,t and Bl,it is a matrix of
coefficients in which the (j, k) scalar element is defined as
βjkl,it = α
jk
l +
M∑
m=1
αjkl,mXm,it (1.2.10)
where t = 1, . . . , T denotes time and i = 1, . . . , N denote the country. Yi,t is a q× 1
vector of explanatory variables. C˜i is a q × 1 vector of country-specific intercepts.
The autoregressive coefficients, βjkl,it, at lag l, capture the dynamics of the system’s
variables as a function of the interaction terms. The interaction term Xm,it is a time-
varying, country-specific characteristic that potentially influences the dynamics of
the system’s variables. This influence is captured in the αjkl,m scalar element. I
allow for M such interactions. Without interaction terms, the sum in eq. (1.2.10)
would disappear, the autoregressive coefficients would collapse to βjkl,it = α
jk
l , and
the model would become a standard panel VAR.27 The interaction terms are also
allowed to affect the level of endogenous variables via the q × 1 vector C˜m. L is
27Equivalently, one can think of the Bl,it matrix as composed of two elements
Bl,it = A˜l +
M∑
m=1
A˜l,mXm,it
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the total number of lags. The residuals in the q × 1 vector u˜i,t are assumed to be
uncorrelated across countries and normally distributed with mean zero and a q × q
constant covariance matrix Σ˜.
The contemporaneous relationships among the model variables is captured by
the q × q matrix B0,it. This matrix is lower triangular with the number 1 on the
main diagonal. The contemporaneous effect of the kth-ordered variable on the jth-
ordered variable is given by the term −βj,k0,it, where βjk0,it is the (j, k) scalar element
of the matrix of contemporaneous coefficients B0,it, and is given by
βjk0,i,t = α
jk
0 +
M∑
m=1
αjk0,mXm,it for k < j (1.2.11)
Accordingly, the coefficients αjk0 and α
jk
0,m capture the (contemporaneous) marginal
contribution of a change in the interaction term Xm,it towards β
jk
0,it. Given the lower
triangular form of B0,it that I impose apriori, β
jk
0,it = 1, whenever k = j, and β
jk
0,it = 0
whenever k > j.
IPVAR Specification
To arrive at the particular form of eq. (1.2.9) used in this paper, I assume, as usually
done in the literature, that the foreign variables do not depend on the domestic
variables. Further, the dynamics of the foreign variables are also assumed to not be
influenced by the interaction terms. That is, the dynamics of the foreign variables
in the system are independent of the amount of credibility of the central bank in the
domestic country and of the amount of FXI conducted by the central bank. The
foreign variables, in this sense, are completely exogenous to the domestic country.
As such, given the recursive structure of the model, the foreign variables will be
with A˜l as a q× q matrix of autoregressive coefficients at lag l, with αjkl as its (j, k) scalar
element. In this form, the influence of the interaction terms is captured by the q×q matrix
of autoregressive slope coefficients A˜l,m, with α
jk
l,m as its (j, k) scalar element.
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ordered first in the vector of variables Yi,t. That is, Yi,t = ( y
∗
i,t yi,t )
T , where y∗i,t
and yi,t are the vectors of foreign and domestic variables, respectively. With these
assumptions in mind, the recursive IPVAR takes the following representation B110,it 0
B210,it B
22
0,it

 y∗it
yit
 = C˜i,t + L∑
l=1
 B11l,it 0
B21l,it B
22
l,it

 y∗i,t−l
yi,t−l
+ u˜i,t (1.2.12)
The matrices B110,it and B
22
0,it are lower triangular with 1’s in the main diagonal;
and B˜11l,it is also lower triangular, but its main diagonal scalar elements are left
unrestricted since they are the autoregressive coefficients on the foreign variables.
In particular, given the assumption that the dynamics of the foreign variables are
not affected by the country characteristics, the (j, k) scalar element of the B˜11l,it block
is given by
βjkl,it = α
jk
l for k <= j (1.2.13)
This in no way precludes the foreign variables to dynamically affect the en-
dogenous variables according to country characteristics. Similarly, under the above
assumptions on the foreign variables, the (j, k) scalar element of the B110,it block of
coefficients is given by
βjk0,it = α
jk
0 for k < j (1.2.14)
Further, the (j, k) scalar element of the B˜21l,it and B˜
22
l,it coefficient matrices are
given by28
βjkl,it = α
jk
l +
M∑
m=1
αjkl,mXm,it (1.2.15)
28As before, thinking in terms of matrices, the lower triangular block of matrices on the
right hand side of eq. (1.2.12) can be expressed as(
B11l,it 0
B21l,it B
22
l,it
)
=
(
A˜11l 0
A˜21l +
∑M
m=1 A˜
21
l,mXm,it A˜
22
l +
∑M
m=1 A˜
22
l,mXm,it
)
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Given the focus on commodity price shocks, the vector y∗i,t is given by
y∗i,t = (CMXi,t ) (1.2.16)
where CMXi,t is the commodity export price index for country i defined in Section
1.2.1.
The domestic variables include macroeconomic indicators that are relevant to IT
economies. Further, I include a measure of the monetary policy stance given that
the interest is on sterilized FXI.29 The vector of domestic variables yi,t is therefore
given by
yi,t = (MPRi,t INVi,t GDPi,t CPIi,t NERi,t )
T (1.2.17)
where MPRi,t denotes the annualized monetary policy rate. INVi,t denotes real
gross fixed capital formation, GDPi,t denotes real gross domestic product, CPIi,t is
the consumer price index, and NERi,t is the nominal exchange rate. All variables
enter in log first differences, except the monetary policy rate which enters in first
differences.
The interactions are X1,it = FXIi,t, and X2,it = CREDi,t, where FXIi,t is
the measure of foreign exchange intervention, and CREDi,t is the measure of CBC
defined in Sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.1, respectively. I control for potential interactions
between the level of FXI and the degree of CBC. Accordingly, I include a third
interaction X3,it = FXIi,t ∗ CREDi,t. With this in mind, M = 3 in eq. (1.2.12),
and the contemporaneous coefficients in matrices B210,it and B
22
0,it are given by
βjk0,it = α
jk
0 +α
jk
0,1FXIi,t+α
jk
0,2CREDi,t+α
jk
0,3FXIi,t ∗CREDi,t for k < j (1.2.18)
29Unsterilized FXI — the situation in which FX purchases are not matched by equal
reductions in the money supply — would have an obvious depreciation effect on the
exchange rate.
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Similarly, the autoregressive coefficients of the B˜21l,it and B˜
22
l,it matrices are given
by
βjkl,it = α
jk
l + α
jk
l,1FXIi,t + α
jk
l,2CREDi,t + α
jk
l,3FXIi,t ∗ CREDi,t (1.2.19)
To analyze the effect of intervention on the exchange rate I first restrict αjkl,2 =
αjkl,3 = 0, for every l. Then, to analyze the effect of central bank credibility on the
dynamics of the exchange rate I set αjkl,1 = α
jk
l,3 = 0, for every l. Finally, to analyze
how the effect of central bank credibility interacts with the effect of FXI on the
exchange rate I leave all coefficients in (1.2.18) and (1.2.19) unrestricted.
The main difference between the IPVAR and a panel VAR is, as Abbritti and
Weber (2018) point out and as one can observe in eq. (1.2.12), that the regressand
is regressed not only on the lagged regressors, but also on the regressors interacted
with the country characteristics. In this case, with the amount of FXI conducted
and with the credibility of the central bank. Fundamentally, this is what allows me
to analyze the IRFs at various combinations of FXI and degrees of central bank
credibility.
The classical concern on FXI studies is the endogeneity of the FXI decision. This
usually refers to the endogeneity of FXI with the exchange rate, but not with other
macroeconomic variables. A potential endogeneity of FXI with respect to other
macroeconomic variables needs to be addressed since in the IPVAR specification
above FXI is not included as an endogeneous variable. That is, FXI is not allowed
to respond to other variables. Yet it is allowed to affect the level and the dynamics of
all variables in the system. A priori, given the nature of FXI, one should not expect
that macroeconomic variables other than the exchange rate to trigger an intervention
decision, but one needs to be sure. One general way to deal with endogeneity issues is
to lag the variable of interest, but in this case that won’t do since I want to include
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a contemporaneous measure of FXI in the interaction terms. The reason is that
interventions occur contemporaneously with exchange rate movements. Lagging
the FXI measure would unnecessarily restrict the notion of intervention given a
shock. Including a contemporaneous measure of FXI, however, requires an explicit
assumption that FXI will not be endogenous with business cycle variables other than
the exchange rate. To formalize this assumption I estimate the following equation
for the post-IT adoption period of the countries in my sample:
FXIi,t = η0 + η2MPRi,t + η3INVi,t + η4GDPi,t
+ η5CPIi,t + η6NERi,t + η7CMXi,t + i,t
(1.2.20)
where FXIi,t is either FXI
LY S
i,t or FXI
RA
i,t . The results can be seen in Table 1.1.
They show that, perhaps as one would expect, an appreciation (depreciation) of
the exchange rate, that is a decrease (increase) in the exchange rate, triggers the
accumulation (selling) of foreign exchange reserves. This is what one would expect
when the central bank is trying to curb an appreciation (depreciation). Further,
this coefficient is highly significant and is generally robust to variations in the spec-
ification. Besides the exchange rate, no other macroeconomic variable appears to
trigger an intervention in a statistically significant way consistently across specifica-
tions and country groups. The estimations do show, however, that real GDP seems
to be correlated with reserve accumulation when the estimation is conducted using
the FXILY Si,t measure, but this only occurs in one specification. CPI inflation also
appears to be correlated with reserve accumulation for the group of EM7 countries,
but the fact that the significance on the exchange rate is lost in those same spec-
ifications tells us that CPI inflation could be picking up some of the correlation
from the exchange rate. This, however, would be taken care of when the IPVAR is
estimated. At any rate, overall, the results in Table (1.1) point to the conclusion
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that assuming that FXI is fundamentally triggered by innovations in the exchange
rate is adequate.
Even with this in mind, estimation of eq. (1.2.12) may still be subject to some
degree of the endogeneity problem that tends to conceal the effect of FXI on the
exchange rate, as it happens it other studies. In that case then, the effect of FXI
found in this paper may be considered a lower bound of the potential effect that
intervention may have on the exchange rate.
Finally, the inclusion of CPI inflation in eq. (1.2.12) is a way to deal with the
endogeneity of the measure of CBC with other business cycle variables. At any rate,
it is perhaps impossible to argue that the measure of CBC used in this paper — the
inflation expectations gap or the observed inflation gap — is not endogenous with
other business cycle variables. For this reason, the measures of CBC used in this
paper will be lagged one quarter in all estimations.
Estimation and Identification
I estimate the model in eqs. (1.2.12), with (1.2.18) and (1.2.19) included, using OLS.
Since, by construction, the errors are uncorrelated across equations, it’s possible to
estimate (1.2.12) equation by equation. Once the coefficients in (1.2.18) and (1.2.19)
are estimated, they can be used to evaluate the βjk0,it and β
jk
l,it coefficients for any
combination of FXI and degree of central bank credibility one desires. Then, using
these βjk0,it and β
jk
l,it coefficients I can analyze the dynamic response of the endogenous
variables to a given shock for the particular combination of FXI and CBC chosen.
I use one lag based on the Schwartz Criterion.
Identification of the commodity price shock is achieved recursively by impos-
ing a small open economy assumption on the countries in the sample. That is,
by ordering the commodity export price index first, and assuming the countries in
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the sample are small enough to have no impact on the prices of the commodities
they export. Effectively, the assumption is that commodity export prices are con-
temporaneously unaffected by the other variables in the system. This identifying
assumption amounts to constraining the matrix B110,it to be lower triangular. Since
the focus is on the commodity export price shock, the ordering of the other variables
in the system is immaterial. In this sense, the model is partially identified.
An implication of this framework is that the IRFs are non-linear functions of the
OLS estimates. Accordingly, analytical errors that rely on first order asymptotics
may not be accurate (see Towbin and Weber, 2013). To deal with this concern,
bootstrapped confidence intervals are reported as proposed by Runkle (1987).
1.2.3 Data
The sample encompasses the period 1999Q1-2016Q4. Two sets of countries are con-
sidered based on whether or not inflation expectations data is publicly available,
which conditions my ability to construct expectations-based CBC measures as de-
scribed in Section 1.2.1. The set of countries for which inflation expectations data is
publicly available includes Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and
Turkey. These are referred to as EM7. Robustness checks and the estimations using
CBC measures based on observed inflation are conducted by expanding the EM7 set
to include Hungary, Indonesia, Philippines, Poland, Romania, and Thailand. The
expanded set is referred to as EM13. All the EMEs included in EM7 and EM13 are
countries with formal IT frameworks. Whether a country is considered to use the IT
framework was based on the classification provided in the IMF’s 2016 Annual Report
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Only countries
with at least 10 years (40 quarters) under the IT framework were included. This
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ensures enough data coverage under de jure floating exchange rates.30 Since the
focus is on analyzing the effectiveness of FXI under the IT regime and the measures
of CBC used in this paper are a function of the central bank’s inflation target, the
sample for any given country is restricted to its post-IT adoption date. This implies
that the sample is unbalanced.
Details and summary statistics on the countries included are summarized in Ta-
ble A.1. Macroeconomic data come mainly from the IMF’s International Financial
Statistics (IFS), the OECD’s Quarterly National Accounts, and the Federal Reserve
of St. Louis’ FRED. The data to construct the FXI measure come from the IFS’
Central Bank Survey and from central banks’ websites. The inflation targets used
in the construction of the credibility measure were obtained directly from the coun-
tries’ central banks’ websites, and the inflation expectations data are obtained from
surveys of inflation expectations conducted by the central banks in the sample. The
commodity export price index is obtained from the database constructed by Gruss
(2014). Details on the data sources are summarized in Table A.2.
1.3 Results
This section presents the results by analyzing the impulse responses of the endoge-
nous variables to a given shock in commodity prices. As it was previously mentioned,
inflation expectations data is publicly available only for a sample of seven countries.
Accordingly, the expectations-based credibility measures defined in Section 1.2.1
are only available for these countries. Recall that these set of countries are referred
to as EM7 and it includes Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and
30Accordingly, the cutoff IT adoption year for a country to be included in the sample is
2006. Sweden was excluded since they started using negative rates in 2014. South Africa
was not included due to limited data availability.
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Turkey. Subsections 1.3.1, 1.3.2, and 1.3.3, present the results using this sample.
Subsection 1.3.1 presents the effects of FXI on exchange rate dynamics, subsection
1.3.2 presents the effects of expectations-based CBC on the dynamics of the econ-
omy, and subsection 1.3.3 presents the results of the interaction between FXI and
expectations-based CBC.
Later, in Subsection 1.3.4, I present the robustness checks which rely upon ex-
panding the sample of countries by adding Hungary, Indonesia, Philippines, Poland,
Romania, and Thailand to the EM7 group. Recall that these are referred to as
EM13. Since for these additional countries, inflation expectations data is not pub-
licly available, I use measures of CBC based on observed inflation as detailed in
Section 1.2.1. For consistency, subsection 1.3.4 presents the effects of FXI on the
exchange rate by rerunning the estimations using the EM13 sample of countries.
Then, subsection 1.3.4 presents the effect of CBC on the dynamics of the exchange
rate using the observed-inflation-based credibility measures using both the EM7
and EM13 samples, and lastly subsection 1.3.4 shows the effect of the interaction
between FXI and observed-inflation-based CBC.
1.3.1 Foreign Exchange Intervention
Since, as Levy-Yeyati et al. (2013) noted, interventions have been aimed, in most
cases, at fighting appreciations (especially in recent years), the analysis will be
focused on the dynamic response of the economy given a positive commodity exports
price shock — a shock that tends to induce an exchange rate appreciation. This
fear of appreciation has become more prevalent since the early 2000s (Levy-Yeyati
et al., 2013), which coincides with the adoption of inflation targeting and de jure
floating exchange rate arrangements of most IT emerging markets.
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Figure 1.4 plots the cumulative response of the nominal exchange rate to a 10
percent positive commodity export price shock under varying intensities of FXI.
Panels 1.4a and 1.4b use the FXI measure FXIRAi,t and FXI
LY S
i,t , respectively. The
first and second columns in each panel show the response of the nominal exchange
rate under heavy intervention and light intervention, respectively. The third column
reports the difference between the point estimates of the exchange rate response
under heavy and light intervention, together with its corresponding confidence band.
The impulse responses under heavy and light FXI are calculated by evaluating the
coefficients in eqs. (1.2.18) and (1.2.19) at two levels of FXI intensity roughly
corresponding to an idea of heavy and light intervention. Since the FXI measures
are allowed to be positive or negative, heavy and light intervention correspond, as
a benchmark, to the 80th and 50th percentile of the FXI distribution, respectively.
Accordingly, for FXIRAi,t , heavy intervention amounts to change in net reserves of 1.3
percent of GDP, and light intervention corresponds to a change in net international
reserves of 0.7 percent of GDP. While for FXILY Si,t , heavy intervention amounts to
change in net reserves of 16.6 percent of the monetary base, and light intervention
corresponds to a change in net international reserves of 1.7 percent of the monetary
base.
The figure clearly shows that, given the shock, the nominal exchange appreci-
ates less under heavy intervention than under light intervention. Using the FXIRAi,t
intervention proxy, the estimations suggest that the nominal exchange rate appre-
ciates by about 0.4 and 1.2 percentage points less under heavy than under light
intervention. Similarly, using FXILY Si,t , the exchange rate appreciates by about 0.4
and 1.5 percentage points less under heavy FXI than under light FXI. The third col-
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umn clearly shows that these differences are statistically significant.31 These results
provide evidence that FXI is effective at curbing appreciation pressures in inflation
targeting EMEs in the context of commodity export price shocks. Specifically, the
results using the FXIRAi,t intervention proxy suggest that to induce, on average, a 1
percent depreciation of the domestic currency, the central bank needs to purchase
foreign currency in the amount equivalent to 0.75 percent of GDP.
In general, these results are in line with the findings in Aizenman et al. (2012),
who find that FXI is effective at curbing appreciations driven by commodity price
shocks. Importantly, no other macroeconomic indicator shows any statistically sig-
nificant difference in its dynamic behavior under heavy and light FXI. This is what
one would expect if one is correctly capturing the change in international reserves
that mostly reflects intervention in the foreign exchange market. The interested
reader is referred to Figures A.6 and A.7 in the Appendix for the response of all the
endogenous variables using the FXIRAi,t and FXI
LY S
i,t measures, respectively.
1.3.2 Expectations-based Central Bank Credibility
The cumulative response of the nominal exchange rate, the monetary policy rate,
and the CPI inflation for varying degrees of central bank credibility are shown in
Figure 1.5. Panels 1.5a and 1.5b correspond to the use of the CREDEGap and
CREDLLR expectations-based credibility measures, respectively. As before, the
first and second columns in each panel show the response of the endogenous vari-
ables under high and low central bank credibility, respectively. The third column
reports the difference between the point estimates under high and low central bank
credibility, together with its corresponding confidence band. The impulse response
31Statistical significance here refers to the fact that the 68 percent (1 standard deviation)
bootstrapped confidence bands do not contain zero.
42
functions at different degrees of central bank credibility are calculated by evaluating
the coefficients in eqs. (1.2.18) and (1.2.19) at two levels of central bank credibility
roughly corresponding to a notion of high and low central bank credibility. Since
CREDEGap is allowed to be positive or negative, a smaller inflation expectations
gap implies a higher degree of central bank credibility — given that this corresponds
to a higher degree of anchoring of inflation expectations. Therefore, the high and
low central bank credibility in this case correspond, as a benchmark, to the 50th
and 80th percentile of the CREDEGap distribution, respectively. Accordingly, high
central bank credibility using the CREDEGap measure amounts to an inflation ex-
pectations gap of 0.6 percent, and low central bank credibility corresponds to an
inflation expectations gap of 1.4 percent. On the other hand, since CREDLLR is
an index that goes from 0 to 1 — with a higher index implying a higher degree of
central bank credibility — high and low central bank credibility in this case corre-
spond to the 80th and 20th percentile of the CREDLLR distribution, respectively.
Accordingly, high central bank credibility using the CREDLLR measure amounts to
an index of 0.98, and low central bank credibility corresponds to an index of 0.36.
The endogenous variables in both panels in Figure 1.5 display the same dynamics.
Given the commodity export price shock, which puts both appreciation as well as
inflationary pressures, the nominal exchange rate appreciates less when the central
bank has a higher degree of credibility. The mechanism is driven by the fact that
under lower CBC — the situation in which inflation expectations a less anchored —
key macroeconomic indicators like CPI inflation and output react more strongly to
the shock, thereby inducing the central bank to raise its policy interest rate more
aggressively than in a situation in which the central bank has a higher degree of
credibility. The relatively higher interest rate increase in the low credibility case
leads to a higher appreciation of the nominal exchange rate. The results using the
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CREDEGap credibility proxy suggest that a loss of credibility in the form of a 1
percent increase in the inflation expectations gap, ultimately leads to a 1.13 percent
appreciation of the exchange rate.
Equivalently, these results show that when the central bank enjoys of higher
levels of credibility — as measured by the anchoring of inflation expectations — the
exchange rate appreciates less given a shock, and this is a consequence of the fact that
more credible central banks needs to raise interest rates by a lower amount than less
credible central banks, given that CPI inflation and output reacted less aggressively
to the shock in the first place. The result in this subsection is related to the findings
reported in chapter 3 of IMF (2018b), which studies the relationship between central
bank credibility and the procyclicality of monetary policy in inflation targeting
countries. That chapter reports that central banks with lower credibility engage in
more procyclical monetary policy, raising interest rates in the face of unfavorable
terms-of-trade shocks. The authors of the chapter interpret the procyclicality as a
rational response of the central bank to poorly anchored inflation expectations.32
It’s important to stress the fact that under higher central bank credibility, not
only CPI inflation reacts more strongly to the shock, but so does output growth.
The reader is referred to Figures A.8 and A.9 in the Appendix for the response of all
variables in the system using the CREDEGap and CREDLLR measures respectively.
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that lower central bank credibility is
desirable insofar as it leads to higher output growth when a positive shock occurs.
First, the difference in output growth between high and low central bank credibility
may not be consider economically significant — the point estimate is 0.1 percent.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, this is simply a reflection of the fact that
32The chapter, however, stops short of reporting the effects of credibility on the exchange
rate response. Further, that chapter does not touch on the subject of foreign exchange
interventions.
44
lower central bank credibility leads, in general, to more aggressive responses from
the endogenous variables. Indeed, given the linearity of the VAR specification, we
know that given a negative shock, output growth would drop by a larger amount
under low credibility. This is not a desirable outcome.
1.3.3 FXI and Expectations-based CBC
I now investigate the response of the nominal exchange rate under different amounts
of FXI conditional on the level of central bank credibility. Figure A.10 plots the
cumulative response of the nominal exchange rate, the monetary policy rate, and
CPI inflation under different combinations of FXI intensity and degrees of CBC.
The first and second columns from the left report the dynamics of the endogenous
variables under heavy FXI; they differ in that the first column considers the case of
high CBC, while the second column considers the case of low CBC. Similarly, the
fourth and fifth columns report the response of the economy under light FXI; again,
they differ in that the fourth column reports the dynamics under high CBC, while
the fifth column reports the dynamics under low CBC. The third and sixth column
report the difference between the first and second column, and between the fourth
and fifth column, respectively. The IRFs are calculated using the FXIRAi,t as a proxy
for intervention, and CREDLLR as the credibility proxy. The level of heavy and
light intervention, and of high and low CBC are those discussed in sections 1.3.1
and 1.3.2.
Overall, Figure 1.6 shows that the effect of FXI can be undone by the degree
of credibility of the central bank, regardless of the intensity of the intervention.
In general, for a given intensity of FXI — whether heavy or light intervention —
the exchange rate appreciates more when the central bank has lower degrees of
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credibility. In particular, the results show that if a central bank engages is heavy
FXI, being less credible is detrimental to the intervention efforts. Columns (1)
and (2) show that, conditional on engaging in heavy intervention, the exchange rate
appreciates by 1.5 percent under high CBC and by 3 percent under low CBC. Indeed,
the third column from the left, labeled Difference (1) - (2), shows that conditional on
engaging in heavy FXI, the exchange rate appreciates by about 1.5 percentage points
less when the central bank enjoys of higher credibility. Qualitatively, the same result
is obtained when the central bank engages in light FXI. In particular, conditional
on engaging in light intervention in foreign exchange markets, the exchange rate
appreciates by about 2.2 percent under high CBC, while it appreciates by about 3.7
percent under low CBC. Once again, the difference, reported in the sixth column
is about 1.5 percentage points. This implies that having higher credibility yields a
sort of credibility premium — the difference in exchange rate appreciation between
high and low credibility for a given FXI intensity (reported in columns 3 and 6 from
the left in Figure 1.6).
The results point to the conclusion that the credibility of the central bank mat-
ters when trying to curb exchange rate pressures. The mechanism behind these
results follows the same logic as discussed in section 1.3.2. Following the shock,
CPI inflation increases more when inflation expectations are less anchored — when
CBC is low — than when they are well anchored — when CBC is high (compare
columns one and two, and four and five in row two of Figure 1.6). This triggers a
more aggressive monetary policy response in the form of higher interest rates than
otherwise would be required under higher level of credibility (compare columns one
and two, and four and five in row three of Figure 1.6). This puts a fresh source of
appreciation pressure on the exchange rate which ultimately undermines part of the
benefit of intervening in foreign exchange markets.
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Figure 1.7 plots the dynamics of the exchange rate using the different measures of
FXI and expectations-based credibility measures defined in sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.1.
The figure shows that, qualitatively, the results are robust to different combinations
of FXI and credibility measures — that is, that the credibility premium on exchange
rate dynamics is robust. Panel 1.7a plots the exchange rate response from Figure
1.6. For a figure similar to Figure 1.6, which plots the exchange rate response along
with the CPI inflation response and the monetary policy reaction, corresponding to
panels 1.7b, 1.7c, and 1.7d, the reader is referred to Figures A.10, A.11 and A.12 in
the Appendix.
How costly can low central bank credibility be in terms of foreign ex-
change intervention?
The point estimates of the exchange rate response in columns (2) and (3) of Panel
1.7a, suggest that a central bank with low credibility and that engages in heavy FXI
can end up with an appreciation that is quantitatively similar to that of a highly
credible central bank that conducts only light FXI.
I now formalize this notion, and obtain an approximation of how costly low
credibility can be in terms of reserve accumulation. To facilitate the discussion,
Figure 1.8 reproduces the exchange rate response to a positive 10 percent commodity
export price shock under various combinations of FXI intensities and degrees of
CBC originally displayed in Figure 1.6. Figure 1.8, however, displays the various
combinations in a different order and plots IRF differences not displayed in Figure
1.6. Column (A) displays the exchange rate response to the shock when the central
bank engages in light FXI and has high credibility. Given that light FXI corresponds
to an accumulation of international reserves equivalent to 0.7 percent of GDP and
that high central bank credibility corresponds to a positive inflation expectations
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gap of 0.6 percent, this can be considered the baseline scenario. Now, consider
column (B), in which the central bank sill has high credibility but engages in heavy
FXI. The third column, labeled (A) - (B), plots the different between these two
cases. As previously discussed, the difference shows that heavy intervention allows
the central bank to depreciate the currency, resulting in an exchange rate that
appreciates less, given the shock. Now suppose that the central bank still engages
in heavy FXI, but loses credibility. This scenario is shown in column (C). The
fifth column, labeled (B) - (C), display the associated difference, and shows that
losing credibility is detrimental to the heavy intervention effort of the central bank.
In particular, a central bank that engages in heavy FXI sees the exchange rate
appreciate 1 percentage point less when it has higher credibility than when it does
not.
Finally, we can answer the question: how costly can lack of credibility be in terms
of reserve accumulation? To answer this, compare the dynamics of the exchange
rate under heavy FXI and low CBC to the dynamics of the exchange rate under
the baseline scenario of light FXI and high CBC. That is, observe the difference
between the two point estimates of columns (A) and (C), displayed in the sixth
column of Figure 1.8. This shows that there is no difference in the cumulative
response of the exchange rate under these two cases. What this implies is that the
central bank needs to engage in heavy FXI only to overcome the extra appreciation
pressure posed by the low credibility and the associated more aggressive interest rate
increase. In this manner, under the assumption that the FXI effort was aimed at
curbing the appreciation pressure posed by the commodity price shock, the results
clearly show that low CBC can completely undermine this effort. That is, low
CBC completely cancels out the effect of FXI in this exercise. Now, note that
going from low to high CBC implies a deterioration of the inflation expectations
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gap by 0.8 percentage points, and going from light to heavy intervention implies an
increase of net international reserves in the amount of 0.6 percent of GDP. Since
these two effects cancel out, this implies that the appreciation effect (through higher
interest rates) of a loss of credibility reflected by a 1 percentage point increase in
the inflation expectations gap, can cancel out the depreciation effect of a purchase
of foreign currency equivalent to 0.75 percent of GDP. Given that the average net
international reserves holding by the countries studied in this paper during the
sample period was 10 percent, the results suggest that a loss credibility can be very
costly in terms of reserve accumulation.
1.3.4 Robustness
As was mentioned earlier, the main results of the paper, those reported in subsec-
tions 1.3.1, 1.3.2, and 1.3.3 use a sample of 7 countries, EM7, for which inflation
expectations data is publicly available. In this subsection, I expand the sample to
13 EMEs by adding Hungary, Indonesia, Philippines, Poland, Romania, and Thai-
land to the EM7 group. I first show that the effect of FXI on the exchange rate
is robust to expanding the sample size. Then, I use the CBC measures based on
observed-inflation described in Section 1.2.1 to show that the effect of expectations-
based CBC on the exchange rate is robust to these alternative CBC measures and
to expanding the sample size. Finally, I show that the notion of the credibility
premium is qualitatively robust to the alternative CBC measures and to expanding
the sample size.
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Foreign Exchange Intervention, Extended Sample Size
I first provide evidence that extending the sample size from EM7 to EM13 one
obtains the sample qualitative results regarding the effectiveness of FXI on curbing
appreciation pressures.
Figure 1.9 plots the cumulative response of the nominal exchange rate to a 10
percent positive commodity export price shock under varying intensities of FXI for
the EM13 sample of countries, in same manner that Figure 1.4 did for the EM7
set of countries. The figure once again shows that under higher levels of FXI, the
nominal exchange rate appreciates less following the shock. Both measures of FXI
are robust to extending the sample size. The figure shows that almost doubling the
amount of countries analyzed, one obtains results that are qualitatively equivalent to
the ones obtained before, and that are quantitatively very close to the ones obtained
before as well. Indeed, the third column of Panel 1.9a shows that the exchange rate
appreciates between 0.4 and 1 percentage points less under heavy FXI than under
light FXI. Similarly, the third column of Panel 1.9b shows that the exchange rate
appreciates between 0.2 and 0.8 percentage points less under heavy FXI than under
light FXI.
Observed-inflation-based CBC
As was mentioned in section 1.2.1, the relationship between inflation expectations
and observed inflation allows me to explore the role of CBC using measures based
on realized inflation. Doing so, I can directly observe whether the results are robust
to the alternative measures of CBC and, additionally, to extending the sample size.
For comparability, I first verify whether the results are robust to using the mea-
sures of CBC based on observed inflation while keeping the set of countries intact.
In Figure 1.10, Panels 1.10a and 1.10b, I plot the cumulative response of the nominal
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exchange rate, the monetary policy rate, and CPI inflation for varying degrees of
observed-inflation-based CBC for the EM7 set of countries. The dynamics of the en-
dogenous variables are equivalent to the findings reported in Figure 1.5, which used
expectations-based CBC measures. Once again, under low CBC, the monetary pol-
icy authority needs to raise interest rate more aggressively given the larger response
of CPI inflation to the shock. As a result, the nominal exchange rate appreciates
more under low CBC.
Now I extend the sample from the EM7 set of countries to the EM13 set of
countries. The results are reported in Figure 1.11, in Panels 1.11a and 1.11b. As
is evident, the dynamics are equivalent to those reported before in Panels 1.10a
and 1.10b, and to those reported in Figures 1.5, which used expectations-based
CBC measures. The mechanism is the same as that reported in subsection 1.3.2.
Quantitatively, however, the point estimates and the possible range of values for
the effect that CBC has on the exchange rate are smaller in magnitude from those
estimated using expectations-based CBC measures. This makes sense given that the
CBC measures based on observed-inflation, although a close proxy, don’t contain
all the information about the credibility of a central bank that expectations-based
CBC measures may contain.
FXI and Observed-inflation-based CBC, Extended Sample
I now report the results using the extended sample of countries and the CBC mea-
sures based on observed inflation. Figure 1.12 plots the cumulative response of the
nominal exchange rate, the monetary policy rate, and CPI inflation under different
combinations of FXI intensity (using the FXILY S measure) and degrees of central
bank credibility (using CREDY oY ) in the same manner as Figure 1.6. As Figure
1.12 shows, the results reported in Figure 1.6 are qualitatively robust to changing
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the CBC measure from one that is based on the inflation expectations gap to one
that is based on the realized inflation gap, and to extending the sample of countries
under consideration. That is, as before, for a given amount of intervention, the
exchange rate appreciates less when the central bank enjoys of a higher degree of
credibility.
The mechanism behind this result is the same as before: lower CBC induces
a more aggressive monetary policy response. That is, interest rates need to be
increased more under lower CBC to compensate for the more aggressive reaction of
CPI inflation to the shock. This puts a fresh source of appreciation pressures on the
exchange rate.
Quantitatively, the credibility premium as measured by the difference between
the point estimates of the exchange rate under high and low CBC, given a certain
amount of FXI, is once again economically significant, but lower in magnitude than
in previous estimations. Indeed, under heavy FXI, the point estimate in column
three of Figure 1.12 shows that the credibility premium stands at almost 0.4 percent.
In turn, under light FXI, the point estimate in column six of the same figure shows
that the the credibility premium stands at about 0.2 percent. These estimates are
lower than those obtained using expectations-based CBC measures, but as it was
mentioned before, they may simply reflect the fact that CBC measures based on
observed inflation don’t contain all information necessary to properly measure the
credibility of a central bank. Nevertheless, these are informative measures, and
they provide the same qualitative conclusion. Indeed, these differences show that
within the context of intervention in foreign exchange markets, the role of CBC is a
important, especially when there is some degree of tension between the intervention
and other policy objectives.
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Using different combinations of the FXI measures (FXIRA and FXILY S) and
the observed-inflation-based CBC measures (CREDY oY and the CRED1Q), one
obtains equivalent results. The reader is referred to Figures A.17, A.18, and A.19
for the results using the remaining combinations of these measures.
1.4 Conclusion
Significant exchange rate pressures — brought forth by large terms-of-trade shocks
and significant international capital flows — have induced central banks in EMEs to
intervene in foreign exchange markets. These interventions have taken place even in
countries with formal inflation targeting regimes in which, in principle, the exchange
rate is supposed to freely float. This has led to an intense debate on the merits and
viability of foreign exchange interventions in IT EMEs. Normative questions aside,
the reality has been that central banks in these countries have actively intervened
in foreign exchange markets given the crucial role that the exchange rate plays in
their economies.
Even with this in mind, given that the primary objective of the IT framework
(and therefore the main mandate of IT central banks) is price stability, there have
been occasions in which central banks have engaged in foreign exchange interven-
tions efforts that were not consistent with the monetary policy stance. The diffi-
culties posed by this kind of policy inconsistency could be made worse insofar as
the monetary policy stance needs to be more aggressive given certain institutional
characteristics. In particular, lack of central bank credibility — as measured by the
anchoring of inflation expectations — could undermine the effectiveness of foreign
exchange intervention efforts to the extent that less credible central banks need to
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increase interest rates more aggressively while trying to fight simultaneous appreci-
ation pressures.
This paper attempts to quantify to what extent the credibility of the central
bank matters in this regard. In particular, using an interacted panel vector autore-
gression framework and a set of seven inflation targeting emerging markets, I first
test whether FX interventions can curb exchange rate pressures in these economies.
Then, I attempt to capture the effect of central bank credibility on the effectiveness
of FX interventions.
I find that, when the central bank fights simultaneous appreciation and inflation-
ary pressures driven by commodity price shocks, FX intervention indeed leads to
less exchange rate appreciation, but that lack of credibility can undermine a central
bank’s FX intervention effort. The mechanism behind this result is that less credible
central banks need to increase interest rates more aggressively to stabilize inflation.
This undermines the simultaneous effort to depreciate the currency by inducing a
new source of appreciation pressure on the exchange rate.
In fact, the results suggest that the appreciation effect of a loss of credibility in
the form of a 1 percentage point increase in the inflation expectations gap can com-
pletely cancel out the depreciation effect of a purchase of foreign currency equivalent
to 0.75 percent of GDP. Equivalently, an IT EME central bank needs to accumulate
international reserves in the amount of 0.75 percent of GDP to overcome the appreci-
ation effect of a 1 percentage point increase in the inflation expectations gap. Given
that the average amount of international reserves held by the IT EMEs included in
this paper is 10 percent of GDP throughout the sample period, the results suggest
that overcoming a loss of credibility can have a large impact on the international
reserves.
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These results show that within the context of intervention in foreign exchange
markets, the role of central bank credibility is a crucial one, especially when other
policy objectives need to be addressed, and when there is some degree of tension
between the intervention and price stability objectives.
There are many benefits to having well-anchored inflation expectations and high
policy credibility, and this paper suggests another one. The results presented here
offer further incentive for policymakers to focus on increasing transparency and
devising better communication strategies with the aim of improving the credibility
of monetary policy. It is typically understood that credible central banks need to do
less to deliver price stability. The results in this paper suggest that credible policy
can also more easily deliver exchange rate stability, and that losing credibility can
be costly.
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Table 1.1: FXI and Business Cycle Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES FXILY S FXILY S FXIRA FXIRA FXILY S FXILY S FXIRA FXIRA
Exchange Rate -0.217 0.0400 -0.0600** -0.0473 -0.480*** -0.374** -0.0772*** -0.0674***
(0.195) (0.245) (0.0266) (0.0354) (0.137) (0.169) (0.0176) (0.0222)
Policy Rate 32.35 -1.565 -101.5 -15.77
(121.3) (17.52) (87.84) (11.52)
Investment 0.429 0.0267 0.183 0.0182
(0.269) (0.0389) (0.153) (0.0201)
Real GDP 1.421 0.0969 2.023* 0.136
(1.405) (0.203) (1.200) (0.157)
CPI Inflation -3.020** -0.371* -1.212 -0.159
(1.314) (0.190) (0.781) (0.102)
Comm. Exp. Price 16.14 0.653 5.759 0.356
(11.72) (1.693) (8.784) (1.152)
Constant 0.762 3.313 0.278 0.629 3.012 4.027 0.482 0.528
(9.287) (9.456) (1.262) (1.367) (8.821) (8.852) (1.130) (1.160)
Observations 383 343 383 343 722 674 722 674
R-squared 0.042 0.091 0.030 0.048 0.058 0.083 0.052 0.063
Num. of countries 7 7 7 7 13 13 13 13
Country Group EM7 EM7 EM7 EM7 EM13 EM13 EM13 EM13
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Note: All variables enter the estimation in log first differences, except the monetary policy rate which enters the
estimation in first differences.
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 1.1: Exchange Rates and Exchange Rate Management, post IT adoption.
(a) Local currency per US dollar
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Note: Panel (a) shows an index of the nominal exchange rate (2005Q1 = 100), defined as
domestic currency per U.S. dollar (so an increase represents a depreciation), for the fol-
lowing countries: Brazil (BRA), Chile (CHL), Colombia (COL), Guatemala (GTM), Hun-
gary (HUN), Indonesia (IDN), Mexico (MEX), Peru (PER), Philippines (PHL), Poland
(POL), Romania (ROM), Thailand (THA), and Turkey (TUR). Panel (b) plots an in-
dex of exchange rate management for a set of IT and non-IT countries. The countries
included are those in panel (a) plus The Dominican Republic (DOM), Russia (RUS),
Croatia (HRV), Costa Rica (CRI), Uruguay (URY), Nicaragua (NIC), Honduras (HND),
and Bolivia (BOL). The index is calculated as ξ = σ∆Reserves/(σ∆Reserves + σ∆NER),
where σ∆Reserves and σ∆NER) are the standard deviations of changes in net international
reserves (normalized by HP trend GDP), and of changes in the nominal exchange rate,
respectively. Therefore, ξ ranges from 0 (pure float) to 1 (a peg). The sample period runs
from 1999-2016; where the sample for each country starts after the adoption of IT.
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Figure 1.2: Inflation Expectations, and Inflation gaps, selected countries.
(a) Expected and Observed Inflation
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(b) Credibility, CREDEGap and CREDY oY
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(c) Credibility Index: CREDLLR
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Note: Panel (a) plots the inflation targets and realized inflation for a subset of EM7
countries. Panel (b) plots the expectations-based credibility measure CREDEGap and
the observed-inflation-based credibility measure CREDY oY . Finally, Panel (c) plots the
expectations-based credibility measure CREDLLR. This index falls between 0 (implying
total loss of credibility) to 1 (implying full credibility).
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Figure 1.3: Commodity Price Indexes.
(a) Country-specific and Broad Indexes
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(b) Commodity prices and the Exchange Rate
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Note: Panel (a) display a set of general commodity price indexes together with the country-
specific index. In panel (b) the country-specific commodity export price index is plotted
along with the nominal exchange rate as an index. In both panels (a) and (b) the indexes
are set to 100 in 2005Q1.
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Figure 1.4: Exchange Rate Dynamics and Foreign Exchange Intervention.
(a) FXI Measure: FXIRAi,t
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(b) FXI Measure: FXILY Si,t
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Note: Nominal Exchange Rate response to a 10 percent commodity export price shock
under heavy and light intervention. Heavy and light intervention refers to he 80th and
50th percentile of the corresponding FXI distribution. Measures of Intervention: FXIRAi,t
(top panel) and FXILY Si,t (bottom panel). The nominal exchange rate is defined so that
a decrease implies an appreciation. EM7 Countries: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala,
Mexico, Peru, and Turkey.
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Figure 1.5: Exchange Rate Dynamics and Expectations-based CBC.
(a) Credibility Measure: CREDEGap
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(b) Credibility Measure: CREDLLR
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Note: Cumulative response to a 10 percent commodity export price shock under high and low central bank credibility. High
and low central bank credibility refers to the 50th and 80th percentile of the CREDEGap distribution, and to the 80th and 20th
percentile of the CREDLLR distribution. EM7 Countries: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and Turkey.
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Figure 1.6: FXI and Expectations-based CBC
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Note: Response to a 10 percent Commodity Export Price Shock. Using FXIRAi,t and CRED
LLR
i,t credibility measure. EM7
Countries: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and Turkey. The 1st and 2nd columns report the dynamics of the
endogenous variables under heavy FXI; the 1st column considers the case of high CBC, while the second column considers the
case of low CBC. Similarly, the 4th and 5th columns report the response of the economy under light FXI; the 4th column reports
the dynamics under high CBC, while the 5th column reports the dynamics under low CBC. The 3rd and 6th columns report the
corresponding differences.
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Figure 1.7: Exchange Rate Dynamics: FXI and Expectations-based CBC.
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(b) FXIRA and CREDLLR
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(c) FXILY S and CREDEGap
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(d) FXILY S and CREDLLR
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Note: Dynamic response to a 10 percent commodity export price shock under heavy and
light foreign exchange intervention, combined with high and low central bank credibility.
Heavy and light intervention refers to he 80th and 50th percentile of the corresponding FXI
distribution. High and low central bank credibility refers to the 50th and 80th percentile
of the CREDEGap distribution, and to the 80th and 20th percentile of the CREDLLR dis-
tribution. The nominal exchange rate is defined so that a decrease implies an appreciation.
EM7 Countries: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and Turkey.
63
Figure 1.8: Exchange Rate Dynamics: FXI and Expectations-based CBC
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Note: Response to a positive 10 percent Commodity Export Price Shock. Using FXIRAi,t and CRED
EGap
i,t credibility measure.
EM7 Countries: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and Turkey.
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Figure 1.9: Exchange Rate Dynamics and Foreign Exchange Intervention, EM13.
(a) FXI Measure: FXIRAi,t
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(b) FXI Measure: FXILY Si,t
−
4
−
3
−
2
−
1
Ex
ch
an
ge
 R
at
e
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Heavy Intervention
−
4
−
3
−
2
−
1
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Light Intervention
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Difference (Heavy − Light)
68 per. C.I. 90 per. C.I. Point est.
Note: Nominal Exchange Rate response to a 10 percent commodity export price shock
under heavy and light intervention. Heavy and light intervention refers ot he 80th and
50th percentile of the corresponding FXI distribution. Measures of Intervention: FXIRAi,t
(top panel) and FXILY Si,t (bottom panel). The nominal exchange rate is defined so that a
decrease implies an appreciation. EM13 Countries: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala,
Hungary, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Thailand, and Turkey.
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Figure 1.10: Exchange Rate Dynamics and Observed-inflation-based CBC, EM7.
(a) Credibility Measure: CREDY oY , EM7
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(b) Credibility Measure: CRED1Q, EM7
−
5
−
4
−
3
−
2
−
1
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
R
a
t
e
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
High Credibility
−
5
−
4
−
3
−
2
−
1
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Low Credibility
−
.
5
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Difference (High − Low)
−
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
P
o
l
i
c
y
 
R
a
t
e
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
−
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
−
.
6
−
.
4
−
.
2
0
.
2
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
−
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
C
P
I
 
I
n
f
l
a
t
i
o
n
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
−
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
−
.
4
−
.
3
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
68 per. C.I. 90 per. C.I. Point est.
Note: Cumulative response to a 10 percent commodity export price shock under high and low central bank credibility, using the
CBC measures based on realized inflation. High and low central bank credibility refers to the 50th and 80th percentile of the
CREDY oY and the CRED1Q distributions. EM7 Countries: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and Turkey.
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Figure 1.11: Exchange Rate Dynamics and Observed-inflation-based CBC, EM13.
(a) Credibility Measure: CREDY oY , EM13
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(b) Credibility Measure: CRED1Q, EM13
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Note: Cumulative response to a 10 percent commodity export price shock under high and low central bank credibility, using the
CBC measures based on realized inflation. High and low central bank credibility refers to the 50th and 80th percentile of the
CREDY oY and the CRED1Q distributions. EM13 Countries: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Mexico,
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Thailand, and Turkey.
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Figure 1.12: FXI and Central Bank Credibility, EM13
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Note: Response to a 10 percent Commodity Export Price Shock. Using FXILY Si,t and CRED
Y oY
i,t credibility measure. EM13
Countries: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Thailand, and
Turkey. The 1st and 2nd columns report the dynamics of the endogenous variables under heavy FXI; the 1st column considers the
case of high CBC, while the second column considers the case of low CBC. Similarly, the 4th and 5th columns report the response
of the economy under light FXI; the 4th column reports the dynamics under high CBC, while the 5th column reports the dynamics
under low CBC. The 3rd and 6th columns report the corresponding differences.
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CHAPTER 2
EXCHANGE RATE DETERMINATION UNDER ALTERNATIVE
INFLATION TARGETS: THE ROLE OF TRADE COSTS
2.1 Introduction
An important branch of the international macroeconomics literature is concerned
with the cross-border spillover effects of shocks and their implications for exchange
rate determination under inflation targeting (IT). However, shocks to international
trade costs and their effects on exchange rate dynamics under the IT regime are
largely ignored in this literature.1 In general, trade costs are a source of frictions in
international transactions that may add short-run volatility to the exchange rate via
their effects on the terms of trade and inflation, and, therefore, via their interaction
with interest rate rules.2 Understanding these effects is more relevant than ever
since governments around the world have taken a protectionist stance that could
lead to an increase in international trade costs.3 Already these trade costs are not
negligible: Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) estimate that for a representative
1International trade costs can be broadly defined as transportation costs, tariffs, and
other policy barriers.
2Although in this paper I emphasize the role of inflation-targeting in the transmission
mechanism of trade costs shocks (which one may interpret as terms-of-trade shocks) to
the volatility of the exchange rate, other work has found that terms-of-trade shocks can
be important even without regard to interest rates rules. For instance, in the context of
a real business cycle model, Mendoza (1995) finds that terms-of-trade shocks account for
45 to 60 percent of the observed variability of exchange rates.
3Even before that, in the aftermath of the recent global collapse of international trade,
protectionist and murky trade barriers were erected as governments went into crisis-
fighting mode (Baldwin and Evenett, 2011).
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rich country, international trade costs amount to a 74% ad-valorem tax equivalent.4
Increases in these costs could pose a challenge for IT central banks.
Under IT, increases in international trade costs could feed directly into import
prices, increase inflation, and trigger monetary policy reactions, which could have
consequences for the exchange rate and the terms of trade. Crucially, these conse-
quences may vary with the magnitude of the inflation rate targeted by the central
bank.5 Controlling for the prevailing inflation target is important since, as Ascari
and Sbordone (2014) have shown in a closed economy model, higher inflation tar-
gets are associated with a more volatile and unstable economy, and they can induce
a stronger monetary policy response to inflation deviations from target. However,
the interaction between trade costs shocks and IT has not been taken into account
in the literature and a number of questions remain unanswered. First, what are
the implications of shocks to international trade costs for the determination of the
nominal exchange rate and the terms of trade under IT, and how do these effects
differ under different inflation targets? Second, are the consequences of these shocks
different when the shock affects only one economy or the entire world? Third, how
do the dynamics of the real exchange rate under trade costs shocks differ from the
corresponding dynamics under other shocks typically studied in the literature (e.g.
monetary policy shocks)?
4Novy (2013) also reports important bilateral trade costs between the US and its trad-
ing partners. He finds that trade costs in the year 2000, expressed as a tariff equivalent,
were 25% for Canada, and 33% for Mexico. Further, he finds that trade costs are consid-
erably higher for Japan and the UK at over 60%.
5There is heterogeneity in the inflation target across countries, and in fact, some coun-
tries may even be considering raising their targets. Since the crisis, some economists have
recently argued that Central Banks could raise their inflation targets (say, from 2% to 4%
in the case of the Federal Reserve) so that monetary policy can have more room for action
in the context of deflationary shocks. See Blanchard et al. (2010) and Ball (2013).
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This paper seeks to answer these questions. In particular, I study the effects of
international trade costs shocks on exchange rate determination under IT. Further,
I investigate how these effects differ when the inflation rate targeted by the central
bank is positive rather than zero, as the literature usually assumes. To do so I
develop a two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of the
New Keynesian (NK) type. I augment the model with international trade costs, and
I assume a positive inflation rate in the steady state.6
Accounting for trend inflation is empirically relevant and methodologically im-
portant.7 As Ascari and Sbordone (2014) point out, price stability in central banks
is usually associated with a moderate rate of trend inflation. However, NK DSGE
models usually assume that the central bank targets a zero inflation rate in its mon-
etary policy rule.8 Ascari and Sbordone (2014) study trend inflation in a closed
economy model and find that trend inflation affects the dynamics of the economy
because it alters the coefficients of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC). In
particular, in the presence of positive steady state inflation, firms put less weight
on current economic conditions and put more weight on future expected output and
inflation deviations from target. This implies that the real interest rate differs with
different inflation targets, for any given increase in the nominal interest rate. In an
open economy, this has implications for the magnitude of interest rate differentials,
and therefore not only for how much the exchange rate and the terms of trade react
6As Engel (2013) points out, most variants of the open-economy NK models have not
focused on the implications of the models for exchange rate dynamics. This current work
seeks to close this gap.
7The terms trend inflation and steady state inflation are used interchangeable through-
out this paper.
8This is usually done because the optimal long-run inflation target in many specifica-
tions of the NK model is zero (Goodfriend and King 2001, and Woodford 2003), but also
because of analytical convenience.
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upon a shock, but also for their respective rates of appreciation or depreciation back
to their steady states. The exact behavior of the nominal and real exchange rates,
and of the terms of trade will depend on the nature of the shock.
The implications of the model are tested via a standard calibration of the model’s
parameters. On the first question above, I find that, under IT, a trade costs shock
received by the Home economy induces a permanent depreciation of the nominal
exchange rate. This result is in line with the study by Benigno and Benigno (2008).
They investigate exchange rate dynamics under different interest rate rules and find
that in a floating exchange rate regime, under producer currency pricing (PCP), the
nominal exchange rate will be non-stationary. This implies that even a stationary
real shock can have persistent effects on the nominal exchange rate, which is in
line with the results. Further, I find that this permanent depreciation is larger
when the inflation rate targeted by the central bank is higher. Additionally, I find
that following the shock and the initial appreciation, the nominal exchange rate
depreciates faster under higher inflation targets. A faster depreciation implies a
larger movement in the exchange rate in a given period, which can lead to more
volatility. The literature that studies the relationship between inflation targeting
and exchange rates has shown that inflation targeting economies have lower exchange
rate volatility (See Rose (2007), and Gonc¸alves and Salles (2008)). However, this line
of research does not take into account the different inflation rates that the central
bank may target, and the work done on the macroeconomic implications of different
inflation targets has typically focused on closed economy models.9 Accordingly, the
9Examples include Ascari and Ropele (2007), Bakhshi et al. (2007), and Ascari and
Sbordone (2014).
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result suggests that, all else equal, higher inflation targets could be associated with
higher exchange rate volatility following a shock to international trade costs.10
On the second question, I find that the exchange rate dynamics depend on
whether the trade costs shock hits both economies or only one. On the one hand,
if the trade costs shock is received by both economies, then, in a symmetric world,
the shock will induce symmetric policy reactions, thereby not having consequences
for the nominal exchange rate or the real exchange rate. Nevertheless, the terms of
trade depreciate in both countries exclusively due to the trade costs shocks. How-
ever, if the world is not perfectly symmetric and say the Foreign economy is more
open than the Home economy, then following a symmetric trade costs shock the
nominal exchange rate will experience a permanent appreciation, and this appreci-
ation will be larger in magnitude when the inflation target is higher. On the other
hand, if the trade costs shock is received only by, say, the Home economy, then the
first result above holds and the trade costs shock induces a permanent depreciation
of the nominal exchange rate.
On the third question, I find that the real exchange rate exhibits more persistence
in its adjustment path given a trade costs shock than given a monetary policy shock.
This result is connected to the broader literature that studies persistent deviations
of the real exchange rate from purchasing power parity (i.e. the PPP puzzle). On
the one hand, the results are in line with Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000), and more
recently the work by Atkeson and Burstein (2011), who introduce trade costs to
account for the slow convergence of real exchange rates. However, in the latter case
the deviations from relative PPP arise as a result of the assumption of pricing-to-
market. I don’t need this assumption in the model for the real exchange rate to
exhibit a high degree of persistence under trade costs shocks. Further, this line
10Importantly, this result also holds under monetary policy shocks.
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of research typically studies the role of trade costs in explaining the PPP puzzle
abstracting from a monetary policy framework, while I are particularly interested in
understanding the role of trade costs under IT. On the other hand, the results are
connected to the literature that studies real exchange rate persistence under interest
rate rules. This line of research emphasizes the role of monetary policy shocks.
For instance, Benigno (2004), shows that when monetary policy exhibits inertia,
then “the real exchange rate exhibits persistence because, through the interest rate
differential, its adjustment is also smoothed over time.”11 Not only do I show that a
trade costs shock induces more persistence in the real exchange rate than a monetary
policy shock, I also show that this persistence is larger when the inflation target is
higher.
The structure of the rest of the paper is the following: Section 2.2 presents
the model, Section 2.3 highlights a few key equations to trace the transmission
mechanism of a shock to international trade costs, Section 2.4 simulates the model
and discusses its implications, and Section 3.5 concludes.
2.2 Model
The world consists of two economies: the Home and Foreign economies. There are
three sets of agents: individuals, firms, and central bank policy makers. Individuals
maximize their intertemporal lifetime expected utility function consisting of util-
ity obtained from consuming domestic (home) goods and foreign (imported) goods,
together with disutility from supplying labor. The production of goods requires
labor input combined with technology. The model employs a Calvo price-setting
11Inertia in the interest rate rule implies that the adjustment of the nominal interest
rate toward its target is smoothed over time.
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process (Calvo, 1983), in which firms are able to change their prices only with some
probability, independent of other firms and the time elapsed since the last adjust-
ment. Firms behave as monopolistic competitors. In all these respects, the model I
build in this paper follows Monacelli (2001), but departs from it in two respects.12
First, imported final goods into both the Home and Foreign economies are subject
to country-specific international trade costs. These costs are accounted for in the
price paid by consumers in the country importing the good just as in Obstfeld and
Rogoff (2001). Second, while Monacelli (2001), and most of the literature using New
Keynesian models for monetary policy analysis, approximate their model around a
zero inflation steady state, the steady state of the model is assumed to exhibit a
positive inflation rate a´ la Ascari (2004) and Ascari and Sbordone (2014).
A word on notation: Subscripts H and F stand for Home and Foreign-produced,
respectively. Superscript ∗ stands for the variables of the Foreign economy. Lower
case letters denote log variables. For a generic variable Bt, let bˆt = log(Bt/B¯). That
is, hatted variables stand for log deviations from steady states. Capital letters with
a bar on top and without a time subscript denote steady-state values.
Since the model is symmetric (except for the country-specific trade costs) I will
mainly focus on the equations of the Home economy unless the discussion requires
the introduction of the Foreign equations for clarity. It is understood that for every
Home equation discussed there exists a Foreign economy equivalent.
12Alternatively, the model can be thought of as a two-country version of the model
developed in Gali and Monacelli (2005).
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2.2.1 Individuals
The representative individual in the Home country, has the following intertemporal
lifetime utility function
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
βk{U(Ct+k)− V (Nt+k)}
]
(2.2.1)
where U(Ct) is the utility out of consuming a composite index of Ct, V (Nt) is
the disutility out of working Nt hours, and 0 < β < 1 is a discount factor. The
composite consumption index Ct is defined by
Ct =
1
(1− γ)(1−γ)γγ (CH,t)
1−γ(CF,t)γ (2.2.2)
where CH,t and CF,t are Home consumption of home and foreign (i.e. imported)
goods, respectively, and γ is the share of domestic consumption allocated to im-
ported goods. In this sense, γ is a measure of openness. The consumption sub-index
is defined by
CH,t =
[∫ 1
0
CH,t(j)
(θ−1)/θdj
]θ/(θ−1)
and CF,t =
[∫ 1
0
CF,t(j)
(θ−1)/θdj
]θ/(θ−1)
(2.2.3)
where CH,t(j) and CF,t(j) represent domestic consumption of home and foreign
good j, respectively, and θ > 1 is the price elasticity of demand faced by each
monopolist.
The individual household constraint in the Home economy is given by∫ 1
0
[PH,t(j)CH,t(j) + PF,t(j)CF,t(j)]dj + Et[Ft,t+1Bt+1] = WtNt +Bt + TRt (2.2.4)
where Ft,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor, Bt+1 is the nominal payoff in period
t+ 1 of the portfolio held at the end of period t, Wt is the nominal wage, and TRt
is the lump sum transfers/taxes. I assume complete international asset markets.
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Optimal consumption allocation
The representative individual in the Home economy chooses optimal levels of con-
sumption of each home and foreign-made good j. Optimal allocation of any given
amount of expenditures across each good j yields the following demand functions
CH,t(j) =
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−θ
CH,t and CF,t(j) =
(
PF,t(j)
PF,t
)−θ
CF,t (2.2.5)
where PH,t(j) is the Home price of Home-produced good j, PF,t(j) is the Home
price of Foreign-produced good j. Further, PH,t is the price index of Home-consumed
Home-made goods, and PF,t is the price index of Home-consumed Foreign-made
(imported) goods.13 These are defined as
PH,t =
(∫ 1
0
[PH,t(j)]
1−θdj
)1/(1−θ)
and PF,t =
(∫ 1
0
[PF,t(j)]
1−θdj
)1/(1−θ)
(2.2.6)
Further, conditional on the optimal behavior described above I have that
PH,tCH,t =
∫ 1
0
PH,t(j)CH,t(j)dj and PF,tCF,t =
∫ 1
0
PF,t(j)CF,t(j)dj (2.2.7)
That is, Home consumption expenditures can be written as the product of the
Home price index times the Home quantity index.
The individual maximizes eq. (2.2.2) for any given level of expenditures. Optimal
allocation across domestic and imported goods yields the following demand functions
for the Home economy
CH,t =
(1− γ)PtCt
PH,t
and CF,t =
γPtCt
PF,t
(2.2.8)
Where Pt is Home CPI, and is defined as
Pt = (PH,t)
1−γ(PF,t)γ (2.2.9)
13Note that since, in the Home economy, consumers are not faced with trade costs,
and since they pay for domestically produced goods with domestic currency, then home
consumers face source prices when buying domestically produced goods, while they face
destination prices when buying foreign goods.
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Optimal intertemporal and intratemporal choices
Conditional on optimal behavior I can write PH,tCH,t+PF,tCF,t = PtCt. This means
I can write eq. (2.2.4), i.e. the budget constraint, as
PtCt + Et[Ft,t+1Bt+1] = WtNt +Bt + TRt (2.2.10)
The representative Home agent’s problem is to choose paths for consumption,
portfolio, and the labor supply. Therefore, the representative consumer in the Home
economy maximizes her expected utility equation (2.2.1) subject to the budget con-
straint equation (2.2.10).
Labor supply decision: I assume log-utility of consumption and linear disu-
tility from labor.14 That is, I assume U(Ct) = logCt and V (Nt) = Nt.
15 Therefore,
the intratemporal problem yields
Wt
Pt
= Ct (2.2.11)
14I assume a logarithmic utility function for tractability. This functional form for the
utility function is commonly used in economic studies. See for instance Bowen et al.
(2014), Azzimonti (2011), Song et al. (2012), and He and Krishnamurthy (2013). As it’s
mentioned in Bowen et al. (2014), if one were to use a more general constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) utility function in which the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
is not unity, the results would be qualitatively the same as the results I obtain here by
assuming a logarithmic utility function.
15I assume an implied inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply of zero in order to obtain
the analytical derivations in the paper. If one assumes nonlinear disutility from labor, the
dynamic response to shocks would also be affected by the dynamics of prices dispersion
(which will be derived below). This would increase the persistence of macroeconomic
variables. See Ascari and Sbordone (2014) for a discussion. Nevertheless, the qualitative
results of the paper would not change.
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Intertemporal optimality: Given the assumption of complete asset markets16,
the intertemporal optimality condition yields the following17
Ft,t+1 = β
(
Ct
Ct+1
)(
Pt
Pt+1
)
(2.2.12)
which is satisfied for all states of nature at t and t+ 1.
I can take conditional expectations of the above and get a conventional Euler
equation
Ft = βEt
[
CtPt
Ct+1Pt+1
]
(2.2.13)
where Ft = Et[Ft,t+1] is the price of a one-period discount bond paying off one
unit of Home currency in every state of the world at time t+1. Equivalently, express
the Euler equation as
1
It
= βEt
[
CtPt
Ct+1Pt+1
]
(2.2.14)
where It = 1/Et[Ft,t+1] is the gross return on a risk-less one-period discount bond
(or equivalently a riskless portfolio) paying 1 unit of Home currency at time t + 1.
Equation (2.2.14) represents the traditional intertemporal Euler equation for total
real consumption.
International risk sharing
The Foreign economy has an intertemporal optimality condition analogous to the
one for the Home economy. In particular, this yields
Ft,t+1 = β
(
C∗t
C∗t+1
)(
P ∗t
P ∗t+1
)(
Ξt
Ξt+1
)
(2.2.15)
16Cole and Obstfeld (1991) show that under Cobb-Douglas-isoelastic preferences (which
I assume in this paper), asset trade is redundant in the sense that the allocation reached
without asset trade cannot be Pareto-improved by introducing asset markets and making
lump-sum transfers. However, assuming complete international asset markets provides a
direct vehicle for reaching the expression for the uncovered interest rates parity derived
below.
17For details on this see the dicussion on Gali and Monacelli (2005)
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Where Ξt is the nominal exchange rate, defined as the price of foreign currency
in terms of home currency. Setting (2.2.12) and (2.2.15) equal to each other, and
after iterating I get
Ct = c˜C
∗
tQt (2.2.16)
where
Qt =
ΞtP
∗
t
Pt
(2.2.17)
is the real exchange rate, and where c˜ = C0P0
C∗0Ξ0P
∗
0
is a constant which will generally
depend on initial conditions regarding relative net asset positions. Assuming sym-
metric initial conditions (i.e. zero net foreign asset holdings and an ex-ante identical
environment) implies that I can set c˜ = 1.
2.2.2 Trade Costs
Iceberg trade costs
I assume that each imported final good j into the home (foreign) economy is subject
to asymmetric, i.e. country-specific, international iceberg trade costs τt (resp. τ
∗
t ).
So for every unit of foreign (home) good shipped abroad, only a fraction 1 − τt
(resp. 1 − τ ∗t ) arrives at the home (foreign) shore. Further, I assume that these
costs are the same across goods, i.e. they are not j-dependent. Let Tt =
1
1−τt and
T ∗t =
1
1−τ∗t . Then, in order to purchase one unit of good j from abroad, a home
(foreign) consumer effectively needs to pay for Tt (resp. T
∗
t ) units of the foreign
(home) good. That is, assuming producer currency pricing (PCP), the destination
prices of imported goods into the Home and Foreign economy are, respectively
PF,t(j) = ΞtP
∗
F,t(j)Tt and P
∗
H,t(j) = (1/Ξt)PH,t(j)T
∗
t (2.2.18)
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That is, the home currency price of an imported foreign variety j is an increas-
ing function of the nominal exchange rate, of the price of the good denominated
in foreign currency, and of gross international trade costs. Equivalently, the foreign
currency price of an imported home variety j is a decreasing function of the nominal
exchange rate (given its definition as the price of foreign currency in terms of do-
mestic currency), and an increasing function of the price of the good denominated
in home currency, and of gross international trade costs.
Since the trade costs are not good-specific I can use the definition of the price
index of Home-consumed Foreign-made goods, PF,t, and of the price index of Foreign-
consumed Home-made goods, P ∗H,t, on Equation (2.2.18) to express these indexes in
terms the exchange rate, source prices, and trade costs as
PF,t = ΞtP
∗
F,tTt and P
∗
H,t = (1/Ξt)PH,tT
∗
t (2.2.19)
It is assumed that these trade costs evolve according the the following AR(1)
process
τt = ρττt−1 + ετt and τ
∗
t = ρτ∗τ
∗
t−1 + ε
τ∗
t (2.2.20)
where τt = log Tt and τ
∗
t = log T
∗
t .
Terms of trade and trade costs
The terms of trade for the Home and Foreign economy, St and S
∗
t , respectively, are
defined as the relative price of imports to exports
St =
PF,t
PH,t
and S∗t =
P ∗H,t
P ∗F,t
(2.2.21)
Accordingly, if the terms of trade increase they experience a depreciation. Using
eq. (2.2.19) I can rewrite eq. (2.2.21) as
St =
ΞtP
∗
F,tTt
PH,t
and S∗t =
(1/Ξt)PH,tT
∗
t
P ∗F,t
(2.2.22)
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That is, the terms of trade of both the Home and Foreign economies are an
increasing function of gross trade costs. Define domestic inflation as piH,t =
PH,t
PH,t−1
,
and foreign inflation as pi∗F,t =
P ∗F,t
P ∗F,t−1
, and let ξt = log(Ξt). Then, log-linearizing the
expression for the Home terms of trade in eq. (2.2.22) I get
∆sˆt = pˆi
∗
F,t − pˆiH,t + ∆ξˆt + ∆τˆt (2.2.23)
That is, the terms of trade depreciate when foreign inflation increases, when
domestic inflation decreases, when the nominal exchange rate depreciates, and when
trade costs increase. The terms of trade typically depend on the first three terms
on the right-hand-side of eq. (2.2.23). Accounting for trade costs on internationally
traded goods, makes the terms of trade depend directly on such costs.
For future reference, I derive a few useful equations. For instance, it’s easy
to show that the following relationship between the terms of trade in the Home
economy and the Foreign economy holds at all times
St =
TtT
∗
t
S∗t
(2.2.24)
Log-linearizing Equation (2.2.24) I obtain
sˆt = τˆt + τˆ
∗
t − sˆ∗t (2.2.25)
Further, using the definition of the CPI’s and the terms of trade in each economy,
it can be shown that the following relationships hold:
Pt
PH,t
=
(
PF,t
PH,t
)γ
= (St)
γ and
P ∗t
P ∗F,t
=
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗F,t
)γ∗
= (S∗t )
γ∗ (2.2.26)
Similarly:
Pt
PF,t
=
(
PH,t
PF,t
)(1−γ)
= (St)
(γ−1) and
P ∗t
P ∗H,t
=
(
P ∗F,t
P ∗H,t
)(1−γ∗)
= (S∗t )
(γ∗−1)
(2.2.27)
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Uncovered interest rate parity, terms of trade, and trade costs
As Gali and Monacelli (2005) point out, the assumption of complete international
asset markets allows us to obtain a version of the uncovered interest parity condition
(UIRP). Indeed, note that under complete markets the equilibrium price (in terms
of the Home economy’s currency) of a bond which pays one unit of Foreign currency
is given by ΞtF
∗
t = Et[Ft,t+1Ξt+1], where F
∗
t is the price of the bond in terms of
Foreign currency. I can combine this Foreign pricing equation with the Home bond
pricing equation Ft = E[Ft,t+1] to obtain a version of the UIRP:
Et[Ft,t+1It] = Et[Ft,t+1I
∗
t (Ξt+1/Ξt)] (2.2.28)
where It and I
∗
t are the gross return on the risk-free Home and Foreign bond,
respectively. Log-linearizing eq. (2.2.28) around the steady state yields
ît − î∗t = Et[ξ̂t+1]− ξ̂t (2.2.29)
Expected changes in the nominal exchange rate depend on nominal interest rate
differentials. Now, using the definition of St, and of PF,t in terms of source prices,
trade costs, and the exchange rate, (and the definition of S∗t , and of P
∗
H,t in terms
of source prices, trade costs, and the exchange rate) I get that
Et
[
St+1
St
]
= Et
[
Ξt+1
Ξt
Tt+1
Tt
pi∗F,t+1
piH,t+1
]
Et
[
S∗t+1
S∗t
]
= Et
[
Ξt+1
Ξt
T ∗t+1
T ∗t
piH,t+1
pi∗F,t+1
]
(2.2.30)
Log-linearizing (2.2.30) and using (2.2.29) I obtain the following expressions for
the terms of trade
ŝt = (î∗t − Et[pi∗F,t+1])− (ît − Et[piH,t+1]) + Et[ŝt+1 −∆τ̂t+1] (2.2.31)
ŝ∗t = (ît − Et[piH,t+1])− (î∗t − Et[pi∗F,t+1]) + Et[ŝ∗t+1 −∆τ̂ ∗t+1] (2.2.32)
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That is, the terms of trade depend on real interest rate differentials, on an
expectation of what the terms of trade will be next period, and on the expected
change on the trade costs. Rearranging equation (2.2.31) I can find an expression
for the rate of change of the terms of trade in terms of real interest rate differentials
and expected changes in trade costs.
Et[∆sˆt+1] = Et[∆τˆt+1] + (ˆit − Et [pˆiH,t+1])− (ˆi∗t − Et
[
pˆi∗F,t+1
]
) (2.2.33)
That is, the terms of trade depend on real interest rate differentials, and on
expected changes in trade costs. Eq. (2.2.33) says that for a given rate of change of
the trade costs, the rate of change of the terms of trade will be larger in magnitude
when the interest rate differential is larger. This is crucial, since as I shall see in
future sections, higher inflation targets are associated with larger real interest rate
differentials, thereby implying a larger depreciation of the terms of trade following
a trade costs shock under higher inflation targets.
Alternatively, note that in the symmetric steady state the terms of trade are
uniquely pinned down. In particular, I show in Appendix B that S¯ = T¯ in the
steady state. If I combine this fact with the assumption of stationarity in the
model’s driving forces, then limT→∞Et[sˆT ] = 0. Therefore, solving eq. (2.2.31)
forward I obtain
sˆt = Et
{ ∞∑
k=0
[(
iˆ∗t+k − pˆi∗F,t+k+1
)
−
(
iˆt+k − pˆiH,t+k+1
)]}
+ τˆt (2.2.34)
That is, the terms of trade are a function of current trade costs, and of current
and anticipated real interest rate differentials.
CPI inflation and trade costs
Let pit be Home CPI inflation, and pi
∗
t be Foreign CPI Inflation
pit =
Pt
Pt−1
pi∗t =
P ∗t
P ∗t−1
(2.2.35)
84
Using the definitions of Pt and P
∗
t , and eqs. (2.2.26) and (2.2.27) I obtain
pit = piH,t
(
St
St−1
)γ
pi∗t = pi
∗
F,t
(
S∗t
S∗t−1
)γ∗
(2.2.36)
Log-linearizing eq. (2.2.36) I get
pˆit = pˆiH,t + γ∆sˆt pˆi
∗
t = pˆi
∗
F,t + γ
∗∆sˆ∗t (2.2.37)
That is, CPI inflation increases if domestic inflation increases, and if the terms of
trade depreciate. In the latter, the increase in CPI inflation occurs up to the level of
openness of the economy. Now, using Equation (2.2.23) and its Foreign equivalent
on the expressions in eq. (2.2.37) I get
pˆit = (1− γ)pˆiH,t + γ
[
∆τˆt + pˆi
∗
F,t + ∆ξt
]
(2.2.38)
and
pˆi∗t = (1− γ∗)pˆi∗F,t + γ∗ [∆τˆ ∗t + pˆiH,t −∆ξt] (2.2.39)
That is, CPI inflation is a weighted average of local inflation and imported infla-
tion from abroad. The contribution of each source of inflation towards CPI inflation
is proportional to the share of consumption allocated to locally-produced and im-
ported goods, respectively. Furthermore, a depreciation of the nominal exchange
rate (from the point of view of Home) is passed through to CPI inflation up to
the level of openness of the economy. This nominal exchange rate increase (an in-
crease in the value of Foreign currency) decreases Foreign CPI inflation. Finally, an
increase in trade costs feeds into CPI inflation up to the level of openness of the econ-
omy. Under CPI inflation targeting this would induce monetary policy responses
whose ramifications (I will show) vary with the inflation target, thereby having con-
sequences for exchange rate determination according to the UIRP condition in eq.
(2.2.29).
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Eqs. (2.2.38) and (2.2.39) imply that I can consider symmetric and asymmetric
trade costs shocks under symmetric or asymmetric parametrizations of the openness
parameter. For instance, I can simulate a symmetric trade costs shock when both
economies are equally open, i.e. when γ = γ∗, and both τt and τ ∗t increase by the
same magnitude for some periods. I can also consider a symmetric trade costs shock
when one economy is more open than the other, say γ < γ∗. And I can consider an
increase in trade costs for the Home economy only (i.e. an asymmetric trade costs
shock), when both economies are equally open. I will in fact do this in section 2.4.
Real exchange rate and trade costs
Using (2.2.19), (2.2.26), and (2.2.24) I can express the real exchange rate as
Qt = (St)
(1−γ−γ∗) (T
∗
t )
γ∗
(Tt)(1−γ
∗) (2.2.40)
Log-linearizing Equation (2.2.40) I get
qˆt = (1− γ − γ∗)sˆt + γ∗τˆ ∗t − (1− γ∗)τˆt (2.2.41)
Taking first differences of Equation (2.2.41) and using Equation (2.2.23) I obtain
∆qˆt = (1− γ − γ∗)
[
pˆi∗F,t − pˆiH,t + ∆ξt
]− γ∆τˆt + γ∗∆τˆ ∗t (2.2.42)
Eq. (2.2.42) shows that, all else equal, following a temporary trade costs shock
the changes in the real exchange rate will be small each period if the shock is
persistent, i.e. if ∆τˆt is small each period. That is, high persistence in a trade costs
shock translates into high persistence for the real exchange rate.
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2.2.3 Resource Constraint
Market clearing with trade costs
Market clearing of a domestically-produced variety j requires that the quantity
produced of each good matches the quantity demanded. Therefore I must have
Yt(j) = CH,t(j) + C
∗
H,t(j)T
∗
t (2.2.43)
where Yt(j) is the domestic output of good j, and where the presence of T
∗
t
reflects the fact that domestic firms exporting to Foreign need to ship out T ∗t times
the amount C∗H,t(j) of good j ultimately consumed by individuals in the Foreign
economy. An analogous argument applies to Foreign firms. Now, using the optimal
choices for CH,t(j) and C
∗
H,t(j), eq. (2.2.43) becomes
Yt(j) =
[
PH,t(j)
PH,t
]−θ
CAH,t (2.2.44)
where
CAH,t = CH,t + C
∗
H,tT
∗
t (2.2.45)
That is, CAH,t is the aggregate world demand for the goods produced in the Home
economy. Now, using the optimal choices of CH,t and C
∗
H,t eq. (2.2.44) becomes
Yt(j) =
[
PH,t(j)
PH,t
]−θ [
(1− γ)PtCt
PH,t
+
γ∗P ∗t C
∗
t
P ∗H,t
T ∗t
]
(2.2.46)
Now, define aggregate output in the Home economy as
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Yt(j)
θ−1
θ dj
) θ
θ−1
(2.2.47)
I can use eq. (2.2.44) in eq. (2.2.47) to easily show that Yt = C
A
H,t. That
is, aggregate domestic output equals aggregate world demand for Home-produced
goods. This means that I can write
Yt =
(1− γ)PtCt
PH,t
+
γ∗P ∗t C
∗
t
P ∗H,t
T ∗t (2.2.48)
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and also that
Yt(j) =
[
PH,t(j)
PH,t
]−θ
Yt (2.2.49)
Starting from eq. (2.2.48), I can factor out the terms Ct, and Pt/PH,t, use
the risk-sharing condition, the definition of Qt, and the fact that ΞtP
∗
H,t = T
∗
t PH,t
to obtain the following expression relating aggregate domestic output to domestic
consumption and price levels:
Yt = Ct
(
Pt
PH,t
)
µ (2.2.50)
where µt = [1− γ + γ∗]. Using the fact that Pt/PH,t = Sγt eq. (2.2.50) becomes
Yt = CtS
γ
t µ (2.2.51)
Eq. (2.2.50) (or equivalently eq. (2.2.51)) describes the resource constraint in
an open economy. Log-linearizing (2.2.51) I get
ŷt = ĉt + γŝt (2.2.52)
2.2.4 Firms
Production
I assume a continium of monopolistically competitive firms indexed by j ∈ [0, 1].
Home firms have the following constant returns to scale production function:
Yt(j) = ZtNt(j) (2.2.53)
where Zt is the total factor productivity shifter for Home firms, and is equal
across goods and firms. In particular, these technology shocks are given by the
following AR(1) process
zt = ρzzt−1 + εzt (2.2.54)
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where zt = logZt. From the cost minimization problem of a firm who receives
an employment subsidy of ω for every unit of labor employed I get the following
standard real marginal cost expression
MCt = (1− ω) Wt
PH,tZt
(2.2.55)
That is, real marginal costs increase when real wages increase, and decrease when
productivity increases.
Calvo pricing
The model employs a Calvo price-setting process, in which producers are able to
change their prices only with some probability (1− α), independently of other pro-
ducers and the time elapsed since the last adjustment. It is assumed that producers
behave as monopolistic competitors. Each Home producer faces the following de-
mand function:
Yt(j) =
[
P˜H,t(j)
PH,t
]−θ
Yt (2.2.56)
A producer that is able to set a new price at time t chooses a price P˜H,t in
order to maximize the current market value of the profits generated while that price
remains effective. That is, the reoptimizing firm chooses P˜H,t to solve the following
problem:
max
P˜H,t
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
αkFt,t+kYt+k(j)
(
P˜H,t −MCnt+k
)]
(2.2.57)
where α is the probability that producers maintain the same price of the previous
period. The problem of the producers is to maximize equation (2.2.57) subject to
the demand constraint (2.2.56). The first order necessary condition of the firm for
this maximization is:
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
αkFt,t+kYt+k(j)
(
P˜H,t −MMCnt+k
)]
= 0 (2.2.58)
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where M = θ
θ−1 . Using the demand function (2.2.56), the resource constraint
(2.2.50), and the definition of the stochastic discount factor Ft,t+k = β
kCtPt/Ct+kPt+k
I obtain
∞∑
k=0
(αβ)kEt
[
(ΠH,t,t+k)
θ−1 P˜−θH,tPH,t
(
P˜H,t
PH,t
−MΠH,t,t+kMCt+k
)]
= 0 (2.2.59)
where ΠH,t,t+k is the cumulative gross inflation rate from time t to time t + k,
that is
ΠH,t,t+k =
 1 for k = 0;(PH,t+1
PH,t
)
× · · · ×
(
PH,t+k
PH,t+k−1
)
for k = 1, 2, · · · .
and MCt+k =
MCnt+k
PH,t+k
is the real marginal cost.
Optimal reset price and aggregate price level dynamics
Solving for the relative optimal price Xt =
P˜H,t
PH,t
I get
Xt =
P˜H,t
PH,t
=M
∑∞
k=0(αβ)
kEt[Π
θ
H,t,t+kMCt+k]∑∞
k=0(αβ)
kEt[Π
θ−1
H,t,t+k]
=Mψt
φt
(2.2.60)
Where ψt and φt are introduced as auxiliary variables. It can be shown that I
can express ψt and φt recursively as
ψt = MCt + (αβ)Et[pi
θ
H,t+1ψt+1] (2.2.61)
and
φt = 1 + (αβ)Et[pi
θ−1
H,t+1φt+1] (2.2.62)
Note that in the limiting case of no price rigidities (α = 0), eq. (2.2.60) collapses
to
Xt =MMCt = θ
θ − 1MCt (2.2.63)
as in the standard model. Therefore, I can still interpretM = θ
θ−1 as the optimal
markup in the absence of constraints on the frequency of price adjustment, i.e. in
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the flexible price economy. Which is why, as Gal´ı (2015) points out, M is referred
to as the “desired”, “natural”, or “frictionless” markup.
The optimal relative price in eq. (2.2.60) is a standard result: firms set prices in a
forward-looking fashion given that prices are sticky (α > 0). Therefore, firms choose
an optimal price that corresponds to the desired markup over a weighted average
of their current and expected nominal marginal costs. The difference between a
model that assumes that the central bank targets a zero inflation rate, and one that
assumes that the central bank targets a positive inflation rate as I do in this paper,
are the weights given to future marginal costs at the time the linear approximation
is computed.
As Ascari and Sbordone (2014) noted regarding eq. (2.2.60) in their closed
economy model: future expected inflation enters both the numerator and the de-
nominator, effectively weighing future marginal costs. I see here that in an open
economy this remains true. If these forward-looking firms expect higher inflation
rates in the future, they will assign more weight to future expected nominal marginal
costs. In this sense, firms become more forward-looking, assigning more weight to
future than to current economic conditions.
Note that eq. (2.2.60) in the steady state is
X =
P˜H
PH
=M
∑∞
k=0(αβpi
θ
H)
kMC∑∞
k=0(αβpi
θ−1
H )
k
=Mψ
φ
(2.2.64)
That is, convergence of φ and ψ in eq. (2.2.64) is conditional on
αβpiθH < 1 and αβpi
θ−1
H < 1 (2.2.65)
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respectively. For a standard calibration of parameters of α = 0.75, and β =
0.99, this implies that the trend inflation rate cannot exceed 12.6 and 14.1 percent
annually.18
The aggregate price level dynamics are expressed as
1 = αpiθ−1H,t + (1− α)X1−θt (2.2.66)
Equivalently, this can be expressed as
Xt =
P˜H,t
PH,t
=
[
1− αpiθ−1H,t
1− α
] 1
1−θ
(2.2.67)
Log-linearization of the Calvo pricing equations
As has been mentioned before, most models are approximated around a zero-inflation
steady state. However, in this paper, I are interested in controlling for different in-
flation targets. Accordingly, I log-linearize eqs. (2.2.60), (2.2.61), (2.2.62), and
(2.2.67) around a positive steady state inflation rate, piH > 0, and obtain
xˆt = ψˆt − φˆt (2.2.68)
ψˆt = (1− αβpiθH)m̂ct + (αβpiθH)
[
θEt[pˆiH,t+1] + Et[ψˆt+1]
]
(2.2.69)
φˆt = (αβpi
θ−1
H )
[
(θ − 1)Et[pˆiH,t+1] + Et[φˆt+1]
]
(2.2.70)
xˆt =
αpiθ−1H
(1− αpiθ−1H )
pˆiH,t (2.2.71)
New Keynesian Phillips Curve and marginal costs
I can combine eqs. (2.2.68), (2.2.69), (2.2.70), and (2.2.71) to find the New Key-
nesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) in terms of marginal costs and positive steady state
18This nuance has already been notice by King and Wolman (1996), Ascari (2004), and
Ascari and Sbordone (2014)
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inflation consisting of two equations, namely:
pˆiH,t = η1m̂ct + η2Et[pˆiH,t+1] + η3Et[ψˆt+1] (2.2.72)
ψˆt = (1− αβpiθH)m̂ct + (αβpiθH)
[
θEt[pˆiH,t+1] + Et[ψˆt+1]
]
(2.2.73)
where η1, η2, and η3 are coefficients defined as
η1 =
(1− αβpiθH)(1− αpiθ−1H )
αpiθ−1H
η2 = β
[
1 + θ(piH − 1)(1− αpiθ−1H )
]
η3 = β(piH − 1)(1− αpiθ−1H ) (2.2.74)
As eqs. (2.2.72) and (2.2.73) show, positive steady state inflation matters for
inflation dynamics because it alters the coefficients of the NKPC. Figure (2.1) plots
the values taken by the weights η1, η2, and η3, for a standard parametrization of
the Calvo parameter, the discount factor, and the elasticity of substitution, against
different values of annualized trend inflation.19 As is evident from the figure, the
weight, η1, that forward-looking firms assign to current marginal costs is a decreasing
function of annualized trend inflation. That is, when the inflation target is higher,
the weight that firms place on current economic conditions is lower. While the
opposite is true of the weights, η2 and η3, assigned to future economic conditions.
That is, as the inflation target increases, firms place a higher weight on future
expected inflation and future expected marginal costs.
Note that when the target for the inflation rate is zero, i.e. in a zero inflation
steady state, the steady state gross trend inflation is equal to 1, that is piH =
1. Therefore, in the zero inflation steady state case: η3 goes to zero, making the
auxiliary variable ψt disappear from the NKPC, η2 = β, and η1 =
(1−αβ)(1−α)
α
.
19That is, for α = 0.75, β = 0.99, and θ = 9
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Implying that the NKPC derived above collapses to its usual expression (when the
model is log-linearized around a zero steady state inflation):
pˆiH,t = βEt[pˆiH,t+1] +
(1− αβ)(1− α)
α
m̂ct (2.2.75)
These coefficients correspond to the the first point in the x-axis in figure (2.1),
i.e. for a zero annualized inflation rate.
2.2.5 Equilibrium
The dynamic IS equation
In order to derive the IS equation for the Home economy I lead equation (2.2.36)
by one period and I combine it with the Euler equation (2.2.14) to get
βEt
[
It
Ct
Ct+1
(St)
γ
(St+1)γ
1
piH,t+1
]
= 1 (2.2.76)
I log-linearize it, and solve for ĉt in (2.2.52) (and for ĉt+1 by leading one period). I
plug the resulting expression into equation (2.2.76) to get, after some manipulation:
ŷt = Et[ŷt+1]− (̂it − Et[piH,t+1]) (2.2.77)
As always, output depends positively on future expected output, and negatively
on the real interest rate.
The NKPC in terms of output
Now I derive expressions for the IS curve and the NKPC in terms of output de-
viations from target. Start with the marginal cost equation (2.2.55), multiply and
divide by Pt, use the Labor Supply decision Ct = Wt/Pt, the fact that S
γ
t = Pt/PH,t,
and the market clearing condition (2.2.51), to obtain
MCt =
(1− ω)
µ
Yt
Zt
(2.2.78)
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I log-linearize this expression to I obtain
m̂ct = yˆt − zˆt (2.2.79)
Therefore, the NKPC can be expressed in terms of log-deviations of output and
technology for their steady states as:
pˆiH,t = η1(yˆt − zˆt) + η2Et[pˆiH,t+1] + η3Et[ψˆt+1] (2.2.80)
with η1, η2, and η3 as defined above, and where
ψˆt = (1− αβpiθH)(yˆt − zˆt) + (αβpiθH)
[
θEt[pˆiH,t+1] + Et[ψˆt+1]
]
(2.2.81)
The Home-Foreign output relationship
I now find an expression to relate the level of Home output to the level of Foreign
output. To do so I use Equations (2.2.40), (2.2.16), (2.2.51) and its symmetric
Foreign version, and (2.2.24). That is, I use the relationship between Qt, St, and Tt,
the risk-sharing condition, the market clearing conditions for the Home and Foreign
economies, and the relationship between Home and Foreign TOT’s. I obtain:
Yt = Y
∗
t
St
Tt
µ
µ∗
(2.2.82)
Log-linearizing (2.2.82) to obtain
yˆt = yˆ
∗
t + sˆt − τˆt (2.2.83)
The IS equation, the NKPC, and the output gap
As listed in Appendix B, the steady state level of output Y¯ depends on steady state
inflation piH . Appendix B shows that in the steady state all inflation rates are the
same. That is,
p¯i = pi∗H = piH = piF = pi
∗
F = p¯i
∗ (2.2.84)
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Accordingly, I can say that the steady state level of output Y¯ depends on steady
state inflation piH = p¯i. Let Y¯ (p¯i) denote the steady state level of output for a given
level of trend inflation p¯i. Then, in general, yˆt is
yˆt = log Yt − Y¯ (p¯i) (2.2.85)
Define the output gap, ygap,t, as the log-deviation of current output from the
output that would arise in a flexible-price environment, namely the natural level
of output Y nt . Indeed, the ygap,t is a measure of the nominal distortion implied by
sticky prices.
ygap,t = log Yt − log Y nt (2.2.86)
Appendix B shows that the output gap can be expressed in terms of output and
the technology process as
ygap,t = yˆt − zˆt + y˜ (2.2.87)
where y˜ = log Y¯ (p¯i)− log Y¯flex, and Y¯flex is the steady state output under flexible
prices, which happens to coincide with the steady state output under zero steady
state inflation (ZISS), i.e. Y¯flex = Y¯ (1). As Ascari and Sbordone (2014) point out,
y˜ is the deviation of the level of output associated with steady state inflation p¯i from
the level of long-run output under flexible prices (or when steady state inflation is
zero). I can find an expression for y˜ in terms of the fundamental parameters as:
y˜ = log
(
1− αβpiθH
1− αβpiθ−1H
)
+
1
1− θ log
(
1− αpiθ−1H
1− α
)
(2.2.88)
which clearly equals 0 when α = 0, i.e. under flexible prices.
All of this implies that I can express the Home NKPC in terms of the output
gap as follows
pˆiH,t = η1(ygap,t − y˜) + η2Et[pˆiH,t+1] + η3Et[ψˆt+1] (2.2.89)
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ψˆt = (1− αβpiθH)(ygap,t − y˜) + (αβpiθH)
[
θEt[pˆiH,t+1] + Et[ψˆt+1]
]
(2.2.90)
with η1, η2, and η3 defined as before.
IS Curve and the output gap
I can express the IS curve in terms of the output gap. Start with the IS curve and
use the fact that ygap,t = yˆt − zˆt + y˜, solve for yˆt, lead one period and use into the
IS curve.
ygap,t = Et[ygap,t+1]− (̂it − Et[piH,t+1]) + Et[∆zˆt+1] (IS)
2.2.6 Monetary Policy
In order to close the model I specify a rule for the nominal interest rate. As always, I
focus on the rule for the Home economy, keeping in mind that there exists a Foreign
equivalent. I specify a CPI-based Taylor Rule with smoothing, namely:
iˆt = ρiiˆt−1 + (1− ρi)(φpipˆit + φyyˆt) + νt (2.2.91)
the monetary policy shock is given by the AR(1) process:
νt = ρννt−1 + ενt (2.2.92)
As usual, the coefficients φpi and φy are chosen by the monetary authority.
I focus on analyzing the consequences of targeting CPI instead of domestic in-
flation, even in the face of terms-of-trade shocks (which is not optimal in these
models), from a consideration of how monetary policy is conducted in practice. In-
deed, the reality is that some inflation-targeting Central Banks react to spikes in
consumer price inflation arising from terms-of-trade shocks when they are worried
about the degree of anchoring of inflation expectations, and when they think that a
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shock that becomes protracted could impact the public’s expectations. In this case,
policymakers decide to take action in the face of these shocks instead of letting the
spike in inflation work its way through. For recent examples of Central Banks in
Latin America that engaged in this type of behavior see IMF (2018b). And even if
focusing on CPI-inflation is not current practice among Central Banks in advanced
economies, some economists have argued that it should be (see for instance Bullard
2011).
2.3 The mechanism of a trade costs shock
The full linearized model can be found in Appendix B. However, in this section I
would like to highlight some equations in order to trace the mechanism of a trade
costs shock. In particular I highlight the Home IS curve, the NKPC, an expression
for the terms of trade in terms of real interest rate differentials and trade costs, an
expression that relates the nominal exchange rate and the trade costs to the terms
of trade, the UIRP condition, an expression for CPI inflation, the CPI-based Taylor
Rule, and an expression for the real exchange rate.
yˆt = Et[yˆt+1]− (̂it − Et[piH,t+1]) (2.3.1)
pˆiH,t = η1(yˆt − zˆt) + η2Et[pˆiH,t+1] + η3Et[ψˆt+1] (2.3.2)
ψˆt = (1− αβpiθH)(yˆt − zˆt) + (αβpiθH)
[
θEt[pˆiH,t+1] + Et[ψˆt+1]
]
(2.3.3)
ŝt = (î∗t − Et[pi∗F,t+1])− (ît − Et[piH,t+1]) + Et[ŝt+1 −∆τ̂t+1] (2.3.4)
∆sˆt = ∆τˆt + pˆi
∗
F,t − pˆiH,t + ∆ξt (2.3.5)
ît − î∗t = Et[ξ̂t+1]− ξ̂t (2.3.6)
pˆit = pˆiH,t + γ∆sˆt (2.3.7)
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iˆt = ρiiˆt−1 + (1− ρi)(φpipˆit + φyyˆt) + νt (2.3.8)
∆qˆt = (1− γ − γ∗)
[
pˆi∗F,t − pˆiH,t + ∆ξt
]− γ∆τˆt + γ∗∆τˆ ∗t (2.3.9)
Consider a temporary increase in international trade costs only for the Home
economy. That is, suppose τt increases temporarily, while τ
∗
t = 0 for all t. According
to eq. (2.3.5) the Home terms of trade immediately depreciate, feeding directly into
CPI inflation as per eq. (2.3.7). The CPI inflation increase induces a monetary
policy response according to the Taylor Rule in eq. (2.3.8). That is, the central
bank increases the nominal interest rate in order to bring CPI inflation back to
target. This induces a short-run appreciation of the nominal exchange rate. This
appreciation partly offsets the effect of the trade costs increase in the CPI inflation.
However, the trade costs increase dominates the offsetting effect of the nominal
exchange rate appreciation, which is why the CPI inflation increases in the first
place.
Since the shock has been received only by the Home economy the Foreign central
bank will not react unless there are spillovers. In this case, the spillovers to the
Foreign economy occur via the nominal exchange rate decrease. This induces an
increase in foreign CPI inflation. Since the change in the nominal exchange rate is
lower in magnitude than the initial trade costs increase in the Home economy, the
increase in foreign CPI inflation is not as large as the increase in home CPI inflation.
This induces the Foreign central bank to increase nominal interest rates by a lower
amount that the required increase in the Home economy in order to bring CPI
inflation back to target. This nominal interest rate differential implies that, after
the initial appreciation, the nominal exchange rate will depreciate according the
UIRP condition in eq. (2.3.6). All this implies that following a trade costs shock,
the nominal exchange rate will depreciate faster (after its initial appreciation) when
99
the interest rate differentials are higher. As I will discuss in the simulations section
below, this will occur when the inflation target is higher.
Furthermore, following the shock, the real exchange rate experiences an initial
appreciation just like the nominal exchange rate, according to eq. (2.3.9). After-
wards, the changes in the real exchange rate will track the changes in the nominal
exchange rate, inflation differentials, and the changes in the trade costs. This im-
plies that each period the changes in the real exchange rate will be small if the shock
is persistent, i.e. if ∆τˆt is small each period. That is, high persistence in a trade
costs shock translates into high persistence for the real exchange rate.
2.4 Simulations
In this section I conduct simulation exercises to test the theoretical implications of
the model. Appendix B spells out the full linearized model.20 I employ a standard
calibration of the model’s parameters in order to interpret each period as a quarter.
Appendix B contains a full list of the underlying parameters and its assumed values.
I perform the simulations in Dynare.
2.4.1 Trade Costs Shocks under different inflation targets
Figure (2.2) shows the dynamic response of the nominal and real exchange rates,
and of other key variables when only the Home economy receives a 1 percent trade
costs shocks, and both monetary policy authorities use CPI-based Taylor Rules.21
20For the interested reader, Appendix B spells out the equations of the full non-linear
model.
21The interested reader is directed to figures (B.1) and (B.2) in Appendix B for the
dynamic response of variables other than those found in figure (2.2). These figures show
the impulse response functions of most of the endogenous variables of both the Home and
100
A trade cost shock received only by the Home economy feeds directly into the
CPI via a depreciation of the terms of trade, as eq. (2.2.23) shows. This triggers
the response of the monetary policy authority who raises the nominal interest rate
in order to bring CPI inflation back to target. Recall that positive steady state
inflation enters the coefficients of the NKPC, as shown in eqs. (2.2.89) and (2.2.90),
making firms more forward looking. That is, under higher inflation targets firms
put a lower weight on current economic conditions and a higher weight on future
expected economic conditions. This implies that following a shock, firms will not
place as much weight on the current induced output drop as they would in an
economy that targets a zero inflation rate. Therefore, the domestic inflation rate
decreases less when the inflation target is higher. This makes the real interest rate
increase by a higher amount when the inflation target is higher. That is, the larger
the steady state inflation, the larger the increase in real interest rates for a given
increase in nominal interest rates.
Even though the trade costs shock is received by the Home economy, there are
spillovers to the Foreign economy via the terms of trade and the nominal exchange
rate. Upon impact the nominal exchange rate appreciates (from the point of vie
of the Home economy). This feeds directly into Foreign CPI as can be seen in
eq. (2.2.39). This increase in Foreign CPI occurs proportionally to the increase
of the nominal exchange rate up to the Foreign openness parameter γ∗. Since the
trade costs shock occurs only in the Home economy, i.e. ∆τˆ ∗ = 0 for all t in eq.
(2.2.39), and since the change in the nominal exchange rate is lower in magnitude
than the initial trade costs increase in the Home economy, the increase in foreign
CPI inflation is not as large as the increase in home CPI inflation. This induces a
Foreign economies, respectively, following this shock. I included only some of these IRFs
in Figure (2.2) due to their relevance to the present discussion.
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monetary policy response in the Foreign economy (to bring CPI inflation back to
target) that is lower in magnitude than the response in the Home economy. The
asymmetric consequences of the shock result in real interest rate differentials. These
differentials arise since the Foreign real interest rate does not increase as much as
the Home real interest rate, and remains well below the Home levels in each period
following the shock.
The nominal and real exchange rates
Following the initial appreciation, the nominal exchange rate depreciates to a new
value in the long run, as Figure (2.3) shows. This result is in line with the study
by Benigno and Benigno (2008), who investigate exchange rate dynamics under
different interest rate rules. They find that in a floating exchange rate regime,
under PCP (as in the model), the nominal exchange rate will be non-stationary.
This implies that even a stationary real shock can have persistent effects on the
nominal exchange rate, which is in line with the results. Importantly, I find that
this permanent depreciation is larger when the inflation rate targeted by the central
bank is higher.
The depreciation of the nominal exchange rate brings CPI inflation back to the
steady state, and this occurs faster when the economy exhibits high trend inflation.
In the context of a closed economy model, Ascari and Sbordone (2014) mention
that trend inflation tends to increase the persistence of macroeconomic variables.
In an open economy setup, this is generally the case, except in the case of the
nominal exchange rate. The nominal exchange rate appreciates much faster in the
high trend inflation case, following a shock to international trade costs. According
to the UIRP condition, the changes in the nominal exchange rate will be larger if
the interest rate differential is larger. Since the nominal interest rate increases by
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more in the high trend inflation case it immediately follows that the rate of change
of the nominal exchange rate will be faster in every quarter following the shock.
That is, the nominal exchange rate depreciates faster in each quarter when there is
high trend inflation. This in turn makes the CPI get back to steady state faster in
the high trend inflation case. The top panel in Fig. (2.4) plots the change in the
nominal exchange rate in every quarter following the shock. This figure makes clear
that the nominal exchange rate depreciates faster (i.e. experiences larger changes
each quarter) under higher inflation targets, and this is due to the larger interest
rate differentials under higher inflation targets. A faster depreciation implies a larger
movement in the exchange rate in a given period, which can lead to more volatility.
Accordingly, the result suggests that, all else equal, higher inflation targets could
be associated with higher exchange rate volatility following a shock to international
trade costs.
The top panel of Figure (2.6) plots the path of the real exchange rate. The slow
adjustment of the real exchange rate following the shock is evident. This is due
to the direct influence of the trade costs on the adjustment of the real exchange
rate. As eq. (2.2.42) shows, the rate of change of the real exchange rate depends on
the rate of change of the trade costs up to the openness parameter. A trade costs
shock that exhibits high persistence will decrease slowly, thereby depreciating the
real exchange rate at a slow pace. Further, I find that this slower adjustment is even
slower under higher inflation targets. The top panel of Figure (2.7) shows that for
the first two years after a trade costs shock, the depreciation of the real exchange
rate occurs at a slower pace when the inflation target is higher.
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The terms of trade
Given the real interest rate differentials, the asymmetric trade costs shock induces
the Home terms of trade to not depreciate one-to-one with the increase in trade costs.
Indeed, note in eq. (2.2.34) that the terms of trade can be expressed in terms of the
contemporaneous trade costs, and all future expected real interest rate differentials.
If the real interest rate is higher in the Home economy at all times, this will have
the effect of appreciating the terms of trade. On the other hand, a contemporaneous
positive deviation of trade costs from its steady state, i.e. a trade costs shock, has
the effect of depreciating the terms of trade. Recall that the trade costs shock is 1
percent on impact, and that this increases the CPI inflation by less than 1 percent
(given that γ < 1, and given the partial offsetting effect of the nominal exchange
rate appreciation). Further, given the smoothing nature of the nominal interest rate,
this induces a nominal interest rate increase of much less than 1 percent on impact.
From eq. (2.2.34) then, it’s clear that the depreciation-inducing trade costs term,
τt , will always dominate the appreciation-inducing real interest rate differential.
Accordingly, I observe that the terms of trade remain depreciated (with respect to
its initial value) at all times after the initial shock.
Note that not only do the Home terms of trade depreciate, which is natural
given the increase in trade costs, but they actually depreciate less when the inflation
target is higher. The reason becomes clear after inspecting eq. (2.2.34) again: the
determination of the terms of trade depends both on trade costs and on current and
expected future real interest rate differentials. As it was mentioned above, on the
one hand, an increase in trade costs induces a depreciation of the terms of trade. On
the other hand, a real interest rate differential in which the Home real interest rate
is larger than the Foreign real interest rate, induces an appreciation of the Home
terms of trade. In general, the relative size of both effects will determine whether the
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terms of trade appreciate or depreciate relative to the steady state in each period.
Now, being an exogenous variable, the trade costs shock does not depend on the
inflation target. However, the size of the real interest rate differential does depend
on the inflation target that prevails in the economy. Under higher inflation targets I
have shown that the real interest rate response is more pronounced, thereby pulling
the Home terms of trade more towards an appreciation. However, the effect of the
increase in trade costs dominates the effect of the real interest rate differentials
in each period. Nonetheless, the effect of the real interest rate differentials is not
negligible and is in fact larger under higher inflation targets. It immediately follows
that the Home terms of trade depreciate less under higher inflation targets.
2.4.2 Symmetric Trade Costs Shock under different infla-
tion targets
In this section I analyze the response of the economy to a 1 percent symmetric trade
costs shock when the Taylor Rule of both economies reacts to CPI inflation. When
the model is calibrated symmetrically there are no interest rate differentials since
both monetary policy authorities react symmetrically to the shock. Accordingly,
the nominal exchange rate remains unchanged. Further, since the magnitude of
the shock is the same on both economies, the effect of changes in the trade costs
in the Home and Foreign economies will cancel each other out in every period, as
can be seen in eq. (2.2.42). Now, since there are no interest rate differentials,
the terms of trade depreciate one-to-one with the increase in trade costs according
to eq. (2.2.34). Accordingly, following the initial depreciation, the terms of trade
appreciate at the rate that the trade costs shock vanishes. This implies that if the
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trade costs shocks exhibits high persistence, then the depreciation of the terms of
trade will occur slowly.
However, in a word that is not perfectly symmetric, even a symmetric trade
costs shock affecting both economies will have consequences for the nominal and
real exchange rates. Now I analyze the consequence of the same shock, but with
the assumption that the Foreign economy is more open that the Home economy. In
particular, I now assume that γ∗ = 0.5, while maintaining all other parameters at
their same values. The middle panel of figure (2.3) plots the path of the nominal
exchange rate following the shock. As can be seen in this figure, following an initial
depreciation, the nominal exchange rate experiences a permanent appreciation, and
this appreciation is larger in magnitude when the inflation target is higher. The
middle panel of figure (2.4) shows that the nominal exchange rate exhibits larger
changes each period on its way back to the new steady state under higher inflation
targets. This is due to the interest rate differentials induced by the higher exposure
of the Foreign economy to external shocks. The higher nominal interest rate increase
in the Foreign economy, relative to the increase in the Home economy can be seen
in figure (2.5).
2.4.3 Monetary policy shock under different inflation tar-
gets
For comparison, I give the Home economy a monetary policy shock of 25 basis
points (1 percent annualized). The bottom panel of figure (2.3) plots the path of
the nominal exchange rate under different inflation targets. Following the mone-
tary policy shock, the nominal exchange rate appreciates and then converges to a
negative value. That is, in the long-run, the nominal exchange rate experiences a
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permanent appreciation, while under the trade costs shock studied above, the nomi-
nal exchange rate experiences a permanent depreciation after its initial appreciation.
Interestingly, the permanent appreciation is much lower in magnitude under higher
inflation targets. In the bottom panel of figure (2.4) I plot the changes in the nomi-
nal exchange rate following the shock, and I can observe that, as in other cases, the
changes experienced by the nominal exchange rate are larger in magnitude every
quarter under higher inflation targets. However, they converge to their respective
new steady states at around the same time. As the figure suggests, converge towards
the new steady state, however, occurs much faster under monetary policy shocks
than under international trade costs shocks.
The monetary policy shock also induces persistence in the adjustment path of
the real exchange rate towards its initial value. However, the real exchange rate
converges much more quickly to its steady state following a monetary policy shock
than following a trade costs shock. That is, the real exchange rate exhibits more
persistence, i.e. a slower pace of adjustment back to its equilibrium value, under
trade costs shocks than under monetary policy shocks.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper studied the implications of international trade costs shocks on exchange
rate determination under the inflation targeting regime. Understanding the conse-
quences of these shocks is important given the protectionist rhetoric coming from
important countries around the world. If this rhetoric translates into policies that
raise the costs of international trade, then monetary policymakers need to under-
stand the implications of these shocks for important variables like the exchange rate,
especially in the context of inflation targeting.
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To study these shocks, I developed a two-country DSGE model of the New
Keynesian type in which the monetary policy authority targets CPI inflation. I
assumed that internationally traded goods are subject to iceberg trade costs and, in
order to properly account for the implications of having different inflation targets,
I assumed a positive inflation rate in the steady state of the model.
I found that a trade costs shock received by the Home economy leads to a
permanent depreciation of the nominal exchange rate, and that this permanent
depreciation is larger in magnitude under higher inflation targets. Further, I found
that the nominal exchange rate exhibits changes of larger magnitude in each period
following the shock under higher inflation targets. This suggests a higher nominal
exchange rate volatility associated with higher inflation targets. I also found that
when the entire world is subject to the same increase in trade costs, a country that
allocates a higher consumption share to imported goods will experience a permanent
nominal exchange rate appreciation in the long run. This implies that an inflation
targeting country that is more open than its trading partners is more exposed to
shocks to international trade costs with long-run consequences for the nominal value
of its currency under the floating regime. Finally, I found that following a shock to
international trade costs, the real exchange rate exhibits a slow pace of adjustment
towards its equilibrium value. The implied persistence of the real exchange rate is
higher under trade costs shocks than under monetary policy shocks.
Certainly, many things remain to be done from an empirical and theoretical
perspective, and the results suggest some testable predictions. First, the finding
that suggests that higher inflation targets are associated with higher exchange rate
volatility could be confronted with the data. The literature finds that IT is usually
associated with lower exchange rate volatility, but this literature does not control
for the different inflation rates that a central bank may target as I do here. Second,
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an interesting implication of the results is related to the exchange rate pass-through
(ERPT) that an IT economy may face. The ERPT literature shows that larger
changes in the nominal exchange rate are associated with higher pass-through mea-
sures. Consequently, the finding suggests that economies that have higher inflation
targets could face higher ERPT. An empirical study of this theoretical implication
is warranted, and could have important policy implications. Third, this paper as-
sumed that only final consumption goods were subject to international trade costs.
However, an important portion of international trade takes the form of trade in
intermediate goods. The model in this paper can be augmented to be able to study
the pricing decisions of firms that face trade costs, and their implications for the
exchange rate under IT. In this case, even domestic inflation targeting could have
consequences for the exchange rate. Fourth, the implications for exchange rate
dynamics under IT when capital mobility is subject to international trade costs
remains to be understood. Finally, this paper focused on two large countries (or
two large economic blocks). The question remains whether these results differ for a
small open economy. These are some possible directions for future research.
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Figure 2.1: NKPC Coefficients vs Annualized Trend Inflation
Note: NKPC weights on current and future expected economic conditions.
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Figure 2.2: Impulse Response Functions: Trade Costs Shock in the Home Economy
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Note: Dynamic responses to a 1 percent trade costs shock received by the Home
economy under different inflation targets.
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Figure 2.3: Impulse Response Functions: Nominal Exchange Rate
Note: Dynamic response of the nominal exchange rate to a 1 percent trade costs
shock (top and middle panels), and to a monetary policy shock of 25 basis points
(bottom panel) under different inflation targets.
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Figure 2.4: Quarterly Changes of the Nominal Exchange Rate
Note: Quarterly changes of the nominal exchange rate following a 1 percent trade
costs shock (top and middle panels), and a monetary policy shock of 25 basis points
(bottom panel) under different inflation targets.
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Figure 2.5: Impulse Response Functions: Trade Costs Shock to both Home and
Foreign
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inflation targets, when the Foreign economy is more open than the Home economy.
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Figure 2.6: Impulse Response Functions: Real Exchange Rate
Note: Dynamic response of the real exchange rate to a 1 percent trade costs shock
(top panel), and to a monetary policy shock of 25 basis points (bottom panel) under
different inflation targets.
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Figure 2.7: Quarterly Changes of the Real Exchange Rate
Note: Quarterly changes of the real exchange rate following a 1 percent trade costs
shock (top panel), and a monetary policy shock of 25 basis points (bottom panel)
under different inflation targets.
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CHAPTER 3
EXCHANGE RATE PASS-THROUGH INTO MICRO PRICES
3.1 Introduction
The appropriate formulation and implementation of monetary policy under the in-
flation targeting regime requires a thorough understanding of the extent to which ex-
ternal shocks can affect consumer prices. In a small open economy, for instance, pol-
icymakers need to be aware of the extent to which changes in the nominal exchange
rate may induce changes in the prices of imported products — i.e. the exchange rate
pass-through.1 This is particularly the case in emerging market economies since: (i)
these economies tend to be subject to large nominal exchange rate shocks (Nord-
strom et al., 2009), (ii) the literature has found that these economies tend to exhibit
higher degrees of exchange rate pass-through (Burstein and Gopinath, 2014), and
(iii) monetary policy authorities in these economies don’t have a long inflation tar-
geting track record, which puts pressure on them to try to curb what may be even
temporary spikes in consumer prices (Nordstrom et al., 2009).
When an exchange rate shock occurs, monetary policymakers have choices to
make. On the one hand, under inflation targeting (IT), policymakers can look
through the inflation impact of changes in nominal exchange rates, but when ex-
change rate pass-through (ERPT) is high this impact may undermine the credibility
of the IT framework and policymakers might be compelled to take action (IMF,
1Exchange rate pass-through refers to the possibility that exchange rate changes may
induce changes in the domestic-currency price of imported goods and services. Suppose
the nominal exchange rate depreciates and an importer pays for an imported product
in foreign currency (i.e. the import is invoiced in foreign currency). The importer may
now increase the domestic-currency price of the import in order to pass-through the cost
increase to consumers. This is one mechanic way in which an exchange rate depreciation
leads to an increase in the (domestic-currency) price of imports.
117
2018b). On the other hand, if ERPT is low there is no trade-off: the nominal
exchange rate can facilitate the adjustment and stabilization of the real economy,
and policymakers can conduct an independent and countercyclical monetary policy
without worrying about consumer price inflation.
With this in mind, it’s important to know the level of ERPT. In this chapter, I
take a granular approach and introduce a novel data set to the literature in order
to study the ERPT into imported agricultural products into Turkey. Turkey is a
small open economy which formally adopted inflation targeting in 2006, and has
seen its exchange rate wildly fluctuate over the years (see Figure 3.1). This makes
the country a good candidate for study given the discussion above.
The data set I introduce has two main advantages over others used in the lit-
erature. First, it consists of the daily wholesale prices of imported agricultural
commodities into Istanbul, Turkey. To my knowledge, this is one of a few databases
available in which the frequency of the observations is daily. One of the main findings
in this chapter will be to establish a relationship between the level of ERPT and the
storage potential of an agricultural commodity (a concept related to the literature
on the economic effects of depreciation of inventories). Having a daily investigation
is crucial for establishing this relationship, since at higher levels of aggregation (e.g.
monthly or quarterly frequencies) one would miss the fact that some agricultural
commodities have a storage potential of only a few days (e.g. raspberries have a
storage potential of 1 week). Second, the data source contains the corresponding
daily prices for domestically produced agricultural products. This allows me to con-
struct a relevant measure that controls for all other macroeconomic developments
in Turkey which may affect the prices of agricultural commodities, thereby allowing
me to properly identify the pure effect of nominal exchange rate changes on prices.
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The daily wholesale prices are then combined with data on the nominal exchange
rate (NER), on the frequency with which the daily import prices change (which I
measure over the sample period), and on the storage potential (in weeks). Doing so
I confirm a variety of empirical regularities found in the ERPT literature, as well as
establishing new facts, especially related to the relationship between ERPT and the
storage potential of perishable agricultural commodities. This chapter goes beyond
the standard linear investigation of ERPT and considers potential nonlinearities.
This is in line with a recent trend in the ERPT which uses nonlinear/threshold
models. For instance, in this literature, Shintani et al. (2013) conclude that the low
ERPT associated with the 1980s and 1990s is likely due to low inflation. Similarly,
Ben Cheikh and Rault (2016) use a logistic smooth transition model for five heavily
indebted countries, to show that ERPT tends to be higher when sovereign bond
yield spreads exceed a certain threshold; Cheikh and Louhichi (2016) use a threshold
model on a set of 63 countries to show that those countries that experience higher
degrees of ERPT are also those countries that have higher rates of inflation; and
Donayre and Panovska (2016) study Canada and Mexico, and they show, using a
threshold vector autoregression, that episodes of larger growth rates of output are
associated with higher ERPT. This chapter contributes to this recent literature by
considering how ERPT varies when the NER changes, the frequency of price change,
and the storage life exceed certain thresholds. Additionally, and as mentioned above,
this chapter uses a highly disaggregated data, as opposed to those papers mentioned
above, thus avoiding aggregation bias and allowing me to establish new empirical
results in the literature.
Using standard empirical methods the chapter findings are in line with existing
studies that employ lower frequencies of data. I find evidence for incomplete daily
ERPT of about 5%. This result is similar to studies that use good-level data sets
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(e.g. see Aron et al. (2014), Gopinath et al. (2010), and Lott and Einav (2013)).
However, the magnitude of the coefficients in this chapter are lower when compared
to those in studies using more aggregated data (e.g. see Goldberg and Knetter
(1996), and Menon (1995)).
Once nonlinearities are considered, as described above, the degree of ERPT
doubles to 10% when NER changes are larger than 0.55% daily, when the daily
frequency of price change is above 3.12%, and when the storage potential of an
agricultural commodity is above 10 weeks. The result that ERPT is higher when
NER changes exceed a certain threshold is in line with the findings in Burstein
et al. (2005), who show that the magnitude of NER changes may be effective in the
determination of ERPT. The finding that the frequency of price changes may affect
the degree of ERPT is in line with the findings in Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010),
who show a positive relationship between the frequency with which prices change
and the magnitude of the ERPT. In particular, and in line with our findings, the
authors of that study find that, on average, products with a high frequency of price
adjustment have a long-run ERPT that is at least twice as high as that of those
goods with low-frequency of adjustment. The final finding of the paper, positively
linking the storage potential of an agricultural commodity and the degree of ERPT,
is in line with an economic channel in which the seller of a perishable product needs
to sell the good as soon as possible, due to its high rate of depreciation. This implies
that sellers of more perishable products (those with lower storage potential) will be
less inclined to try to pass-through their higher costs to consumers in the event of an
exchange rate shock. On the contrary, an importer of commodities with longer shelf
lives may pass-through her higher costs simply because she can afford to wait for
an optimal price. This channel is in line with the studies of Kryvtsov and Midrigan
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(2012), and Alessandria et al. (2013), who show that the optimal price of a seller
decreases as the depreciation rate of its inventories increase.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 introduces the data set,
Sector 3.3 describes the methodology employed, Section 3.4 presents and discusses
the results, and Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Data
The data set consists of daily wholesale prices of 52 agricultural products imported
into Istanbul, Turkey, from January 2005 until August 2015. The data source was
obtained from the web page of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality.2 Of particu-
lar importance for this chapter, the data source distinguishes between imported and
domestically-produced agricultural commodities. This works perfectly for the inves-
tigation: to control for local macroeconomic effects I construct the daily domestic
inflation rate using daily wholesale price data for 311 domestically-produced agri-
cultural commodities within Turkey and sold in Istanbul. I construct such domestic
inflation rate by calculating the average percentage change in good-level prices, after
ignoring the outlier goods, where outlier goods are defined as those that have price
changes more than 2 standard deviations away from the average inflation.
This data set is combined with the daily nominal exchange rate between the
Turkish Lira and the U.S. dollar. This data was obtained from the web page of
The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. We use the Lira/U.S. dollar exchange
rate given that U.S. dollars are the main currency used for Turkish imports and
that most of global trade takes place in U.S. dollars. In particular, Nazlioglu and
Soytas (2011), Richards et al. (2012), and Schaffnit-Chatterjee et al. (2010) show
2The web page of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality is www.ibb.gov.tr.
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that agricultural products are globally traded in U.S. dollars, and Gopinath (2015),
show that the majority (60%) of Turkish imports are invoiced in U.S. dollars, while
only 3% of them are invoiced in Turkish liras. Given that imports from the U.S.
account for only 6% of total Turkish imports, it follows that the U.S. dollar is
the main foreign currency used for invoicing Turkish imports, regardless of what
country these products come from. Data concerning the storage potential of each
agricultural commodity in the sample comes from Cantwell (2001).
3.3 Empirical Methodology
The specification used in this study follows Campa and Goldberg (2005) and Burstein
and Gopinath (2014). In particular, to obtain the ERPT measure I estimate:
∆pg,t = α +
(
T∑
k=0
βk∆et−k
)
+ γpit + δg + St + t (3.3.1)
where ∆pg,t is the log change of the daily wholesale price of good g, βk captures the
exchange rate pass through of the kth lag of the log NER change, ∆et−k is the kth
lag of the log NER change, pit is the daily domestic inflation rate, δgs are good-fixed
effects, St is a vector of dummies representing seasonality controls, and t is the
error term.
Lag selection is achieved by using the standard AIC and BIC criteria, together
with the significance of the corresponding coefficients. The control variable pit fa-
cilitates the identification of the ERPT coefficient. Since pit captures the average
price of locally produced agricultural commodities, this variable implicitly captures
all Turkey-specific macroeconomic characteristics that may have an impact on the
prices of these internationally traded agricultural commodities, thereby facilitating
the identification of the ERPT coefficient. Good fixed effects, δg help control for
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good-specific factors that may affect the good-specific prices. Given the daily fre-
quency of our data set, I follow Al-Ississ (2010), Ali et al. (2017), Boffa et al. (2014),
and Boffa et al. (2014), and include weekday fixed effects, monthly fixed effects,
and Ramadan fixed effects in the vector of time fixed effects St. The importance
of controlling for these fixed effects can be seen in Figures 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5,
which plot the daily log change of the exchange rate during Ramadan and during
non-Ramadan days, and during different weekdays, months, and years, respectively.
Similarly, Figures 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9, plot the daily log change of the prices of
the agricultural commodities during Ramadan and during non-Ramadan days, and
during different weekdays, months, and years, respectively. As the figures show, the
dispersion of the daily log changes depend on what dates are considered, lending
support to the use of these fixed effects.
3.3.1 Nonlinearities
We also consider potential nonlinearities in the determination of ERPT. The litera-
ture studying nonlinearities in ERPT has made use both of the threshold approach
and of the smooth transition framework. In a threshold regression (TR), the transi-
tion from one regime to the next is instantaneous in the sense that the nonlinearity
kicks in fully and immediately once the transition variable passes its threshold value.
While in a smooth transition regression (STR) the transition across extreme regimes
is gradual. The choice of one approach over another depends on whether the analysis
is at the macro or microeconomic level. At the aggregate level, as Ben Cheikh and
Rault (2017) point out, “firms form very diverse opinions about the macroeconomic
environment in the importing country; hence, assuming an abrupt transition from
one regime to the other is unrealistic.” Any heterogeneity across firms in how they
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perceive the state of the importer’s macroeconomic conditions may be hidden due
to the aggregation. In that case, the nonlinearity in ERPT may be smooth and the
estimation needs to be able to capture a potential gradual transition across regimes.
However, when the analysis is at the microeconomic level, as it is in the case of
this paper, Ben Cheikh and Rault (2017) point out that a single foreign firm has
the ability to change prices sharply in response to changes in the macroeconomic
condition of the importing country. In this case, a threshold regression approach
is more appropriate. Accordingly, I make use of the following threshold regression
specification:
∆pg,t = α+
(
T∑
k=0
βk∆et−kI(qg,t ≤ τ)
)
+
(
T∑
k=0
βk∆et−kI(qg,t > τ)
)
+γpit+δg+St+t
(3.3.2)
where qg,t is the threshold variable (representing the NER, the frequency of price
change or the storage potential of a given product), τ is the corresponding threshold
value, I(qg,t ≤ τ) is an indicator function which takes the value of 1 if qg,t ≤ τ and
0 otherwise, and I(qg,t > τ) is an indicator function taking the value of 1 if qg,t > τ
and 0 otherwise. For any given τ , the coefficients βk are obtained via ordinary
least squares. The question, however, remains on how the threshold value is found.
We follow Chan et al. (1993) and Hansen (2000) and estimate the threshold τ by
performing a grid search over all possible values of τ such that the residual sum of
squares is minimized. In particular, denote R(τ) the residual sum of squares (RSS)
obtained when the value τ is used for the sample split. The estimate for τ is found
via least squares by minimizing R(τ) over all possible values of τ . Denoting this
consistent estimator of the threshold by τˆ , I look for:
τˆ = arg min
τ
R(τ) (3.3.3)
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For practical purposes, considering all possible values of τ amounts to consider-
ing at most all possible values of the threshold variable qg,t in the sample. Further-
more, following Hansen (1999), since it is desirable to have an adequate amount of
observations on either side of the threshold one may eliminate from the search the
highest and lowest 15% of the ordered values of qg,t to end up with a range of values,
[τ , τ ] = Γ, over which to search. I do this only in the case of the exchange rate, and
the frequency of price change thresholds. Without losing significant accuracy I per-
form the minimization by using a grid search over Γ in the case of the exchange rate
and the frequency of price change thresholds. For the storage potential threshold I
perform the search for τ over all possible values of the storage potential. Practically,
by plotting the RSS, R(τ), for all values of τ , one can immediately identify which
τ minimizes it. This can be seen in Figures 3.10, 3.11, and 3.12. In particular, the
threshold values are 0.55% for the exchange rate, 3.12% for the frequency of price
change, and 10 days for the storage potential.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Lag Selection
I first determine the optimal amount of lags of the exchange rate to be used in all
other estimations. To achieve this I estimate Equation 3.3.1 considering different
lags of the NER up to T = 8. The results are shown in Table 3.1. The standard AIC
and BIC criteria for lag selection both select T = 1 as the optimal amount of lags to
be used. However, the corresponding ERPT coefficient is statistically insignificant
(see column 2). This insignificance holds whether one considers some or all possible
controls (see Table 3.2). Accordingly, I continue the analysis considering only the
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contemporaneous ERPT coefficient, that is, considering lags only up to T = 0. This
is in line with Lott and Einav (2013), who study daily ERPT using data on eBay
transactions of U.S. imports from Germany. With this in mind, the coefficient β0 in
Equation 3.3.1 will be the measure of ERPT in this chapter.
As a baseline, the results of the estimation of Equation 3.3.1 presented in Table
3.1 and Table 3.2 show that the average wholesale price response of an agricultural
commodity to a 1 percent depreciation is about 0.05 percent. Equivalently, one could
say that given a 100% depreciation, the price of an imported agricultural commodity
would increase by about 5%. This evidence is in line with that presented in the
literature. In particular, the literature tends to find evidence for incomplete ERPT
pass-through (i.e. a less than 1 to 1 relationship between exchange rate changes and
price changes). This result is similar to studies that use good-level data sets (e.g.
see Aron et al. (2014), Gopinath et al. (2010), and Lott and Einav (2013)), although
the magnitude of the coefficients in this chapter are lower when compared to those
in studies using more aggregated data (e.g. see Goldberg and Knetter (1996), and
Menon (1995)).
3.4.2 ERPT Across Time
I know consider the possibility that ERPT may be higher or lower in certain years
in the sample period. Sample selection is a known source of bias in any empirical
study, and it may be the case that selecting certain time frames yields a different
picture for the average price increase to exchange rate changes. With this in mind,
I estimate Equation 3.3.1 for each year in the sample. The results are reported
in Table 3.3. As the results show, 2009, 2010, and 2015 are years in which the
ERPT coefficient increased significantly to 0.23, 0.38, and 0.29 percent, respectively.
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These magnitudes are more in line with those reported in studies using more highly
aggregated data, suggesting that aggregation bias as well as sample selection may
play an important role in the magnitudes of ERPT found in empirical work.
Additionally, some of the years in with ERPT was significantly higher were also
years in which the exchange rate experienced rapid depreciations, suggesting, along
the lines of Burstein et al. (2005), that the size of the NER shock may matter for
the degree of ERPT. I investigate this matter in the next subsection.
3.4.3 ERPT and Nonlinearities
I now consider potential nonlinearities by estimating Equation 3.3.2, where the
threshold values were found by minimizing the residual sum of squares as described
in Chan et al. (1993) and Hansen (2000), and as discussed in Section 3.3. One further
consideration comes from the paper by Gopinath et al. (2010), who suggest that the
degree of ERPT may be conditional on actual price changes — i.e. ERPT may be
higher when it occurs at a time when prices actually change. To entertain this possi-
bility, I estimate Equation 3.3.2 on the entire sample (i.e. considering no restrictions
on price changes), and on the sub-sample that includes only those observations in
which prices actually change (i.e. considering only nonzero price changes). Accord-
ingly, I present the results for the threshold analysis by distinguishing between all
price changes and nonzero price changes.
Tables 3.4, 3.6, and 3.8 present the results using the threshold values for the
magnitude of the exchange rate change, for the frequency of price change, and for
the storage potential, using all price changes. In turn, Tables 3.5, 3.7, and 3.9
present the results using the threshold values for the same variables, but using only
nonzero price changes. Each table consists of four columns. Columns 1 through 3
127
include some controls and exclude others, while column 4 includes all controls and
all fixed effects, and is therefore the baseline for comparison across specifications.
For ease of discussion, the exchange rate pass-through coefficients of interest (those
in column 4) have been summarized in Table 3.10.
On the one hand, as Table 3.10 shows, when the estimation is achieved consider-
ing all price changes, there is evidence of incomplete ERPT of around 10% when the
daily NER changes exceed the threshold value of 0.55%, when only those goods for
which the frequency of price change is above 3.12% are considered, and when only
those goods with a storage potential higher than 10 weeks are considered. How-
ever, the ERPT for agricultural commodities is statistically insignificant when the
corresponding variables obtain values below their corresponding threshold values.
On the other hand, when only nonzero price changes are considered (in the spirit
of Gopinath et al. (2010)), I find evidence for complete ERPT, given the confidence
intervals of each point estimate contains the coefficient 1. The findings suggest that,
on average, the ERPT coefficient is about 155% for agricultural commodities with
a storage potential that is higher than 10 weeks, 120% for days when the exchange
rate change is higher than 0.55%, and 73% for goods whose prices change more than
3.12% of the time.
These results are in line with the evidence in the literature and with economic
theory. The finding that ERPT tends to be higher when exchange rate changes
exceed a certain threshold is in line with the results in Burstein et al. (2005). They
show that the magnitude of NER changes may be effective in the determination of
ERPT.
The result linking the frequency of price change to the degree of ERPT is in line
with the findings in Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010), who show a positive relationship
between the frequency with which prices change and the magnitude of the ERPT.
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In line with my findings, the authors of that paper find that, on average, goods with
a high frequency of price adjustment have a long-run ERPT that is at least twice
as high as that of those goods with low-frequency of adjustment.
The most novel finding of the chapter, which positively links the storage po-
tential of an agricultural import and the degree of ERPT, is in line an economic
channel in which the seller of a perishable good needs to sell the product as soon as
possible, due to its high depreciation rate. This channel implies that sellers of more
perishable commodities (i.e. those that are less “inventoriable” or those with lower
storage potential) will be less inclined to try to pass-through their higher costs to
consumers in the event of an exchange rate change. On the contrary, an importer of
commodities with longer shelf lives may choose to pass-through her higher costs sim-
ply because she can afford to wait for an optimal price. Intuitively, since importers
need to sell more perishable products (those with lower storage life) more quickly,
they may optimally choose to take lower price offers, regardless of what happens to
the exchange rate. This would imply an ERPT coefficient that is higher for more
“storable” or less perishable products. Equivalently, this implies an ERPT coeffi-
cient that is lower for less “storable”, more perishable commodities, or goods with
higher rates of depreciation, in general. This economic channel is in line with the
studies of Kryvtsov and Midrigan (2012), and Alessandria et al. (2013), who show
that the optimal price of a seller decreases as the depreciation rate of its inventories
increase.
3.5 Conclusion
The appropriate design and implementation of monetary policy rests on the abil-
ity of policymakers to understand the extent to which external shocks reverberate
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throughout the economy. This is particularly true in emerging market economies
with inflation targeting frameworks. These economies are constantly subject to ex-
ternal shocks and policymakers are repeatedly facing policy trade-offs. An exchange
rate shock, for instance, can pose several adverse macroeconomic consequences and
a thorough understanding of these consequences is crucial. In particular, mone-
tary policymakers in inflation targeting countries need to understand the extent to
which changes in the nominal exchange rate may induce changes in consumer prices
at home via the effect on the prices of imports. That is, policymakers need to have
a full understanding of the extent of the exchange rate pass-through. This is crucial,
because different degrees of ERPT will have different consequences for how mon-
etary policy is communicated, how inflation expectations will be affected, and for
the ability of policymakers to effectively have a councercyclical stance in response
to shocks.
With this in mind, in this chapter I set out to measure the degree of ERPT
in Turkey — an emerging market economy under inflation targeting and in which
the nominal exchange rate has fluctuated wildly over the last decade. The chap-
ter introduces a novel data set consisting of daily observations of wholesale prices
of imported agricultural products into Turkey. This is one of the few available
databases of import prices with observations at the daily frequency. The fact that
these observations are daily allows me to study whether the degree of ERPT varies
with the storage potential of the agricultural commodities, a link that has not been
previously studied in the ERPT literature. One of the main advantages of the data
is that its source also includes the prices for agricultural commodities domestically
produced in Turkey and sold in Istanbul. This allows me to properly identify the
effect of the exchange rate on the prices of imported products, since I can control
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for all other local macroeconomic aspects that may affect the prices of agricultural
commodities imported into Turkey.
The chapter contributes to a recent line of the literature that considers nonlin-
earities in the determination of the ERPT coefficient. In particular, several recent
papers (e.g. Shintani et al. (2013), Ben Cheikh and Rault (2016), Cheikh and
Louhichi (2016), Donayre and Panovska (2016)) have employed threshold models
in order to understand whether the ERPT measure is higher or lower when the
characteristics of interest exceed certain threshold levels. First, I use standard em-
pirical methods commonly found in the ERPT literature to establish that the newly
introduced data set shares in the empirical regularities typically found in the litera-
ture. Then, I go on to use a threshold model to study whether the ERPT coefficient
varies when the magnitude of the exchange rate change, when the frequency of price
change, or when the storage potential of the agricultural commodities exceed certain
thresholds.
I find evidence for incomplete daily ERPT intro agricultural import prices of
about 5%. The incompleteness result is similar to those found in studies that use
good-level data sets (e.g. see Aron et al. (2014), Gopinath et al. (2010), and Lott and
Einav (2013)). However, the magnitude of the coefficients in this chapter are lower
when compared to those in studies using more aggregated data (e.g. see Goldberg
and Knetter (1996), and Menon (1995)).
Once nonlinearities are considered, the degree of ERPT into the prices of im-
ported agricultural products doubles to about 10% when NER changes are larger
than 0.55% daily, when the daily frequency of price change is above 3.12%, and
when the storage potential of an agricultural commodity is above 10 weeks. The
result that ERPT is higher when NER changes exceed a certain threshold is in line
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with the findings in Burstein et al. (2005), who show that the magnitude of NER
changes may be effective in the determination of ERPT.
The finding that the ERPT coefficient may depend on the frequency of price
changes is in line with the findings in Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010), who show
a positive relationship between the frequency with which prices change and the
magnitude of the ERPT. In line with my findings, the authors of that study find
that, on average, products with a high frequency of price adjustment have a long-run
ERPT that is at least twice as high as that of those goods with low-frequency of
adjustment.
The most novel finding of the chapter relates the degree of ERPT to the storage
potential or to the rate of depreciation of the imported agricultural product. The
finding positively links the storage potential of an agricultural commodity and its
degree of ERPT. This is in line with an economic channel in which the seller of
a perishable product needs to sell the good as soon as possible, due to its high
depreciation rate. This implies that sellers of highly perishable products (those
with lower storage potential or lower shelf life) will be less inclined to try to pass-
through their higher costs to consumers in the event of an exchange rate shock. On
the contrary, an importer of commodities with longer shelf lives may pass-through
her higher costs simply because she can afford to wait for an optimal price. This
channel is in line with the studies of Kryvtsov and Midrigan (2012), and Alessandria
et al. (2013), who show that the optimal price of a seller decreases as the depreciation
rate of its inventories increase.
The results presented in this chapter indicate that, overall and on average, ERPT
is low for agricultural commodities in Turkey. This implies that in the event of
nominal exchange rate shocks, Turkish policymakers may allow the exchange rate
to move freely without fear that the prices of agricultural imports, and thereby of
132
consumer prices, will spike significantly. The nominal exchange rate can, therefore,
facilitate the adjustment process of the real and the external sector of the economy to
the shock, and Turkish policymakers can conduct monetary policy in an independent
and countercyclical manner, in line with the requirements of the inflation targeting
regime (see Devereux et al. (2006), and Winkelried (2014)).
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Table 3.1: ERPT with Alternatives Exchange Rate Lags
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES Price Price Price Price Price Price Price Price Price
Exchange Rate 0.0490** 0.0438* 0.0520* 0.0598** 0.0623** 0.0585* 0.0616* 0.0594* 0.0582*
(0.0230) (0.0255) (0.0271) (0.0272) (0.0291) (0.0300) (0.0314) (0.0325) (0.0337)
Exchange Rate, Lag 1 -0.0386 -0.00581 -0.0157 -0.00894 -0.0155 -0.0166 -0.0167 -0.0238
(0.0289) (0.0289) (0.0293) (0.0278) (0.0292) (0.0294) (0.0294) (0.0294)
Exchange Rate, Lag 2 0.0542* 0.0795*** 0.0740*** 0.0546** 0.0507* 0.0526 0.0451
(0.0296) (0.0272) (0.0268) (0.0269) (0.0291) (0.0315) (0.0312)
Exchange Rate, Lag 3 -0.00991 0.000741 2.69e-06 -0.00303 -0.000575 -0.00185
(0.0284) (0.0301) (0.0306) (0.0291) (0.0301) (0.0303)
Exchange Rate, Lag 4 -0.00601 -0.0257 -0.0210 -0.0273 -0.0239
(0.0287) (0.0275) (0.0265) (0.0270) (0.0266)
Exchange Rate, Lag 5 0.0418 0.0432 0.0345 0.0258
(0.0264) (0.0281) (0.0277) (0.0268)
Exchange Rate, Lag 6 -0.0362 -0.0248 -0.0255
(0.0217) (0.0253) (0.0262)
Exchange Rate, Lag 7 0.0194 0.0179
(0.0309) (0.0327)
Exchange Rate, Lag 8 0.00297
(0.0229)
Inflation 0.335*** 0.325*** 0.328*** 0.334*** 0.339*** 0.344*** 0.334*** 0.336*** 0.335***
(0.0694) (0.0684) (0.0695) (0.0709) (0.0716) (0.0713) (0.0712) (0.0708) (0.0714)
Constant -0.00435*** -0.00361*** -0.00372*** -0.00396*** -0.00293*** -0.00353*** -0.00361*** -0.00372*** -0.00410***
(0.000739) (0.000702) (0.000758) (0.000778) (0.000659) (0.000728) (0.000788) (0.000812) (0.000829)
Observations 37,806 36,950 36,058 35,164 34,291 33,503 32,743 31,997 31,253
R-squared 0.019 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021
Goods FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Seasonality YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
AIC -123466 -124685 -121932 -118911 -116218 -113645 -110946 -108199 -105873
BIC -123312 -124523 -121762 -118733 -116032 -113452 -110744 -107989 -105656
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.2: Alternative Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Price Price Price Price Price Price Price Price
Exchange Rate 0.0454* 0.0595* 0.0445* 0.0446* 0.0438* 0.0580* 0.0584* 0.0567*
(0.0254) (0.0303) (0.0255) (0.0253) (0.0255) (0.0303) (0.0305) (0.0305)
Exchange Rate, Lag 1 -0.0363 -0.0410 -0.0382 -0.0367 -0.0386 -0.0421 -0.0435 -0.0446
(0.0278) (0.0284) (0.0289) (0.0277) (0.0289) (0.0283) (0.0294) (0.0293)
Inflation 0.351*** 0.400*** 0.325*** 0.350*** 0.325*** 0.400*** 0.374*** 0.374***
(0.0737) (0.0857) (0.0683) (0.0740) (0.0684) (0.0860) (0.0801) (0.0803)
Constant 0.000269* 0.000201*** -0.00227*** -0.00122*** -0.00361*** -0.00138*** -0.00212** -0.00377***
(0.000136) (2.98e-05) (0.000746) (0.000261) (0.000702) (0.000302) (0.000941) (0.000877)
Observations 36,950 25,082 36,950 36,950 36,950 25,082 25,082 25,082
R-squared 0.017 0.023 0.020 0.018 0.021 0.024 0.027 0.028
AIC -124572 -85889 -124656 -124599 -124685 -85919 -85962 -85994
BIC -124538 -85832 -124486 -124574 -124523 -85895 -85775 -85840
Perishability YES YES YES YES
Seasonality YES YES YES YES
Goods FE YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.3: ERPT in Different Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
VARIABLES Price Price Price Price Price Price Price Price Price Price Price
Exchange Rate -0.0354 -0.108 -0.00401 -0.0503 0.231** 0.379** -0.0778 -0.172 -0.0199 0.116 0.290**
(0.121) (0.0730) (0.111) (0.0556) (0.0926) (0.157) (0.155) (0.190) (0.151) (0.0970) (0.135)
Inflation 0.0353 0.159* 0.116*** 0.358*** 0.397** 0.476*** 0.517*** 0.397*** 0.448*** 0.428*** 0.126
(0.0736) (0.0882) (0.0375) (0.107) (0.162) (0.121) (0.147) (0.136) (0.116) (0.128) (0.115)
Constant -0.0183 0.000395 -0.00127 -0.00986*** -0.000845 -0.00252 -0.00808*** -0.00486 0.00223 0.000920 -0.00849***
(0.0126) (0.00217) (0.00114) (0.00332) (0.00209) (0.00226) (0.00191) (0.00287) (0.00198) (0.00202) (0.00286)
Observations 3,173 2,516 3,102 3,156 3,478 3,389 3,973 3,918 3,886 4,209 3,006
R-squared 0.010 0.016 0.022 0.044 0.030 0.040 0.029 0.031 0.022 0.033 0.051
Goods FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Seasonality YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
AIC -8233 -10244 -11867 -10174 -11732 -10704 -13019 -12825 -13065 -14814 -9097
BIC -8124 -10139 -11758 -10071 -11621 -10593 -12912 -12712 -12953 -14700 -9006
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.4: ERPT: Threshold on Exchange Rate Changes, All Price Changes.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Price Price Price Price
Inflation 0.358*** 0.335***
(0.0745) (0.0694)
High Exchange Rate Changes 0.0971*** 0.0988*** 0.112*** 0.110***
(0.0362) (0.0368) (0.0383) (0.0389)
Low Exchange Rate Changes -0.00804 0.000435 -0.0266 -0.0166
(0.0381) (0.0391) (0.0382) (0.0392)
Constant -0.000311 -6.63e-05 -0.00460*** -0.00468***
(0.000200) (0.000213) (0.000824) (0.000821)
Observations 37,806 37,806 37,806 37,806
R-squared 0.000 0.016 0.007 0.019
AIC -122766 -123365 -122978 -123467
BIC -122740 -123331 -122824 -123305
Goods FE YES YES
Seasonality YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Threshold value at 0.55%. High and low exchange rate changes correspond
to exchange rate changes above and below the threshold value. No restrictions on
price changes.
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Table 3.5: ERPT with Threshold on Exchange Rate Changes, Nonzero Price
Changes.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Price Price Price Price
Inflation 1.862*** 1.680***
(0.143) (0.101)
High Exchange Rate Changes 0.916** 1.168** 1.032** 1.201**
(0.400) (0.462) (0.452) (0.494)
Low Exchange Rate Changes -0.0527 0.108 -0.236 -0.0329
(0.407) (0.361) (0.368) (0.342)
Constant -0.00280 -0.00250 -0.0452*** -0.0384**
(0.00214) (0.00215) (0.0165) (0.0152)
Observations 3,989 3,989 3,989 3,989
R-squared 0.001 0.084 0.057 0.116
AIC -3981 -4322 -4182 -4434
BIC -3963 -4297 -4069 -4315
Goods FE YES YES
Seasonality YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Threshold value at 0.55%. High and low exchange rate changes correspond
to exchange rate changes above and below the threshold value. Only nonzero price
changes.
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Table 3.6: ERPT with Threshold on Frequency of Price Changes, All Price Changes.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Price Price Price Price
Inflation 0.358*** 0.335***
(0.0745) (0.0694)
Exchange Rate x High Frequency 0.0860*** 0.0928*** 0.0856*** 0.0905***
(0.0239) (0.0245) (0.0241) (0.0245)
Exchange Rate x Low Frequency -0.0292 -0.0278 -0.0327 -0.0307
(0.0318) (0.0331) (0.0319) (0.0328)
Constant -9.05e-05 0.000140 -0.00433*** -0.00445***
(0.000124) (0.000141) (0.000741) (0.000745)
Observations 37,806 37,806 37,806 37,806
R-squared 0.000 0.016 0.007 0.019
AIC -122767 -123366 -122978 -123468
BIC -122741 -123332 -122824 -123305
Goods FE YES YES
Seasonality YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Threshold value at 3.12%. High and low frequency of price changes correspond
to a frequency of price change above and below the threshold value. No restrictions
on price changes.
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Table 3.7: ERPT with Threshold on Frequency of Price Changes, Nonzero Price
Changes.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Price Price Price Price
Inflation 1.856*** 1.674***
(0.142) (0.0993)
Exchange Rate x High Frequency 0.619*** 0.768*** 0.607** 0.732**
(0.221) (0.278) (0.272) (0.317)
Exchange Rate x Low Frequency -1.504 -0.456 -1.736 -0.712
(1.759) (1.554) (1.746) (1.521)
Constant -0.000940 -0.000462 -0.0428*** -0.0361**
(0.00130) (0.00135) (0.0156) (0.0143)
Observations 3,989 3,989 3,989 3,989
R-squared 0.002 0.083 0.058 0.115
AIC -3983 -4321 -4183 -4432
BIC -3964 -4296 -4070 -4313
Goods FE YES YES
Seasonality YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Threshold value at 3.12%. High and low frequency of price changes correspond
to a frequency of price change above and below the threshold value. Only nonzero
price changes.
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Table 3.8: ERPT with Threshold on Storage Potential, All Prices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Price Price Price Price
Inflation 0.358*** 0.335***
(0.0745) (0.0694)
Exchange Rate x Low Storage Pot. 0.0336 0.0377 0.0326 0.0356
(0.0258) (0.0269) (0.0262) (0.0269)
Exchange Rate x High Storage Pot. 0.0899** 0.0980** 0.0870** 0.0940**
(0.0367) (0.0379) (0.0356) (0.0361)
Constant -8.81e-05 0.000142 -0.00425*** -0.00436***
(0.000124) (0.000140) (0.000738) (0.000741)
Observations 37,806 37,806 37,806 37,806
R-squared 0.000 0.016 0.006 0.019
AIC -122764 -123363 -122975 -123464
BIC -122739 -123329 -122821 -123302
Goods FE YES YES
Seasonality YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Threshold value at 10 weeks. Goods with Low Storage Potential are those with a storage potential that is less than or
equal to the threshold value, while goods with High Storage Potential are those with a storage potential that is strictly
greater than the threshold value. No restrictions on price changes.
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Table 3.9: ERPT with Threshold on Storage Potential, Nonzero Prices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Price Price Price Price
Inflation 1.862*** 1.682***
(0.141) (0.0989)
Exchange Rate x Low Storage Pot. 0.325 0.513* 0.266 0.432
(0.223) (0.259) (0.247) (0.280)
Exchange Rate x High Storage Pot. 1.132* 1.441** 1.289** 1.553**
(0.606) (0.696) (0.507) (0.647)
Constant -0.000901 -0.000423 -0.0428*** -0.0361**
(0.00127) (0.00134) (0.0156) (0.0143)
Observations 3,989 3,989 3,989 3,989
R-squared 0.001 0.083 0.057 0.115
AIC -3980 -4321 -4181 -4433
BIC -3962 -4296 -4067 -4314
Goods FE YES YES
Seasonality YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Threshold value at 10 weeks. Goods with Low Storage Potential are those with a storage potential that is less than or
equal to the threshold value, while goods with High Storage Potential are those with a storage potential that is strictly
greater than the threshold value. Only nonzero price changes.
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Table 3.10: ERPT and Thresholds - Summary Table
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Figure 3.1: Exchange Rate over Time: Turkish Lira per U.S. Dollar
Figure 3.2: Fixed Effects: Exchanges Rates Changes vs Ramadan
Note: Observations of daily log exchange rate changes in Ramadan vs non-Ramadan
days.
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Figure 3.3: Fixed Effects: Exchanges Rates Changes vs Weekdays
Note: Observations of daily log exchange rate changes each weekday.
Figure 3.4: Fixed Effects: Exchanges Rates Changes vs Months
Note: Observations of daily log exchange rate changes each month.
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Figure 3.5: Fixed Effects: Exchanges Rates Changes vs Years
Note: Observations of daily log exchange rate changes each year.
Figure 3.6: Fixed Effects: Price Changes vs Ramadan
Note: Observations of daily log price changes in Ramadan vs non-Ramadan days.
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Figure 3.7: Fixed Effects: Price Changes vs Weekdays
Note: Observations of daily log price changes each weekday.
Figure 3.8: Fixed Effects: Price Changes vs Months
Note: Observations of daily log price changes each month.
147
Figure 3.9: Fixed Effects: Price Changes vs Years
Note: Observations of daily log price changes each year.
Figure 3.10: Threshold Analysis: Exchange Rate Change
Note: Residual Sum of Squares (RSS) over all possible values of the exchange rate
change threshold.
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Figure 3.11: Threshold Analysis: Frequency of Price Change
Note: Residual Sum of Squares (RSS) over all possible values of the frequency of
price change threshold.
Figure 3.12: Threshold Analysis: Storage Potential
Note: Residual Sum of Squares (RSS) over all possible values of the storage potential
threshold.
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APPENDICES
A Chapter 1 Appendix
Figures for all countries
Figure A.1: Inflation Targets, Expected Inflation, and Observed Inflation.
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Note: One year ahead inflation expectations data available for EM7 only: Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Guatemala, Peru, Mexico, and Turkey. Inflation targets are those announced
by each country’s Central Bank. Year-on-year inflation refers to the CPI inflation rate
from the corresponding quarter the previous year.
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Figure A.2: Inflation Expectations Gap and Observed Inflation Gap.
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Note: The figure plots the credibility measures CREDEGap and CREDY oY . The
CREDEGap measure is plotted only for countries for which inflation expectations data
is available; i.e. for EM7 countries only: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico,
Peru, and Turkey.
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Figure A.3: Credibility Index: CREDLLR
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Note: CREDLLR is an expectations-based credibility measure as proposed by Levieuge
et al. (2018). The index falls between 0 (implying total loss of credibility) to 1 (implying
full credibility). CREDLLR is plotted only for countries for which inflation expectations
data is available; i.e. for EM7 countries only: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico,
Peru, and Turkey.
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Figure A.4: Commodity Prices Indexes: Country-specific and Broader Indexes
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Note: The figure displays the country-specific commodity export price index, CMXi,t,
along with a set of not-country-specific price indexes for broad categories of commodities.
All indexes are set to 100 in 2005Q1.
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Figure A.5: Commodity Prices and the Exchange Rate.
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of the nominal exchange rate. Both indexes are set to 100 in 2005Q1.
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Extended IRFs
Figure A.6: Foreign Exchange Intervention: FXIRAi,t
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Note: Dynamic response to a 10 percent commodity export price shock for different levels
of foreign exchange intervention. Using FXIRAi,t . Countries: Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and Turkey.
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Figure A.7: Foreign Exchange Intervention: FXILY Si,t
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Note: Dynamic response to a 10 percent commodity export price shock for different levels
of foreign exchange intervention. Using FXILY Si,t Countries: Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and Turkey.
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Figure A.8: Central Bank Credibility: CREDEGapi,t
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Note: Dynamic response to a 10 percent commodity export price shock for different levels
of central bank credibility. Using the CREDEGapi,t credibility measure. Countries: Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and Turkey.
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Figure A.9: Central Bank Credibility: CREDLLRi,t
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Note: Dynamic response to a 10 percent commodity export price shock for different levels
of central bank credibility. Using the CREDLLRi,t credibility measure. Countries: Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and Turkey.
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Figure A.10: FXI and Central Bank Credibility: FXIRAi,t and CRED
LLR
i,t
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Note: Response to a 10 percent Commodity Export Price Shock. Using FXIRAi,t and CRED
LLR
i,t credibility measure. Countries:
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and Turkey.
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Figure A.11: FXI and Central Bank Credibility: FXILY Si,t and CRED
EGap
i,t
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Note: Response to a 10 percent Commodity Export Price Shock. Using FXILY Si,t and CRED
EGap
i,t credibility measure. Countries:
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and Turkey.
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Figure A.12: FXI and Central Bank Credibility: FXILY Si,t and CRED
LLR
i,t
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Note: Response to a 10 percent Commodity Export Price Shock. Using FXILY Si,t and CRED
LLR
i,t credibility measure. Countries:
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and Turkey.
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Figure A.13: Central Bank Credibility: CREDY oYi,t
−
5
−
4
−
3
−
2
−
1
Ex
ch
an
ge
 R
at
e
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
High Credibility
−
5
−
4
−
3
−
2
−
1
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Low Credibility
−
.
5
0
.
5
1
1.
5
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Difference (High − Low)
−
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
Po
lic
y 
Ra
te
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
−
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
−
.
6
−
.
4
−
.
2
0
.
2
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
−
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
CP
I I
nf
la
tio
n
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
−
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
−
.
4
−
.
3
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
G
DP
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
−
.
3
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
−
1
0
1
2
3
In
ve
st
m
en
t
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
−
1
0
1
2
3
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
−
1.
5
−
1
−
.
5
0
.
5
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
68 per. C.I. 90 per. C.I. Point est.
Note: Dynamic response to a 10 percent commodity export price shock for different levels
of central bank credibility. Using the CREDY oYi,t credibility measure. Countries: Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and Turkey.
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Figure A.14: Central Bank Credibility: CRED1Qi,t
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Note: Dynamic response to a 10 percent commodity export price shock for different levels
of central bank credibility. Using the CRED1Qi,t credibility measure. Countries: Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and Turkey.
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Figure A.15: Central Bank Credibility: CREDY oYi,t , Extended Sample
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Note: Dynamic response to a 10 percent commodity export price shock for different levels
of central bank credibility. Using the CREDY oYi,t credibility measure. Countries: Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Ro-
mania, Thailand, and Turkey.
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Figure A.16: Central Bank Credibility: CRED1Qi,t , Extended Sample
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Note: Dynamic response to a 10 percent commodity export price shock for different levels
of central bank credibility. Using the CRED1Qi,t credibility measure. Countries: Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Ro-
mania, Thailand, and Turkey.
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Figure A.17: FXI and Central Bank Credibility: FXIRAi,t and CRED
Y oY
i,t
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Note: Response to a 10 percent Commodity Export Price Shock. Using FXIRAi,t and CRED
Y oY
i,t credibility measure. Countries:
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Thailand, and Turkey.
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Figure A.18: FXI and Central Bank Credibility: FXIRAi,t and CRED
1Q
i,t
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Note: Response to a 10 percent Commodity Export Price Shock. Using FXIRAi,t and CRED
1Q
i,t credibility measure. Countries:
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Thailand, and Turkey.
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Figure A.19: FXI and Central Bank Credibility: FXILY Si,t and CRED
1Q
i,t
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Note: Response to a 10 percent Commodity Export Price Shock. Using FXILY Si,t and CRED
1Q
i,t credibility measure. Countries:
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Thailand, and Turkey.
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Data
Table A.1: Countries and Summary Statistics
IT Adoption Date FXIRA FXILY S CREDY oY CREDEGap CREDLLR
Brazil 1999 -0.04 0.11 1.90 1.58 0.51
Chile 1999 0.18 3.90 0.22 0.12 0.91
Colombia 1999 0.25 3.37 0.18 0.33 0.85
Guatemala 2005 0.43 2.11 0.39 0.86 0.59
Hungary 2001 0.29 4.32 0.62 . .
Indonesia 2005 0.26 4.24 1.50 . .
Mexico 2001 0.14 3.89 0.83 0.74 0.68
Peru 2002 0.51 9.47 0.59 0.51 0.78
Philippines 2002 1.03 7.18 -0.28 . .
Poland 1999 0.23 3.17 0.03 . .
Romania 2005 0.19 4.65 0.59 . .
Thailand 2000 1.09 9.86 0.36 . .
Turkey 2006 0.29 3.72 2.70 1.79 0.32
Note: Column “IT Adoption Date” displays the year in which the inflation targeting framework was adopted in each country. The
remaining columns show the average of the given variable for each country. All these are in percent, except for the column for
CREDLLR which shows an index.
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Table A.2: Variable Definitions and Data Sources
Variable
Name
Definition Source
FXI FXI proxy, computed as the
change of net reserves, normal-
ized by the lagged monetary
base . Net reserves are calcu-
lated as the difference between
net foreign assets and central
government deposits at the Cen-
tral Bank.
See underlying variables’
sources below.
NFA Net foreign assets at the Central
Bank.
IFS’s Central Bank Survey:
Net foreign assets series.
Gov. Deposits Government deposits at the
Central Bank.
IFS’s Central Bank Survey:
Liabilities to central govern-
ment series.
NER Nominal Exchange Rate. Do-
mestic currency per U.S. Dollar.
IFS
Money Base Monetary base. IFS’s Central Bank Survey.
CRED Inflation gap from target, com-
puted as the difference between
the expected or realized CPI
inflation rate (depending on
the measure) and the Central
Bank’s target.
Inflation targets obtained
from Central Bank’s web-
sites. Inflation expecta-
tions data obtained from
surveys of inflation expecta-
tions conducted by central
banks. See below for CPI.
CPI Consumer price index. IFS. FRED database for
Chile.
CMX Commodity export price index. Gruss (2014)
MPR Monetary policy-related inter-
est rate. Percent per annum.
IFS. Central Bank website
for Hungary, Peru, Poland,
and Romania.
INV Real gross fixed capital forma-
tion, seasonally adjusted using
ARIMA X-12.
OECD’ Quarterly National
Accounts database. IFS
for Guatemala, Indonesia,
Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Romania, Thailand, and
Turkey.
GDP Real gross domestic product,
seasonally adjusted.
IFS. OECD’s Quarterly Na-
tional Accounts database
for Colombia and Mexico.
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B Chapter 2 Appendix
Aggregate Output, employment, and price dispersion
Note that equilibrium in the Home labor market requires
Nt =
∫ 1
0
Nt(j)dj =
∫ 1
0
Yt(j)
Zt
dj =
Yt
Zt
∫ 1
0
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−θ
dj (B.1)
Let
dt =
∫ 1
0
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−θ
dj (B.2)
Then we get
Nt =
Yt
Zt
dt (B.3)
Or equivalently
Yt =
Zt
dt
Nt (B.4)
Schmitt-Grohe et al. (2007) show that dt ≥ 1 and it is equal to 1 only if all the
prices are the same, that is, only if there is no price dispersion. Log-linearizing this
we get
yˆt = nˆt + zˆt − dˆt (B.5)
where dˆt is a measures of price dispersion within the Home economy. As pointed
out before, the literature usually log-linearizes the equilibrium conditions around a
zero inflation steady state. In that case it can easily be shown that dˆt = 0. However,
when the economy exhibits trend inflation this measure is not necessarily zero and
in fact evolves according to
dˆt = θαpi
θ−1
H
[
piH − 1
1− αpiθ−1H
]
pˆiH,t + αpi
θ
H dˆt−1 (B.6)
As discussed in Ascari and Sbordone (2014) and Ascari (2004), price dispersion
is akin to a negative aggregate productivity shock since it increases the amount
of labor required to produce a given level of output, as can be seen in (B.4). In
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the main text, the model assumed indivisible labor. This assumption makes price
dispersion irrelevant for the dynamics of output and inflation, as noted by Ascari
and Sbordone (2014). That is, when labor is not indivisible, i.e. when the Frisch
elasticity is not zero, price dispersion enters the NKPC via its interaction with Frisch
elasticity. This is not the case in our model. In a future iteration of the paper we
will relax the invisible labor assumption.
Flexible Price Equilibrium and The Output Gap
The steady state level of output Y¯ depends on steady state inflation piH . Appendix
B shows that in the steady state all inflation rates are the same. That is,
p¯i = pi∗H = piH = piF = pi
∗
F = p¯i
∗ (B.7)
Accordingly, we can say that the steady state level of output Y¯ depends on
steady state inflation piH = p¯i. Let Y¯ (p¯i) denote the steady state level of output for
a given level of trend inflation p¯i. Then, in general, let yˆt be
yˆt = log Yt − Y¯ (p¯i) (B.8)
Define the output gap, ygap,t, as the log-deviation of current output from the
output that would arise in a flexible-price environment, namely the natural level
of output Y nt . Indeed, the ygap,t is a measure of the nominal distortion implied by
sticky prices.
ygap,t = log Yt − log Y nt (B.9)
No price rigidities implies α = 0. From the above equations one can immediately
see that when α = 0 we get that Xt = 1 for all t. Furthermore, dt = 1 as well. Now,
the steady state output under flexible prices Y¯flex, becomes
Y¯flex =
θ − 1
θ
µZ¯
1− ω (YFss)
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and clearly Y¯flex does not depend on trend inflation. As noted in Ascari and
Sbordone (2014), this flexible price steady state is equal to the zero inflation steady
state (ZISS). Therefore, Y¯flex is also the steady state output under ZISS. That is,
under zero inflation, i.e. p¯i = 1 we have that
Y¯flex = Y¯ (1) (B.10)
That is, the ZISS is equivalent to the flexible price steady state. Taking into
account shocks the natural level of output is
Y nt =
θ − 1
θ
µ
(1− ω)Zt (B.11)
Taking ratios of Y nt and Y¯flex we get
Y nt
Y¯flex
=
θ−1
θ
µ
(1−ω)Zt
θ−1
θ
µZ¯
1−ω
=
Zt
Z¯
(B.12)
Let yˆnt = log Y
n
t − log Y¯flex denote the log-deviations of the natural output level
from its steady state. It follows that
yˆnt = log Y
n
t − log Y¯flex = log
Zt
Z¯
= zˆt (B.13)
The natural level of output deviates from its steady state level when there are
productivity shocks. Hence, the output gap in a ZISS (i.e. when pˆi = 1) is
ygap,t = log Yt − Y nt ± log Y¯flex
= log Yt − log Y¯flex − Y nt + log Y¯flex
= log Yt − log Y¯ (1)− Y nt + log Y¯flex
= yˆt − log Y nt + log Y¯flex
= yˆt − (log Y nt − log Y¯flex)
= yˆt − yˆnt
= yˆt − zˆt (B.14)
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Notice from (Yss) that when trend inflation is not zero and/or prices are not
flexible, the steady state level of output will generally depend on the trend inflation
level. In the general case, we can decompose yˆt into
yˆt = log Yt − Y¯ (p¯i)
= (log Yt − log Y nt ) + (log Y nt − log Y¯flex) + (log Y¯flex − log Y¯ (p¯i))
= ygap,t + yˆ
n
t − y˜
= ygap,t + zˆt − y˜ (B.15)
where we set y˜ = log Y¯ (p¯i)− log Y¯flex, which is also equal to log Y¯ (p¯i)− log Y¯ (1)
As Ascari and Sbordone (2014) point out, Y˜ is the deviation of the level of
output associated with steady state inflation p¯i from the level of long-run output
under flexible prices (or when steady state inflation is zero). Therefore, in general
yˆt = ygap,t + zˆt − y˜ (B.16)
or alternatively
ygap,t = yˆt − zˆt + y˜ (B.17)
We can further obtain an expression for y˜. Simply, take the ratio of (Yss) and
(YFss)
Y¯ (p¯i)
Y¯flex
=
θ−1
θ
(1−αβpiθH)µZ¯
(1−αβpiθ−1H )(1−ω)
X¯
θ−1
θ
µZ¯
1−ω
=
(1− αβpiθH)
(1− αβpiθ−1H )
[
1− αpiθ−1H
1− α
] 1
1−θ
(B.18)
then
log
(
Y¯ (p¯i)
Y¯flex
)
= log Y¯ (p¯i)− log Y¯flex = log
(
1− αβpiθH
1− αβpiθ−1H
)
+
1
1− θ log
(
1− αpiθ−1H
1− α
)
(B.19)
so
y˜ = log
(
1− αβpiθH
1− αβpiθ−1H
)
+
1
1− θ log
(
1− αpiθ−1H
1− α
)
(B.20)
Clearly, under flexible prices (when α = 0), or under a zero inflation steady state
(p¯iH = 1) it follows that y˜ = 0.
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Home and Foreign steady state inflation
The definition of CPI inflation is
pit =
Pt
Pt−1
=
(PH,t)
1−γ(PF,t)γ
(PH,t−1)1−γ(PF,t−1)γ
(B.21)
Therefore, in the steady state CPI is equal to
p¯i = (piH)
(1−γ)(piF )γ (B.22)
Now, by definition import inflation is
piF,t =
PF,t
PF,t−1
=
ΞtP
∗
F,tTt
Ξt−1P ∗F,t−1Tt−1
(B.23)
While the nominal exchange rate is non-stationary, changes in the nominal ex-
change rate are. Therefore, in the steady state, this collapses to:
piF = pi
∗
F (B.24)
That is, in the steady state, the inflation rate of imports into the Home economy
is simply the inflation rate of foreign producers. A similar argument for the inflation
rate of imported goods into the Foreign economy implies that
pi∗H = piH (B.25)
Now, the complete asset markets assumption implies that β
p¯i
= β
∗
p¯i∗ . Which implies
that in the steady state
p¯i = p¯i∗ (B.26)
Therefore
(piH)
(1−γ)(piF )γ = (pi∗F )
(1−γ∗)(pi∗H)
γ∗ (B.27)
Using eqs. (B.24) and (B.25) in the RHS of eq. (B.27) we have that
(pi∗F )
(1−γ∗)(pi∗H)
γ∗ = (piF )
(1−γ∗)(piH)γ
∗
(B.28)
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Setting the RHS of eq. (B.28) and the LHS of eq. (B.27) equal to each other we
get
pi
(1−γ−γ∗)
H = pi
(1−γ−γ∗)
F (B.29)
which immediately implies that
piH = piF (B.30)
Which means that
pi∗H = piH = piF = pi
∗
F (B.31)
Finally, we have that
p¯i = (piH)
(1−γ)(piF )γ = (piH)(1−γ)(piH)γ = piH (B.32)
All of the above implies that
p¯i = pi∗H = piH = piF = pi
∗
F = p¯i
∗ (B.33)
That is, in the steady state, all inflation rates are the same.
The Complete Linearized Model
Tables (B.1) and (B.2) list all endogenous and exogenous variables in the linear
model, respectively, and give their descriptions. There are 38 endogenous variables:
Home Economy: ygap,t, iˆt, pˆiH,t, zˆt, ψˆt, yˆ
n
t , yˆt, sˆt, τˆt, pˆit, ξˆt, qˆt, nˆt, dˆt, wˆt, cˆt, cˆH,t,
cˆF,t, rˆt, νˆt
Foreign Economy: y∗gap,t, iˆ
∗
t , pˆi
∗
F,t, zˆ
∗
t , ψˆ
∗
t , yˆ
∗n
t , yˆ
∗
t , sˆ
∗
t , τˆ
∗
t , pˆi
∗
t , nˆ
∗
t , dˆ
∗
t , wˆ
∗
t , cˆ
∗
t , cˆ
∗
F,t,
cˆ∗H,t, rˆ
∗
t , νˆ
∗
t
6 Exogenous variables: εzt , ε
z∗
t , ε
τ
t , ε
τ∗
t , ε
ν
t , ε
ν∗
t
Parameters: β, α, θ, p¯i = piH , p¯i
∗ = pi∗F , γ, γ
∗, ρi, ρi∗ , ρν , ρν∗ , ρz, ρz∗ , ρτ , ρτ∗
Constant: y˜, y˜∗
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Table B.1: Endogenous Variables
Home Foreign Description
ygap,t y
∗
gap,t Output Gap
yˆt yˆ
∗
t Output
yˆnt yˆ
∗n
t Natural Output
pˆit pˆi
∗
t CPI Inflation
pˆiH,t pˆi
∗
F,t Domestic Inflation
ψˆt ψˆ
∗
t NKPC Aux variable
sˆt sˆ
∗
t Terms of Trade
nˆt nˆ
∗
t Employment
dˆt dˆ
∗
t Domestic Price Dispersion
cˆt cˆ
∗
t Consumption
cˆH,t cˆ
∗
H,t Consumption of Home-produced goods
cˆF,t cˆ
∗
F,t Consumption of Foreign-produced goods
wˆt wˆ
∗
t Real Wage Rate
rˆt rˆ
∗
t Real Interest Rate
iˆt iˆ
∗
t Nominal Interest Rate
zˆt zˆ
∗
t AR(1) Technology shock process
νˆt νˆ
∗
t AR(1) Monetary Policy shock process
τˆt τˆ
∗
t AR(1) Trade shock process
ξˆt Nominal Exchange Rate
qˆt Real Exchange Rate
Table B.2: Exogenous Variables
Home Foreign Description
εzt ε
z∗
t Technology shock
ετt ε
τ∗
t Trade costs shock
ενt ε
ν∗
t Monetary policy shock
ygap,t = Et[ygap,t+1]− (̂it − Et[piH,t+1]) + Et[∆zˆt+1] (IS)
y∗gap,t = Et[y
∗
gap,t+1]− (̂i∗t − Et[pi∗F,t+1]) + Et[∆zˆ∗t+1] (IS*)
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pˆiH,t = η1(ygap,t − y˜) + η2Et[pˆiH,t+1] + η3Et[ψˆt+1] (B.34)
ψˆt = (1− αβpiθH)(ygap,t − y˜) + (αβpiθH)
[
θEt[pˆiH,t+1] + Et[ψˆt+1]
]
(B.35)
with η1, η2, and η3 defined as
η1 =
(1− αβpiθH)(1− αpiθ−1H )
αpiθ−1H
η2 = β
[
1 + θ(piH − 1)(1− αpiθ−1H )
]
η3 = β(piH − 1)(1− αpiθ−1H ) (B.36)
and
y˜ = log
(
1− αβpiθH
1− αβpiθ−1H
)
+
1
1− θ log
(
1− αpiθ−1H
1− α
)
(B.37)
pˆi∗F,t = η
∗
1(y
∗
gap,t − y˜∗) + η∗2Et[pˆi∗F,t+1] + η∗3Et[ψˆ∗t+1] (B.38)
ψˆ∗t = (1− αβ(pi∗F )θ)(y∗gap,t − y˜∗) + (αβ(pi∗F )θ)
[
θEt[pˆi
∗
F,t+1] + Et[ψˆ
∗
t+1]
]
(B.39)
and where η∗1, η
∗
2, and η
∗
3 are defined as
η∗1 =
(1− αβ(pi∗F )θ)(1− α(pi∗F )θ−1
α(pi∗F )θ−1
η∗2 = β
[
1 + θ(pi∗F − 1)(1− α(pi∗F )θ−1)
]
η∗3 = β(pi
∗
F − 1)(1− α(pi∗F )θ−1) (B.40)
and
y˜∗ = log
(
1− αβ(pi∗F )θ
1− αβ(pi∗F )θ−1
)
+
1
1− θ log
(
1− α(pi∗F )θ−1
1− α
)
(B.41)
yˆnt = zˆt yˆ
∗n
t = zˆ
∗
t (YNAT)
ygap,t = yˆt − zˆt + y˜ y∗gap,t = yˆ∗t − zˆ∗t + y˜∗ (YGAP)
yˆt = yˆ
∗
t + sˆt − τˆt yˆ∗t = yˆt + sˆ∗t − τˆ ∗t (B.42)
pˆit = pˆiH,t + γ∆sˆt pˆi
∗
t = pˆi
∗
F,t + γ
∗∆sˆ∗t (B.43)
∆sˆt = pˆi
∗
F,t − pˆiH,t + ∆τˆt + ∆ξt (B.44)
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qˆt = (1− γ − γ∗)sˆt + γ∗τˆ ∗t − (1− γ∗)τˆt (B.45)
yˆt = nˆt + zˆt − dˆt yˆ∗t = nˆ∗t + zˆ∗t − dˆ∗t (B.46)
dˆt = θαpi
θ−1
H
[
piH − 1
1− αpiθ−1H
]
pˆiH,t + αpi
θ
H dˆt−1 (B.47)
dˆ∗t = θα(pi
∗
F )
θ−1
[
pi∗F − 1
1− α(pi∗F )θ−1
]
pˆi∗F,t + α(pi
∗
F )
θdˆ∗t−1 (B.48)
ŷt = ĉt + γŝt ŷ
∗
t = ĉ
∗
t + γ
∗ŝ∗t (B.49)
wˆt = cˆt wˆ
∗
t = cˆ
∗
t (B.50)
cˆH,t = cˆt + γsˆt cˆF,t = cˆt − (1− γ)sˆt (B.51)
cˆ∗F,t = cˆ
∗
t + γ
∗sˆ∗t cˆ
∗
H,t = cˆ
∗
t − (1− γ∗)sˆ∗t (B.52)
rˆt = iˆt − Et[pˆiH,t+1] rˆ∗t = iˆ∗t − Et[pˆi∗F,t+1] (B.53)
iˆt = ρiiˆt−1 + (1− ρi)(φpipˆiH,t + φyyˆt) + νt (B.54)
iˆ∗t = ρi∗ iˆ
∗
t−1 + (1− ρi∗)(φpi∗pˆi∗F,t + φy∗ yˆ∗t ) + ν∗t (B.55)
zt = ρzzt−1 + εzt z
∗
t = ρz∗z
∗
t−1 + ε
z∗
t (B.56)
τt = ρττt−1 + ετt τ
∗
t = ρτ∗τ
∗
t−1 + ε
τ∗
t (B.57)
νt = ρννt−1 + ενt ν
∗
t = ρν∗ν
∗
t−1 + ε
ν∗
t (B.58)
The Complete Non-linear Model
36 Endogenous variables:
Home Economy: Ct, CH,t, CF,t, pit, piH,t, Xt, ψt, φt, MCt, Yt, wt, Nt, dt, it, St,
Qt, Ξt, Zt, Tt
Foreign Economy: C∗t , C
∗
F,t, C
∗
H,t, pi
∗
t , pi
∗
F,t, X
∗
t , ψ
∗
t , φ
∗
t , MC
∗
t , Y
∗
t , w
∗
t , N
∗
t , d
∗
t , i
∗
t ,
S∗t , Z
∗
t , T
∗
t
6 Exogenous variables: εzt , ε
z∗
t , ε
τ
t , ε
τ∗
t , ε
ν
t , ε
ν∗
t
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Parameters: β, α, θ, p¯i = piH , p¯i
∗ = pi∗F , γ, γ
∗, µ, µ∗, ω, ω∗
1
(1 + it)
= βEt
[
Ct
Ct+1pit+1
]
1
(1 + i∗t )
= βEt
[
C∗t
C∗t+1pi
∗
t+1
]
(Euler)
1 = αpiθ−1H,t + (1− α)X1−θt 1 = α(pi∗F,t)θ−1 + (1− α)(X∗t )1−θ (APD)
Xt =
P˜H,t
PH,t
=
(
θ
θ − 1
)
ψt
φt
X∗t =
P˜ ∗F,t
P ∗F,t
=
(
θ
θ − 1
)
ψ∗t
φ∗t
(OP)
ψt = MCt + (αβ)Et[pi
θ
H,t+1ψt+1] ψ
∗
t = MC
∗
t + (αβ)Et[(pi
∗
F,t+1)
θψ∗t+1] (PSI)
φt = 1 + (αβ)Et[pi
θ−1
H,t+1φt+1] φ
∗
t = 1 + (αβ)Et[(pi
∗
F,t+1)
θ−1φ∗t+1] (PHI)
MCt =
(1− ω)
µ
Yt
Zt
MC∗t =
(1− ω∗)
µ∗
Y ∗t
Z∗t
(MC)
wt =
Wt
Pt
= Ct w
∗
t =
W ∗t
P ∗t
= C∗t (RW)
Nt =
Yt
Zt
dt N
∗
t =
Y ∗t
Z∗t
d∗t (LO)
dt = (1− α)X−θt + αpiθH,tdt−1 d∗t = (1− α)(X∗t )−θ + α(pi∗F,t)θd∗t−1 (PD)
Yt = CtS
γ
t µ Y
∗
t = C
∗
t (S
∗
t )
γ∗µ∗t (MKT)
pit = piH,t
(
St
St−1
)γ
pi∗t = pi
∗
F,t
(
S∗t
S∗t−1
)γ∗
(CPITOT)
Yt = Y
∗
t
St
Tt
µ
µ∗
(YY)
Ct = C
∗
tQt (RS)
CH,t = (1− γ)Sγt Ct CF,t = γ
Ct
S1−γt
(CHCF)
C∗F,t = (1− γ∗)(S∗t )γ
∗
C∗t C
∗
H,t = γ
∗ C
∗
t
(S∗t )(1−γ
∗) (CHCFstar)
Qt = (St)
(1−γ−γ∗) (T
∗
t )
γ∗
(Tt)(1−γ
∗) (RER)
Et
[
β
Ct
Ct+1pit+1
(1 + it)
]
= Et
[
β
Ct
Ct+1pit+1
(1 + i∗t )(Ξt+1/Ξt)
]
(UIRP)(
1 + it
1 + i¯
)
=
(pit
p¯i
)φpi (Yt
Y¯
)φy
eνt
(
1 + i∗t
1 + i¯∗
)
=
(
pi∗t
p¯i∗
)φ∗pi (Y ∗t
Y¯ ∗
)φ∗y
eν
∗
t (B.59)
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zt = ρzzt−1 + εzt (B.60)
z∗t = ρz∗z
∗
t−1 + ε
z∗
t (B.61)
τt = ρττt−1 + ετt (B.62)
τ ∗t = ρτ∗τ
∗
t−1 + ε
τ∗
t (B.63)
νt = ρννt−1 + ενt (B.64)
ν∗t = ρν∗ν
∗
t−1 + ε
ν∗
t (B.65)
The Steady State
Assume that in the steady state T¯ = T¯ ∗, and Z¯ = Z¯∗. Given the fundamental
parameters, the steady state is solved in this sequence
p¯i
β
= 1 + i
p¯i∗
β
= 1 + i∗ (Eulerss)
X¯ =
[
1− αpiθ−1H
1− α
] 1
1−θ
X¯∗ =
[
1− α(pi∗F )θ−1
1− α
] 1
1−θ
(OPss)
d¯ =
1− α
1− αpiθH
X¯θ d¯∗ =
1− α
1− α(pi∗F )θ
(X¯∗)θ (PDss)
Y¯ =
θ − 1
θ
(1− αβpiθH)µZ¯
(1− αβpiθ−1H )(1− ω)
X¯ Y¯ ∗ =
θ − 1
θ
(1− αβ(pi∗F )θ)µ∗Z¯∗
(1− αβ(pi∗F )θ−1)(1− ω)
X¯∗
(Yss)
N¯ =
Y¯
Z¯
d¯ N¯∗ =
Y¯ ∗
Z¯∗
d¯∗ (Nss)
C¯ =
Y¯
(T¯ )γµ
C¯∗ =
Y¯ ∗
(T¯ ∗)γ∗µ∗
(Css)
w˜ = C¯ w˜∗ = C¯∗ (wss)
φ¯ =
1
1− αβpiθ−1H
φ¯∗ =
1
1− αβ(pi∗F )θ−1
(PHIss)
ψ¯ =
(1− ω)Y¯
(1− αβpiθH)µZ¯
ψ¯∗ =
(1− ω∗)Y¯ ∗
(1− αβ(pi∗F )θ)µ∗Z¯∗
(PSIss)
S¯ = T¯ S¯∗ = T¯ ∗ (Sss)
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C¯H = (1− γ)S¯γC¯ C¯F = γ C¯
S1−γ
(CHCFss)
C¯∗F = (1− γ∗)(S¯∗)γ
∗
C¯∗ C¯∗H = γ
∗ C¯
∗
(S¯∗)(1−γ∗)
(CHCFstarss)
Q¯ = T¯ (γ
∗−γ) (Qss)
C¯ = C¯∗Q¯ (RSss)
Y¯
Y¯ ∗
=
(1− γ + γ∗)Z¯
(1− γ∗ + γ)Z¯∗ (B.66)
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More Impulse Response Functions
Figure B.1: Impulse Response Functions: Trade Costs Shock in the Home Economy, Home Response
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Note: Dynamic response of Home variables to a 1 percent trade costs shock, under different inflation targets.
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Figure B.2: Impulse Response Functions: Trade Costs Shock in the Home Economy, Foreign Response
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Note: Dynamic response of Foreign variables to a 1 percent trade costs shock, under different inflation targets.
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Parametrization
The following parametrization was used to conduct all simulations of the model,
unless noted otherwise in the main text. The Foreign equivalent of each parameter
takes the same values as those listed here, unles noted otherwise in the main text.
Table B.3: Parameterization
Parameter Value Description
γ 0.4 Openness
α 0.75 Calvo parameter
β 0.99 Discount factor
θ 9 Elasticity of substitution
piH 0, 2, 4 Trend inflation at Home
piF 0, 2, 4 Trend inflation at Foreign
φpi 1.5 Inflation feedback Taylor Rule
φy 0.5/4 Output feedback Taylor Rule
ρi 0.8 Inertia in Taylor Rule
ρτ 0.95 Persistence trade costs shock
ρz 0.9 Persistence technology shock
ρν 0 Persistence monetary policy shock
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